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[F]rom a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable about a  
prediction of future criminal conduct.1 
Electronic databases form the nervous system of contemporary criminal justice  
operations. In recent years, their breadth and influence have dramatically  
expanded. . . . The risk of error stemming from these databases is not 
slim. . . . Inaccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic  
information raise grave concerns for individual liberty.2 
INTRODUCTION  
The Fourth Amendment requires “reasonable suspicion” to stop a suspect.3 
As a general matter, police officers develop this suspicion based on infor-
mation they know or activities they observe. Suspicion is individualized to a 
particular person at a particular place.4 Most reasonable suspicion cases 
involve police confronting unknown suspects engaged in observable suspi-
cious activities.5 Essentially, the reasonable suspicion doctrine is based on 
“small data”—discrete facts, limited information, and little knowledge about 
the suspect.6  
But what happens if this small data suspicion is replaced by “big data” 
suspicion?7 What if police can “know” personal information about the 
suspect by searching vast networked information sources? The rise of big 
data technologies offers a challenge to the traditional paradigm of Fourth 
Amendment law. With little effort, officers can now identify most unknown 
 
1 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984). 
2 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (“[W]e have said repeatedly that 
[courts] must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining 
officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”). 
5 See infra Part I. 
6 “Small data,” like “big data,” has no set definition. Generally, small data is thought of as 
solving discrete questions with limited and structured data, and the data are generally controlled 
by one institution. See generally JULES J. BERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF BIG DATA: PREPARING, 
SHARING, AND ANALYZING COMPLEX INFORMATION 1-2 (2013). 
7 See generally Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1920-21 (2013) 
(“‘Big Data’ is shorthand for the combination of a technology and a process. The technology is a 
configuration of information-processing hardware capable of sifting, sorting, and interrogating vast 
quantities of data in very short times. The process involves mining the data for patterns, distilling 
the patterns into predictive analytics, and applying the analytics to new data. Together, the 
technology and the process comprise a technique for converting data flows into a particular, highly 
data-intensive type of knowledge.”); Steve Lohr, Amid the Flood, A Catchphrase Is Born, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2012, at BU3 [hereinafter Lohr, Amid the Flood] (“Big Data is a shorthand label 
that typically means applying the tools of artificial intelligence, like machine learning, to vast new 
troves of data beyond that captured in standard databases.”). 
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suspects, not through their observations, but by accessing a web of information 
containing extensive personal data about suspects.8 New data sources, 
including law enforcement databases, third-party records, and predictive 
analytics, combined with biometric or facial recognition software, allow 
officers access to information with just a few search queries.9 At some point, 
inferences from this personal data (independent of the observation) may 
become sufficiently individualized and predictive to justify the seizure of a 
suspect. The question this Article poses is whether a Fourth Amendment 
stop can be predicated on the aggregation of specific and individualized, but 
otherwise noncriminal, factors. 
For example, suppose police are investigating a series of robberies in a 
particular neighborhood. Arrest photos from a computerized database are 
uploaded in patrol cars. Facial recognition software scans people on the 
street.10 Suddenly there is a match—police recognize a known robber in the 
targeted neighborhood. The suspect’s personal information scrolls across the 
patrol car’s computer screen—prior robbery arrests, prior robbery convictions, 
and a list of criminal associates also involved in robberies.11 The officer then 
searches additional sources of third-party data, including the suspect’s GPS 
location information for the last six hours or license plate records which tie 
the suspect to pawn shop trades close in time to prior robberies.12 The 
police now have particularized, individualized suspicion about a man who is 
not doing anything overtly criminal. Or perhaps predictive software has 
already identified the man as a potential reoffender for this particular type 
of crime.13 Or perhaps software has flagged the suspect’s social media 
comments or other Internet postings that suggest planned criminal or gang 
 
8 See infra Part II. 
9 See infra Part II.  
10 See infra Part II; see also Cop Car with Built-In Face Recognition and Predictive Policing Wins 
UK Award, PRIVACYSOS.ORG (Apr. 4, 2013, 4:10 PM), http://privacysos.org/node/1016, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y7BA-NTV2 (highlighting an example of technological advances in policing).  
11 All of this information is available through a National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 
search. See National Crime Information Center, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/P3CG-M5HF (explaining resources for finding 
information about criminals). This information is further available through police computers 
accessible in police cars and in police stations. See National Crime Information Center Celebrates 40th 
Birthday, GOV’T TECH. ( J an. 22, 2007), http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/103437, archived at 
http://perma.cc/PDL7-JKS6 (discussing how NCIC records have helped law enforcement). 
12 See infra Part II. 
13 Local jurisdictions sometimes create their own “most wanted” lists of locally identified 
criminals. See, e.g., Most Wanted, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/most_wanted 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9P5R-KZRG (showing a local jurisdiction’s 
most wanted list).  
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activity.14 Can this aggregation of individualized information be sufficient 
to justify interfering with a person’s constitutional liberty? 
This Article traces the consequences of a shift from “small data”  
reasonable suspicion, focused on specific, observable actions of unknown 
suspects, to a “big data” reality of an interconnected, information rich world 
of known suspects. With more specific information, police officers on the 
streets may have a stronger predictive sense about the likelihood that they 
are observing criminal activity.15 This evolution, however, only hints at the 
promise of big data policing. The next phase will use existing predictive 
analytics to target suspects without any firsthand observation of criminal 
activity, relying instead on the accumulation of various data points.16 
Unknown suspects will become known to police because of the data left 
behind.17 Software will use pattern-matching techniques18 to identify individ-
uals by sorting through information about millions of people contained in 
networked databases. This new reality simultaneously undermines the 
protection that reasonable suspicion provides against police stops and 
potentially transforms reasonable suspicion into a means of justifying those 
same stops. 
This Article seeks to offer three contributions to the development of 
Fourth Amendment theory. First, it demonstrates that reasonable suspicion—
as a small data doctrine—may become practically irrelevant in an era of big 
 
14 See, e.g., Heather Kelly, Police Embrace Social Media as Crime-Fighting Tool, CNN (Aug. 30, 2012, 
5:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/tech/social-media/fighting-crime-social-media, archived at 
http://perma.cc/D2LC-DEH8 (detailing ways police officers use social media to catch or thwart 
criminals). 
15 While this may protect some individuals who are not likely to be involved in criminal 
activity, it may also create additional burdens on those who are predicted to be involved in 
criminal activity. See infra Part IV. 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716 (2010) (highlighting the difficulty of protecting the privacy of data 
subjects by anonymizing data); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and 
a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1877-78 (2011) (discuss-
ing identification of individuals from personally identifiable information found from data sources); 
Rebecca J. Rosen, Stanford Researchers: It Is Trivially Easy to Match Metadata to Real People, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 24, 2013, 1:50 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/stan 
ford-researchers-it-is-trivially-easy-to-match-metadata-to-real-people/282642/, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/QFK5-6JUC (explaining the ease with which metadata can be matched with specific 
individuals). 
18 See Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2005) (“Data mining’s computerized sifting of personal characteristics and behaviors (sometimes 
called ‘pattern matching’) is a more thorough, regular, and extensive version of criminal profiling, 
which has become both more widespread and more controversial in recent years.”); Gareth Cook, 
Software Helps Police Draw Crime Links, BOS. GLOBE, July 17, 2003, at A1 (discussing how law 
enforcement officers are using databases as research tools). 
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data policing. Second, it examines the distortions of big data on police 
observation, investigation, and prediction, concluding that big data infor-
mation will impact all major aspects of traditional policing. Third, it seeks 
to offer a solution to potential problems using the insights and value of big 
data itself to strengthen the existing reasonable suspicion standard.  
Part I of this Article examines the development of Fourth Amendment 
law on reasonable suspicion. Much of this case law involves “unknown” 
suspects, such as when a police officer sees an individual on the street but 
does not know his or her identity. In these cases, reasonable suspicion 
necessarily derives from the suspect’s observable actions. Most Fourth 
Amendment cases involving police–citizen encounters are of this “stranger” 
variety.19 Thus, the reasonable suspicion test, as it evolved, required the 
police officer to articulate individualized, particularized suspicion to distin-
guish a stranger’s suspicious actions from non-suspicious actions.20 The 
resulting doctrine, created around actions, not individuals, makes sense 
within the context it arose (as presumably most officers would not know all 
of the potential criminals in their patrol areas).21 The resulting reasonable 
suspicion test, however, becomes significantly distorted when officers have 
access to more individualized or predictive information about a suspect.  
Part II of this Article addresses the rise of “big data” in criminal law  
enforcement. Law enforcement organizations are working to grow the scope, 
sophistication, and detail of their databases.22 Agencies and their officers may 
now search national databases and gain instant access to the information.23 
Indeed, “data” is the new watchword in many smart-policing districts.24 
 
19 See infra Part I.  
20 See William J. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 551, 594-95 (1984) (“[T]he police must be able to justify singling out from 
the rest of humanity (or at least from the rest of the people in the general area) the particular 
individual whom they have stopped as somehow meriting this special attention.”). 
21 This assumption is certainly true in large urban police districts, although it may hold less 
true for small towns or rural areas. As will be discussed later, “big data” in some ways turns big 
city policing into old-fashioned, small-town policing, with the benefits and drawbacks that come 
from that scale of police surveillance.  
22 See infra Part II.  
23 See infra Part II. 
24 See Nina Cope, Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence?, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 
188, 191 (2004) (discussing an operational structure for the organization of intelligence processes in 
police forces); Stephen Baxter, Modest Gains in First Six Months of Santa Cruz’s Predictive Police 
Program, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Feb. 26, 2012, 4:59 PM), http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/ 
rss/ci_20050377, archived at http://perma.cc/KPM5-K634 (reporting on the success of a data algorithm 
used by the Santa Cruz Police Department); Carrie Kahn, At LAPD, Predicting Crimes Before They 
Happen, NPR (Nov. 26, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/26/142758000/at-lapd-predicting-
crimes-before-they-happen, archived at http://perma.cc/P5JL-ZVWV (discussing how police use data 
to predict future crimes); Joel Rubin, Stopping Crime Before It Starts, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2010), 
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Crimes are recorded.25 Criminals are cataloged.26 Some jurisdictions record 
data about every police–citizen encounter, making both the person and 
justification for the stop (not necessarily even an arrest) instantly available 
to any officer.27 Some jurisdictions have compiled “bad guy lists” identifying 
suspects in a neighborhood based on computer analysis of past actions and 
arrests.28 In addition, law enforcement agencies increasingly rely on predic-
tive algorithms to forecast individual recidivism and areas of likely criminal 
activity.29  
Just as law enforcement agencies now collect and electronically analyze 
more personal data, so do private, third-party organizations.30 These third-
party entities are a familiar part of our daily lives. “Smartphones” record 
 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/21/local/la-me-predictcrime-20100427-1, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
N223-8J9K (suggesting that predictive policing that uses sophisticated data systems is the future of 
law enforcement). 
25 Cf. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing ‘High 
Crime Areas,’ 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 225-27 (2011) [hereinafter Ferguson, Crime Mapping]  
(discussing issues with recorded crime data). 
26 Cf. id. at 182 n.11. 
27 For example, in New York City, every stop-and-frisk is supposed to be recorded in an official 
UF-250 police report. See Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth 
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 862 n.210 (2011) (“According to the NYPD’s Patrol Guide, a 
police officer who stops and frisks an individual must complete a UF-250 if a person is (1) stopped 
by force; (2) stopped and frisked or searched; (3) arrested; or (4) stopped and refuses to identify 
oneself. . . . In situations that fall outside these four contexts, a police officer may fill out a form 
if he or she desires to do so.” (citation omitted)). 
28 See Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police Organization Continuity and Change: 
Into the Twenty-First Century, in 39 CRIME & JUSTICE 55, 88 (Michael Tonry ed., 2010) (“Police 
now appear to rely more heavily on certain IT-based forms of surveillance—‘database policing’—
where officers use computers to ‘patrol’ massive data files (e.g., wanted lists) looking for ‘hits’ on 
information they possess on suspects.”); Bryan Llenas, Brave New World of “Predictive Policing” Raises 
Specter of High-Tech Racial Profiling, FOX NEWS LATINO (Feb. 25, 2014), http://latino.foxnews.com/ 
latino/news/2014/02/24/brave-new-world-predictive-policing-raises-specter-high-tech-racial-
profiling/, archived at http://perma.cc/VG5W-WV93 (“[T]he Chicago Police Department, thanks 
to federal funding, is now helping to drive policing into territory previously only dreamed of in 
science fiction: The ability to essentially predict who will be the next perpetrator or the next 
victim of a crime.”); Robert L. Mitchell, Predictive Policing Gets Personal, COMPUTERWORLD, 
(Oct. 24, 2013, 3:50 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2486424/government-it/predictive-
policing-gets-personal.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GDW5-B8JD (“Predictive policing is at 
the top of a lot of people’s lists.”). 
29 See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 507 
(2012) (discussing how the majority of states detain or only conditionally release defendants 
determined to be dangerous); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable 
Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 265-69 (2012) [hereinafter Ferguson, Predictive Policing] (providing 
an overview of predictive policing). 
30 See infra Part II. 
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where we go.31 Credit card companies record what we buy, and banks 
chronicle what we spend.32 “OnStar” systems in cars catalog where and how 
fast we drive.33 Phone records reflect our contacts and communications.34 
Internet searches reveal what we read and expose our interests.35 Social 
media sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, even disclose what we think.36 
Currently, law enforcement officers may access many of these records 
without violating the Fourth Amendment, under the theory that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information knowingly revealed to 
third parties.37 While certain statutory protections exist, most statutes 
include law enforcement exceptions,38 and in any case, these private, 
commercial data aggregators have turned personal data into a commodity, 
available for purchase and analysis to anyone willing to pay.39  
 
31 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Police Are Using Phone Tracking as Routine Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 
2012, at 1. 
32 Cf., e.g., Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012 (Magazine), at 30 
(discussing retail analytics). 
33 See, e.g., Ned Potter, Privacy Battles: OnStar Says GM May Record Car’s Use, Even If You Cancel 
Service, ABC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/onstar-gm-privacy-terms-
company-record-car-information/story?id=14581571, archived at http://perma.cc/VGN2-MJMZ. 
34 Phone companies record whom we call and even where we are located when we make those 
calls. See, e.g., Noam Cohen, It’s Tracking Your Every Move, and You May Not Even Know, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at A1. 
35 See, e.g., Chloe Albanesius, Facebook: Tracking Your Web Activity Even After You Log Out?, 
PC MAG. (Sept. 26, 2011, 11:59 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2819,2393564,00.asp, 
archived at http://perma.cc/NWP2-DRXN; Robert Epstein, Google’s Gotcha, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (May 10, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/05/10/15-
ways-google-monitors-you, archived at http://perma.cc/94V8-AUSX.  
36 See generally Noah Shachtman, Exclusive: U.S. Spies Buy Stake in Firm That Monitors Blogs, 
Tweets, WIRED (Oct. 19, 2009, 12:03 PM), http://www.wired.com/2009/10/exclusive-us-spies-buy-
stake-in-twitter-blog-monitoring-firm/, archived at http://perma.cc/BZC6-SWAS (highlighting the 
intelligence value of social media posts). 
37 See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-
Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 982-83 (2007) 
[hereinafter Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment] (exploring the ways in which the 
third-party doctrine shortchanges privacy interests); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All 
Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Infor-
mation from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 376-79 (2006) [hereinafter Henderson, 
Fifty States] (describing the third-party doctrine); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party 
Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009) (same). 
38 Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the 
Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 487 & n.2 
(2013) (“The United States Code currently contains over twenty separate statutes that restrict 
both the acquisition and release of covered information. . . . Yet across this remarkable diversity, 
there is one feature that all these statutes share in common: each contains a provision exempting 
law enforcement from its general terms.”). 
39 See infra Part II. 
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The rise of “big data” means that this information is potentially available 
for use by law enforcement. In the same way that a drug store can predict 
that you will need a coupon this month because you bought a similar 
product last month,40 the police will be able to anticipate that you will be 
selling drugs this week because you purchased an unusual number of  
mini–plastic bags last week.41 Neither prediction is necessarily accurate, but 
both are based on individualized and particularized data that makes the 
prediction more likely.  
Part III analyzes the intersection of big data and the current Fourth 
Amendment framework. The wrinkle of big data is that now officers are no 
longer dealing with “strangers.” Even people unknown to officers can be 
identified and, with a few quick searches, revealed as a person with recognizable 
characteristics or about whom certain predictions can be made.42 If officers 
view those individualized and particularized identifying characteristics—
such as prior convictions, gang associations, and GPS coordinates near the 
scene of the crime—as suspicious, then otherwise innocent actions might 
create a predictive composite that satisfies the reasonable suspicion standard. 
In essence, reasonable suspicion will focus more on an individual’s predictive 
likelihood of involvement in criminal activity than on an individual’s 
actions.  
Part III then looks at Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion through 
three different lenses: (1) situations involving officers observing an ongoing 
crime, (2) situations involving officers investigating a past crime, and (3) 
situations involving officers predicting a future crime. Big data affects the 
analysis in each application, distorting the reasonable suspicion standard. 
Knowing who the suspect is and having more information (even innocent 
information) will allow officers to meet the reasonable suspicion threshold 
more easily because the information will be sufficiently individualized and 
particularized. 
 
40 See Duhigg, supra note 32, at 30; Rebecca Greenfield, Facebook Now Knows What You’re Buying 
at Drug Stores, WIRE (Sept. 24, 2012, 11:49 AM), http://www.thewire.com/technology/2012/09/face 
book-tracking-you-drug-store-now-too/57183/, archived at http://perma.cc/N5XH-QBA4; William 
F. Pewen, Protecting Our Civil Rights in the Era of Digital Health, ATLANTIC (Aug. 2, 2012, 11:09 
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/08/protecting-our-civil-rights-in-the-era-of-
digital-health/260343/?single_page=true/, archived at http://perma.cc/8FB6-VERF. 
41 Mini–plastic bags (e.g., Ziploc bags) are used to package drugs sold on the street including 
cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. See United States v. Dingle, 114 F.3d 307, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(“The government’s narcotics expert testified that crack cocaine is typically packaged in small 
ziplock bags for street-level distribution.”); United States v. Betts, 16 F.3d 748, 757 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(noting that pagers and Ziploc baggies are “hallmark paraphernalia” of drug distribution). 
42 See infra Part III. 
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Part IV assesses this new technological reality. Can the current reasonable 
suspicion doctrine adapt? Should it? What are the possible benefits or 
dangers of big data reasonable suspicion? Using big data may help reduce 
the negative consequences of traditional policing techniques, but at the 
same time may create a whole new set of concerns. This section evaluates 
the tradeoffs of big data as applied to the Fourth Amendment.  
Part V offers a few solutions to the problem presented by the big data 
distortions of Fourth Amendment doctrine. This Article suggests that the 
nature of big data itself might provide a means of strengthening the reasona-
ble suspicion standard. If big data resources are used to tip the scales of 
reasonable suspicion in favor of law enforcement, then courts should require 
a higher level of detail and correlation using the insights and capabilities of 
big data. This requirement would involve precise statistical analysis, 
geospatial analysis, temporal analysis, and link analysis of the data. Big data 
can provide information about a person on a generalized or granular scale, 
and the latter should be required. The power of big data allows investigators 
to go deep into the data and make sure that the information is as tightly 
correlated as possible. In this way, a big data–infused reasonable suspicion 
standard will do what the reasonable suspicion requirement was always 
supposed to do—distinguish the criminal from the noncriminal in a manner 
that balances the need for effective law enforcement with a measure of 
personal liberty.  
I. REASONABLE SUSPICION: A SMALL DATA DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment serves as a constitutional barrier, protecting 
individuals from unreasonable police intrusion.43 On the street, the police 
may not constitutionally stop, seize, or search individuals without the 
requisite legal justification.44 To seize a person temporarily, a police officer 
 
43 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (“Hostility to 
seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the Fourth Amend-
ment, and decisions immediately after its adoption affirmed that ‘common rumor or report, 
suspicion, or even “strong reason to suspect” was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest.’” 
(citing Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959))); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (“The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitu-
tion’s protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the 
predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards.”).  
44 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (“A central concern in balancing these competing 
considerations in a variety of settings has been to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the 
field.”). 
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must have “reasonable suspicion” that the individual is committing, is about 
to commit, or has committed a crime.45  
The “reasonable suspicion” standard first arose in Terry v. Ohio, when 
the Supreme Court created a new threshold for Fourth Amendment 
suspicion, lower than probable cause, to justify a brief detention.46 In Terry, 
Detective Martin McFadden observed three unknown men walking back 
and forth in front of a downtown store.47 McFadden, an experienced police 
officer, while not knowing the men involved, believed their actions were 
consistent with the actions of individuals seeking to rob a store.48 Based on 
this suspicion, McFadden stopped the individuals.49 In the process of 
frisking them, McFadden recovered unlawful firearms.50 Possession of these 
firearms served as the basis for the arrest, conviction, and later appeal of the 
constitutionality of the initial stop-and-frisk.51 In finding the stop permis-
sible, the Court established a new Fourth Amendment standard for investi-
gatory stops, requiring that police “be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.”52  
Terry mirrors a common factual situation that recurs millions of times a 
year across the country. Officers on the street observe a particular suspect or 
group of suspects. Because police officers do not know all of the suspects in 
a jurisdiction personally, the officers must focus on the suspect’s actions and 
on the inferences that can be drawn from those actions. The amount of 
information an officer knows about the suspect is necessarily limited. Like 
Detective McFadden in Terry, officers are usually limited to evaluating 
observed actions through intuition. This practice epitomizes small data 
 
45 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (articulating the standard and explaining the 
rationale behind it); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985) (highlighting cases 
where the Court upheld investigatory stops where police had less than probable cause but 
nonetheless had reasonable suspicion that a crime was in progress, would be committed, or had 
been committed). 
46 392 U.S. at 21-22. 
47 Id. at 5-6. 
48 Of course, McFadden admitted at the trial level that he had no significant experience 
investigating robbery suspects, and the overlay of racial considerations in a segregated area of 
downtown Cleveland in the late 1960s likely contributed to his suspicion. See Thomas B. McAffee, 
Setting Us Up for Disaster: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Terry v. Ohio, 12 NEV. L.J. 609, 611 n.13 
(2012) (discussing the racial context of Cleveland at the time); see also Terry v. Ohio 30 Years Later: 
A Symposium on the Fourth Amendment, Law Enforcement and Police–Citizen Encounters, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 721 app. B, at 1477 ( John Q. Barrett ed., 1998) [hereinafter Terry v. Ohio 30 Years 
Later] (reporting Detective McFadden’s testimony). 
49 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7-8. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 21. 
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policing—suspicion generated by information discrete in amount, fixed in 
time, and isolated in context. Thus, the predictive judgments made about 
the suspect are similarly limited and disconnected from other data sources. 
This Part discusses how reasonable suspicion has developed as a small 
data doctrine. The language the Supreme Court used to define reasonable 
suspicion, the standard’s application in a variety of contexts, and the law’s 
assumption of unknown suspects and direct observations, all speak to the 
doctrine’s utility in certain situations. In general, the archetypical reasonable 
suspicion setting involves police officers reacting to a quickly unfolding 
criminal situation, with unknown suspects and without the time or  
resources to find more information. The Fourth Amendment calculus, 
though, changes when officers have access to personal data about the 
suspects. Specifically, law enforcement officers can more easily satisfy the 
reasonable suspicion standard when a third party provides some minimal 
information about an otherwise unknown suspect.  
Already, the reasonable suspicion standard provides little protection in 
situations involving suspects previously known to police. This reality 
illustrates one of the many shortcomings of a small data doctrine. Specific 
and particularized data about a suspect, even if not specific and particularized 
about a crime, tends (in practice) to reduce the protection of the reasonable 
suspicion standard. Because the police can obtain information about a 
suspect more easily in a world of big data, this doctrinal weakness points to 
a problem in the protective scope of current Fourth Amendment law.  
A. The Reasonable Suspicion Standard  
Despite the common application of the reasonable suspicion language in 
tens of thousands of federal and state court cases, the contours of the 
standard remain ill-defined.53 Cases from Terry to the present day emphasize 
that suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts.”54 Those 
facts must be “objective.”55 Suspicion must be particularized.56 It must 
 
53 See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2175 (2002) (“The 
central problem with regulating the manner of street stops is definition: No one knows how to 
craft a legal formula that will tell officers how to behave in advance.”). 
54 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (holding that an officer must be able to identify “specific and 
articulable facts[,] which . . . together with rational inferences from those facts,” establish the 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity required to justify a seizure). 
55 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (noting that police officers must “have a reasonable 
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity” to make a 
investigatory stop); see also id. (“To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must 
be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure 
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relate to criminal activity, not just to the criminal.57 Officers must have 
reasonable suspicion before the stop occurs; retroactive justification is not 
sufficient.58 The suspicion must relate to current criminal activity,59 with some 
latitude for post-crime investigative actions60 and pre-crime intervention.61  
Courts evaluate these suspicious facts under the “totality of circumstances” 
test, which means that all relevant factors should be considered.62 The 
content and the quality of the information are both relevant considera-
tions,63 but courts have not settled on a required quantum of proof.64  
 
of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying 
explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.”). 
56 See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 270-72 (2002) (noting that reasonable suspicion 
must be based on a “‘[p]articularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing” 
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981))). 
57 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (“The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires 
that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate 
person.”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (“An investigatory stop must be 
justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in 
criminal activity.”). 
58 J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 (“The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what 
the officers knew before they conducted their search.”). 
59 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is not 
enough to suspect that an individual has committed crimes in the past, harbors unconsummated 
criminal designs, or has the propensity to commit crimes. On the contrary, before detaining an 
individual, law enforcement officers must reasonably suspect that he is engaged in, or poised to 
commit, a criminal act at that moment.”). 
60 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227-29 (1985) (upholding a stop based only on 
a “wanted flyer” from another police department that named the suspect). 
61 See generally Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial 
Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 335-357 (2014) (discussing restraints that target yet-uncommitted 
crime, like the No-Fly List and Megan’s Laws). 
62 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (explaining that reasonable suspicion depends 
on the totality of the circumstances); Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-8 (“The concept of reasonable 
suspicion, like probable cause, is not ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal 
rules.’ . . . In evaluating the validity of a stop such as this, we must consider ‘the totality of the 
circumstances—the whole picture.’” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); Cortez, 449 
U.S. at 417)). 
63 White, 496 U.S. at 330 (“Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon 
both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors—
quantity and quality—are considered in the ‘totality of the circumstances—the whole picture,’ that 
must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417)). 
64 See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a 
less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than 
preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of 
objective justification for making the stop.”). 
  
340 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 327 
 
Innocent factors, characteristics about an area, and specialized law enforce-
ment training are all factors that shape the totality of the circumstances.65  
The result has been a standard which retains the virtue of flexibility and 
the vice of malleability. As the Supreme Court has explained, reasonable 
suspicion involves “commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with 
‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’”66 Scholars have been less 
charitable, critiquing the standard as being at best meaningless and at worst 
discriminatory.67 At a minimum, the reasonable suspicion standard requires 
police to articulate why an individual was stopped, which may reduce overly 
arbitrary or animus-based stops.  
The standard, while applicable in many situations, makes the most sense 
for unknown suspect cases. The requirement of specific, particularized, 
objective facts seeks to distinguish by their observable actions those indi-
viduals who have done nothing wrong from those who have done something 
wrong. Detective McFadden stopped Mr. Terry not because he recognized 
Mr. Terry as a known robber or because there was a report of a robbery, but 
because of the observed actions that drew his suspicions at that particular 
time. Personal factors may be relevant, but usually relate to the suspect’s 
observable actions.68  
 
65 See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563 (1980) (“Among the circumstances 
that can give rise to reasonable suspicion are the agent’s knowledge of the methods used in recent 
criminal activity and the characteristics of persons engaged in such illegal practices.”). 
66 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231). 
67 See, e.g., David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1, 5 n.18 (1994) (noting that for certain minority groups, reasonable suspicion seems to 
include even benign conduct); David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: 
Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 
1022 (1998) (arguing that the reasonable suspicion standard has led to targeting of minorities for 
stops almost at will); Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist’s View, 74 MISS. 
L.J. 423, 493 (2004) (“[I]n . . . the inner city, the possibility of criminal activity is so substantial 
as to make everyone in the area subject to police inquiry.”); Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury 
Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1081 
(1998) (calling reasonable suspicion jurisprudence “a mess”). 
68 For example, the “high crime area” nature of a neighborhood has been accepted as a  
contextual factor that may affect reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & 
Damien Bernache, The “High Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for 
Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1609-18 (2008) (“[W]hat is 
termed a ‘high-crime area’ can differ from case to case, and jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”); Margaret 
Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in 
Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 120-22 (1999) (“[S]tanding on a street corner 
may create reasonable suspicion in Louisiana, but not in Pennsylvania . . . .”). 
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B. Reasonable Suspicion in Application 
This Section traces how an officer’s knowledge about a suspect influ-
ences the reasonable suspicion analysis. As discussed below, the more data 
known or discovered about a particular suspect, the easier it is to justify a 
stop based on reasonable suspicion. This result is not necessarily negative or 
surprising, as more information connecting a suspect to a crime increases 
the likelihood that the suspect was involved. It does, however, show how 
the aggregation of information—even innocent information—can shift the 
balance within a fluid legal standard.  
1. Unknown Suspect Cases 
Perhaps not surprisingly, many Fourth Amendment reasonable suspi-
cion cases have followed the Terry small data model.69 Such cases involve 
officers observing unknown suspects70 engaged in what officers believe to be 
suspicious activity. These encounters regularly occur on the street71 and as 
part of traffic stops that lead to the seizure of cars’ occupants.72 In both 
types of encounters, police stop the individual based on speculations about 
the criminal nature of the actions involved—independent of the person—
because the actor’s identity is unknown. In determining reasonable suspicion, 
 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 268-72 (2002) (involving an unknown 
driver stopped on suspicion of drug trafficking); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 677-78 
(1985) (same); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1984) (per curiam) (involving unknown 
suspects stopped because of suspicious and furtive movements in an airport); Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 493 (1983) (involving an unknown traveler stopped in an airport because his actions fit a 
“drug courier profile”); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 875 (1975) (involving 
unknown suspects believed to be in the country unlawfully); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-
45 (1972) (involving an unknown suspect stopped based on an informant’s tip that the suspect was 
armed).  
70 Specifically, suspects personally unknown to the officer. 
71 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49 (1979) (involving an unknown suspect stopped in an 
alley in a neighborhood known for drug trafficking); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121 
(2000) (involving a stop of an unknown suspect who fled on foot after seeing police in a Chicago 
neighborhood known for drug trafficking); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622-23 (1991) 
(involving a chase of unknown juvenile suspects who fled on foot after seeing police). 
72 See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1036 (2013) (involving the stop of an  
automobile occupied by unknown suspects who had just left an apartment for which the police had 
obtained a search warrant); Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009) (involving a traffic stop 
for suspended vehicle registration); Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 252 (2007) (involving a 
traffic stop stemming from vehicle registration concerns); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 
(2005) (involving a traffic stop for speeding); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998) (same); 
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (same); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 107-08 (1986) 
(involving a traffic stop of an unknown suspect for speeding and driving with a cracked windshield). 
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a court will evaluate whether the officer’s observations were objectively 
reasonable to warrant the stop. 
Sibron v. New York is a useful example of the application of the  
reasonable suspicion standard with respect to unknown suspects.73 In Sibron, 
a case decided the same day as Terry v. Ohio, an officer observed an unknown 
suspect in a series of meetings with known narcotics addicts for approximately 
eight hours.74 The police officer did not know Sibron personally and could 
not overhear any of the conversations.75 Yet, after observing Sibron com-
municate with nine to eleven known addicts over the course of the day, the 
officer concluded that he had observed a series of drug transactions. The 
officer then approached Sibron and searched his pockets, recovering heroin.76 
The Supreme Court held that Sibron’s activity did not create reasonable 
suspicion.77 The officer did not see any drug transactions, did not know the 
subject of the conversations, and accordingly did not have the requisite 
suspicion to justify the search under the Fourth Amendment.78 While 
 
73 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
74 Id. at 45 (“Officer Martin testified that while he was patrolling his beat in uniform on 
March 9, 1965, he observed Sibron ‘continually from the hours of 4:00 P.M. to 12:00, mid-
night . . . in the vicinity of 742 Broadway.’ He stated that during this period of time he saw 
Sibron in conversation with six or eight persons whom he (Patrolman Martin) knew from past 
experience to be narcotics addicts. The officer testified that he did not overhear any of these 
conversations, and that he did not see anything pass between Sibron and any of the others. Late in 
the evening Sibron entered a restaurant. Patrolman Martin saw Sibron speak with three more 
known addicts inside the restaurant. Once again, nothing was overheard and nothing was seen to 
pass between Sibron and the addicts. Sibron sat down and ordered pie and coffee, and, as he was 
eating, Patrolman Martin approached him and told him to come outside. Once outside, the officer 
said to Sibron, ‘You know what I am after.’ According to the officer, Sibron ‘mumbled something 
and reached into his pocket.’ Simultaneously, Patrolman Martin thrust his hand into the same 
pocket, discovering several glassine envelopes, which, it turned out, contained heroin.” (alteration 
in original)). 
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 64. Because Sibron was decided on the same day as Terry, there is some debate about 
whether the Court found the search unconstitutional because the officer lacked probable cause to 
search or because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop-and-frisk. The majority opinion 
echoed the reasonable suspicion language in Terry without specifically using the term. “The 
inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics 
is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon 
an individual’s personal security.” Id. at 62. Justice Harlan more explicitly referenced the Terry 
standard in his concurrence. “The forcible encounter between Officer Martin and Sibron did not 
meet the Terry reasonableness standard. In the first place, although association with known 
criminals may, I think, properly be a factor contributing to the suspiciousness of circumstances, it 
does not, entirely by itself, create suspicion adequate to support a stop.” Id. at 73 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
78 Id. at 62 (“The officer was not acquainted with Sibron and had no information concerning 
him. He merely saw Sibron talking to a number of known narcotics addicts over a period of eight 
hours. It must be emphasized that Patrolman Martin was completely ignorant regarding the 
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Sibron might be decided differently today, the Court, it should be noted 
here, determined that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion because the 
officer had no information about Sibron that gave rise to the inference of 
criminal activity. Merely associating with addicts was not a crime.  
In both Terry and Sibron, officers did not know the suspect but instead 
inferred from the unknown suspect’s actions that criminal activity was 
afoot.79 In both cases, officers based their predictive judgments on limited 
data points, which were disconnected from larger information sources about 
the suspect. While the Supreme Court came to different conclusions in 
Terry and Sibron about whether the police had reasonable suspicion, it 
reached both outcomes based solely on the facts observed by the officers. 
This reality has been repeated in hundreds of cases since then.  
2. Some Information on the Suspect 
A slight wrinkle to the classic unknown suspect case involves situations in 
which some minimal information is provided about an otherwise unknown 
suspect. Informant tips, police tips, or further police investigation can alter 
the reasonable suspicion analysis.80 That is, the likelihood that a court will 
find reasonable suspicion increases proportionally to the amount of personal 
data the police officer has about the suspect.  
In Florida v. J.L., an anonymous caller “reported to the Miami–Dade 
Police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing 
a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”81 Police responded and searched a young 
black male, J.L., wearing a plaid shirt. Police found a gun on J.L. and 
arrested him.82 In determining whether this anonymous tip was sufficient to 
justify the stop, the Court held that such a bare tip, without either identifying 
information about the suspect or predictive details corroborated by observation, 
was insufficient for reasonable suspicion.83 There was no identifying or 
 
content of these conversations, and that he saw nothing pass between Sibron and the addicts. So 
far as he knew, they might indeed ‘have been talking about the World Series.’”). 
79 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (“[P]olice can stop and briefly detain a 
person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable 
facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.”). 
80 See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 180-81 (2004) (involving 
a telephone tip that provided reasonable suspicion to investigate a domestic violence case). 
81 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000). 
82 Id. at 268-69. 
83 Id. at 270 (“Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and 
who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, . . . ‘an anonymous tip 
alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.’” (quoting Alabama v. 
White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990))). 
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predictive information involved. The only data point was an anonymous 
accusation without context or verifiability.  
In Alabama v. White, by contrast, the Supreme Court found that a tip 
including the suspect’s name, location, and predicted route of travel was 
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.84 In White, the anonymous 
tipster claimed that the suspect “would be leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace 
Apartments at a particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with 
the right taillight lens broken, that she would be going to Dobey’s Motel, 
and that she would be in possession of about an ounce of cocaine inside a 
brown attaché case.”85 The police followed the suspect as she left the motel 
in a Plymouth station wagon, stopped her, and requested to search her car.86 
She consented, and police recovered marijuana.87 The Court held that in 
this situation, the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion.88  
The differences between White and J.L. are slight but revealing. A more 
descriptive account of the suspect and corroborated predictive detail 
changed an insufficient anonymous tip into constitutionally sufficient 
reasonable suspicion.89 Note, however, that many of the same concerns that 
caused the Court to find no reasonable suspicion in J.L. were still present in 
White. An anonymous tip revealing a single and obvious pattern of movement 
does not provide much proof of “insider” knowledge. Most individuals drive 
a particular type of car and follow a predictable routine in parts of daily life 
(e.g., driving to work, to daycare, to the gym, to the local coffee shop). Yet, 
the Court still found the additional individualized information about the 
suspect sufficient for reasonable suspicion.90 
The Supreme Court’s first transition to a “medium data” case occurred 
in Ornelas v. United States.91 In Ornelas, officers developed reasonable 
suspicion by proactively searching for data to support their hunch.92 The 
 
84 496 U.S. at 331-32. 
85 Id. at 327. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 332. 
89 Compare id. (“Although it is a close case, we conclude that under the totality of the  
circumstances the anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to 
justify the investigatory stop of respondent’s car.”), and Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) 
(“Only after police observation showed that the informant had accurately predicted the woman’s 
movements, we explained, did it become reasonable to think the tipster had inside knowledge 
about the suspect and therefore to credit his assertion about the cocaine.”), with id. at 271 (“The 
anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive information and therefore left the police 
without means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility.”). 
90 See White, 496 U.S. at 332. 
91 517 U.S. 690 (1996).  
92 Id. at 692.  
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case involved a Milwaukee detective who observed a suspicious car parked 
at a local motel.93 The car was purportedly “suspicious” because it was a 
make and model frequently used by drug dealers—a 1981 two-door Oldsmo-
bile.94 Not having any information about the owner of the Oldsmobile, the 
detective radioed his dispatcher and found the car was registered under 
Ornelas’s name.95 A further inquiry with the local office of the Drug  
Enforcement Administration revealed that Ornelas’s name appeared in a 
federal database of known and suspected drug traffickers (the Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs Information System (NADDIS)).96 With this additional 
information, which would otherwise have been unknown, the detective 
stopped Ornelas (and another man) when they exited the motel and entered 
the car. The underlying constitutional issue in the case was whether the 
information connecting the car, the name, and the criminal database was 
sufficient to create reasonable suspicion.97 While the Supreme Court 
deferred answering the Fourth Amendment question, focusing instead on 
the appropriate standard of appellate review, the trial court both initially 
and on remand found that the information together was sufficient cause for 
reasonable suspicion.98 Note, though, that Ornelas’s actions were not 
suspicious at all. He parked overnight at a motel and then exited the motel 
and got into his car. What created the suspicion was independent data about 
Ornelas himself. The detective, by searching for more information about 
 
93 Id. at 691-92. 
94 Id. at 692. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 694. 
98 See United States v. Ornelas, No. 94-3349, 1996 WL 508569, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 1996). 
The Seventh Circuit, however, raised concerns with the accuracy and use of the information. See 
United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 716-17 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Clearly, were it not for the 
NADDIS hits, the officers would not have had grounds for reasonable suspicion that the defendants 
were drug traffickers. Not only is every circumstance on which the officers relied other than the 
hits innocent taken by itself—many Americans (approximately one in eight) are Californians, 
many Californians are Hispanic, many Americans drive two-door General Motors cars, many 
people check into motels very late at night (or early in the morning), many travel in pairs rather 
than alone, and many do not make advance reservations—but the confluence of these circumstances 
is pretty innocuous as well, especially since many of the circumstances are correlated rather than 
independent.”); see also id. at 717 (“Maybe NADDIS is no better than a vast compendium of 
rumors, errors, and libels: garbage in, garbage out. That seems unlikely. It would not be heavily 
used by drug enforcement authorities if it were merely a random sample of the American 
population. Which is not to say, however, that it is highly reliable; concern that it may not be is 
heightened by the (scanty) secondary literature, which depicts NADDIS as an unselective, 
unweeded repository of unsubstantiated allegations, often dated.”). 
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Ornelas, discovered personal data—particularized and individualized facts—
to support his suspicion.99  
This development of reasonable suspicion resulting more from aggregated 
information about a suspect, and less from the actions of the suspect, occurs 
with some regularity in the case law.100 In essence, courts reason that the 
“tip” or database hit provides information that shifts the balance toward 
reasonable suspicion. This is true even if the observable, innocent actions 
on the street remain the same.  
3. Known Suspects 
The third situation involves “known suspects” stopped by police because 
of their identity and not necessarily because of any observed activities. The 
Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the issue, but United States v. 
Hensley provides an interesting example of a stop based solely on identity.101  
Hensley involved a stop based on a “wanted flyer” for a suspect in an 
armed robbery.102 The Police Department in St. Bernard, Ohio, had issued 
a flyer identifying Mr. Hensley as a suspect and sent it to surrounding 
jurisdictions.103 The flyer did not indicate that the police had a warrant for 
Mr. Hensley’s arrest.104 The Covington Police Department, located in 
neighboring Kentucky, received the flyer, and its officers were on the 
lookout for Mr. Hensley.105 Based on the wanted flyer, Covington Police 
 
99 See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 692. 
100 See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 4 (1989) (recounting an incident where an 
airline ticket agent informed police of a passenger’s suspicious behavior, police determined that the 
name the suspect had given the ticket agent did not match phone records but that the suspect’s 
voice appeared on the answering machine connected to the phone number the suspect provided); 
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 533 (1985) (describing details giving rise to 
reasonable suspicion by customs officers, including the suspect’s eight prior trips to Miami or Los 
Angeles, possession of $5000 in cash, and lack of specific plans for her stay in the United States); 
id. at 542 (“The facts, and their rational inferences, known to customs inspectors in this case 
clearly supported a reasonable suspicion that respondent was an alimentary canal smuggler. We 
need not belabor the facts, including respondent’s implausible story, that supported this suspicion. 
The trained customs inspectors had encountered many alimentary canal smugglers and certainly 
had more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,”’ that respondent was 
smuggling narcotics in her alimentary canal.” (citations omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 27 (1968)). 
101 469 U.S. 221, 223 (1985) (addressing whether a stop based only on a “wanted flyer” from 
another jurisdiction runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 
U.S. 366, 368 (1993) (discussing the stop of an unknown suspect based on detective’s knowledge 
that the building was a notorious “crack house”). 
102 Hensley, 469 U.S. at 223. 
103 Id. at 225.  
104 See id. at 225. 
105 Id. at 223. 
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officers stopped Mr. Hensley and eventually recovered a handgun.106 The 
Supreme Court had to decide whether this wanted poster—identifying Mr. 
Hensley specifically—created reasonable suspicion to stop Hensley.  
In its discussion, the Court noted that “if police have a reasonable suspi-
cion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter 
was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a 
Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.”107 The principle 
applies even if another jurisdiction’s police officers generated that reasonable 
suspicion. Thus, the Covington police permissibly relied on the St. Bernard’s 
Police Department’s determination of reasonable suspicion.  
Hensley shows that a stop can be based simply on identifying infor-
mation about a suspect that is provided to police. In Hensley, the arresting 
officers did not have an arrest warrant or any predictive detail about 
Hensley’s future actions, and they did not corroborate any of the allegations 
of criminal activity. The only data point for suspicion was Hensley’s 
identity. Yet the Court nonetheless held that if information about an 
identified suspect rises to the level of reasonable suspicion, a stop is justi-
fied.108 Because police collect a significant amount of information about 
suspects and create regular “target lists” of potential suspects, this type of 
stop, based merely on identity, raises serious questions.  
Hensley also substantially broadened the application of the reasonable 
suspicion standard from preventing or apprehending ongoing criminal 
activity to investigating it after the fact. After Hensley, reasonable suspicion 
was no longer limited to ongoing criminal action, but could be used to 
justify stops to investigate completed crimes.  
Other courts have been even more explicit that prior knowledge of the 
suspect can factor into reasonable suspicion. The Seventh Circuit stated that 
“[k]nowledge of gang association and recent relevant criminal conduct, while 
of doubtful evidentiary value in view of the strictures against proving guilt by 
 
106 Id. at 223-25. 
107 Id. at 229. 
108 Id. This recognition is also implicit (albeit grounded in a different rationale) in the 
Court’s decisions involving the Fourth Amendment rights of probationers and individuals on 
parole who were stopped because their probation or parole officers knew they had prior criminal 
charges. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 (2006) (“Officer Alex Rohleder of the 
San Bruno Police Department observed petitioner walking down a street with a woman and a 
child. Based on a prior contact with petitioner, Officer Rohleder was aware that petitioner was on 
parole and believed that he was facing an at-large warrant. Accordingly, Officer Rohleder stopped 
petitioner and asked him whether he had an outstanding parole warrant.”); United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 115 (2001) (“Detective Hancock decided to conduct a search of Knights’ 
apartment. Detective Hancock was aware of the search condition in Knights’ probation order and 
thus believed that a warrant was not necessary.”).  
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association or by a predisposition based on past criminal acts, is a permissible 
component of the articulable suspicion required for a Terry stop.”109 Courts in 
Massachusetts,110 Minnesota,111 and Hawaii,112 among others,113 recognize that 
knowledge of a defendant’s criminal history can factor into the reasonable 
suspicion analysis. As one Massachusetts court reasoned,  
[t]he officers were also entitled to consider their personal knowledge of the 
defendant, including the fact that he had a pending court case involving 
charges of firearm possession and armed assault with intent to murder. In 
several cases, this court has allowed police knowledge of a person’s arrest 
record or unspecified “criminal record” to be considered in a reasonable 
suspicion evaluation.114 
 
109 United States v. Feliciano, 45 F.3d 1070, 1074 (7th Cir. 1995). 
110 See, e.g., Roe v. Att’y Gen., 750 N.E.2d 897, 914 (Mass. 2001) (“A person’s prior criminal 
record is a legitimate factor to consider in determining whether there is reasonable suspicion for a 
stop or probable cause for a search or an arrest.”); Commonwealth v. Dasilva, 849 N.E.2d 249, 253 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (allowing police knowledge of a suspect’s criminal record to be considered 
in the reasonable suspicion evaluation); Commonwealth v. Calderon, 681 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1997) (indicating that knowledge of defendant’s criminal history can be factored into 
reasonable suspicion determination). 
111 See, e.g., State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Minn. 1980) (confirming that knowledge 
of a suspect’s potential involvement in a homicide and in a firearms-related incident can contribute 
to reasonable suspicion); State v. Bellikka, 490 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
that an officer’s knowledge that a suspect had a history of burglary offenses strengthened the 
officer’s reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved in a recent burglary); State v. Munoz, 
385 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding the officer’s knowledge of the suspect’s prior 
drug deals, possession of guns, and previous felony convictions corroborated a tip that the suspect 
was selling methamphetamine). 
112 See State v. Spillner, 173 P.3d 498, 507 (Haw. 2007) (“[A]lthough we have already emphasized 
that a person’s prior history of drug arrests is insufficient to establish probable cause, awareness of 
past arrests may, when combined with other specific articulable facts indicating the probability of 
current criminal activity, factor into a determination that reasonable suspicion, sufficient to 
warrant a temporary investigate stop, exists.” (quoting State v. Kaleohano, 56 P.3d 138, 148 (Haw. 
2002))). 
113 See, e.g., In re J.T., 678 S.E.2d 111, 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (“[B]ecause of their prior contact 
with J.T., the officers knew that J.T. was enrolled in and supposed to be attending school on the 
date and time in question. The officers therefore had a reasonable, particularized and objective 
basis for suspecting that J.T. was truant and were consequently justified in stopping him in order 
to determine why he was not attending school.”); State v. Valentine, 636 A.2d 505, 510-11 (N.J. 
1994) (“Moreover, a police officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s criminal history, especially where that 
history involves weapons offenses, is a relevant factor in judging the reasonableness of a Terry 
frisk. Although an officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s criminal history alone is not sufficient to 
justify the initial stop of a suspect or to justify a frisk of a suspect once stopped, an officer’s 
knowledge of a suspect’s prior criminal activity in combination with other factors may lead to a 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.”). 
114 Dasilva, 849 N.E.2d at 253. 
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Of course, courts draw a line between using prior knowledge about a 
suspect to justify a stop and using prior knowledge as one factor in the 
totality of the circumstances.115 Prior knowledge of past criminal activity 
alone is not enough to stop an individual.116 As one court stated,  
knowledge of a person’s prior criminal involvement (to say nothing of a 
mere arrest) is alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable sus-
picion. . . .  
If the law were otherwise, any person with any sort of criminal record—
or even worse, a person with arrests but no convictions—could be subjected 
to a Terry-type investigative stop by a law enforcement officer at any time 
without the need for any other justification at all. Any such rule would 
clearly run counter to the requirement of a reasonable suspicion, and of the 
need that such stops be justified in light of a balancing of the competing 
interests at stake.117 
Thus, knowledge about the suspect cannot alone justify a stop; the officer’s 
knowledge must be tied to a suspected criminal activity, past or present. 
Data regarding a suspect’s criminal history, however, can influence the 
officer and be included in the totality of the circumstances analysis for 
reasonable suspicion. 
C. Concluding Thoughts 
Fourth Amendment case law suggests that personal information about a 
suspect influences the reasonable suspicion analysis—even if the suspect’s 
actions remain the same. When data about the suspect corroborates suspi-
cion from observation, the information helps the officer justify his or her 
suspicion. In simple terms, personal data provide the individualized, 
objective facts that officers need to articulate their suspicion.  
While it makes intuitive sense that information about a suspect in  
connection with a crime can help provide reasons for the officer’s suspicion, 
 
115 See, e.g., United States v. Laughrin, 438 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that 
prior criminal involvement alone is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion); Spillner, 173 P.3d 
at 506 (“The danger of ‘the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials,’ also prohibits law 
enforcement from basing a stop solely on an officer’s knowledge of a particular citizen’s criminal 
background . . . .” (citation omitted) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979))). 
116 See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 388 So.2d 286, 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (“We hold that 
an officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s previous arrest, standing alone, is insufficient to give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a crime may have been or is being committed in order to justify a lawful 
investigatory stop.”). 
117 Spillner, 173 P.3d at 506 (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542-43 (10th Cir. 
1994)). 
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there are real concerns associated with this increased access to personal 
information. First, the personal information can be overbroad. In Ornelas, 
for example, the officer’s suspicion that a particular car was connected with 
a known drug dealer did not alone create a reasonable suspicion that the 
individual possessed drugs at the time.118 The actions of the suspect, 
including staying overnight at a motel, also did not necessarily suggest drug 
distribution. To justify the stop, the police officer considered additional 
data points in his calculus, but the data themselves did not meaningfully 
relate to the likelihood of criminal activity at the particular time. Second, the 
personal information can be wrong. In White, for example, the tipster was 
wrong about some facts, including the type of narcotics police would recover 
from the suspect.119 Third, the personal information can be unreliable. After 
Hensley, police-generated watchlists can be used to justify stops of individu-
als. As these lists are shared nationally, there is no guarantee of accuracy or 
any mechanism to correct mistakes.120 Potential clerical errors, errors in 
judgment, and a lack of judicial oversight all create red flags for this broad-
ening of factors included in the reasonable suspicion analysis.121  
These concerns animate the discussion about how new data sources will 
affect the reasonable suspicion doctrine. Information may shape reasonable 
suspicion, but, as developed in the next Part, the available data can also 
overwhelm officers and interfere with the determination of who should be 
stopped for suspected criminal activity.  
II. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING  
Big data—both as a catchphrase and a reality—is transforming the 
world.122 This Part outlines the growth of big data and its potential impact 
 
118 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 692-93, 700 (1996) (remanding the case for de 
novo review of the district court’s determination that the officer had reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause). 
119 Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). 
120 See infra Part IV; see also, e.g., Mike McIntire, Ensnared by Error on Growing U.S. Watch 
List, With No Way Out, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at A1 (describing the difficulty of correcting 
mistakes on the no fly list and identifying the correct targets to include); Ellen Nakashima, 
Terrorism Watch List Is Faulted for Errors, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2007, at A12 (explaining problems 
with the accuracy of government watchlists). 
121 See infra Part IV; see also Joshua D. Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 115, 118 (2005) (“[E]vidence suggests that those operating the databases are 
not capable of ensuring that non-gang members do not find themselves documented and trapped 
in the database system.”). 
122 See Lohr, Amid the Flood, supra note 7, at BU3 (“Big Data is a shorthand label that typically 
means applying the tools of artificial intelligence, like machine learning, to vast new troves of data 
beyond that captured in standard databases.”); Steve Lohr, Sizing Up Big Data, Broadening Beyond 
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on law enforcement practices. The big data revolution is just beginning, but 
it has already begun influencing how police identify and investigate criminal 
activity.  
Big data will affect police officers on the streets in two primary ways. 
First, in conjunction with facial recognition or other biometric identification 
technologies,123 unknown suspects can be known—not simply identified by 
name, but revealed through a web of facts involving criminal records, 
personal history, and past location data.124 Vast troves of networked data 
can provide individualized and particularized facts from which to form 
suspicion.125 Second, patterns emerging from the data will allow individuals 
to be identified predictively as suspects because their past actions generate 
suspicion about future criminal involvement.126 Law enforcement already 
uses predictive policing software to predict areas of crime, but big data will 
soon predict actions, if not individuals.127 The data will reveal predictive 
profiles to identify those believed to warrant further investigation by 
police.128 In both cases, the growth of “big data” has the potential to change 
the reasonable suspicion calculus because more personal or predictive 
information about a suspect will make it easier for police to justify stopping 
a suspect.  
 
the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2013, at F1 [hereinafter Lohr, Sizing Up Big Data] (“Big Data is 
the shorthand label for the phenomenon, which embraces technology, decision-making and public 
policy. . . . Big Data is a vague term, used loosely, if often, these days. But put simply, the 
catchall phrase means three things. First, it is a bundle of technologies. Second, it is a potential 
revolution in measurement. And third, it is a point of view, or philosophy, about how decisions 
will be—and perhaps should be—made in the future.”).  
123 See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959, 
962 (2013) (“Chicago’s Operation Virtual Shield includes at least 2,250 cameras, 250 of which have 
biometric technology.”); Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1575 n.91 (2012) 
(“‘Biometrics’ refers either to biological or physiological characteristics usable for automatic 
recognition of individuals on the basis of such characteristics.”).  
124 See infra subsection II.B.3. 
125 See infra Section II.B.  
126 See infra Section II.C.  
127 See Ferguson, Predictive Policing, supra note 29, at 266-67 (describing predictive policing 
strategies that identify the locations of potential crimes). 
128 See Richard Berk, Balancing the Costs of Forecasting Errors in Parole Decisions, 74 ALB. L. 
REV. 1071, 1074 (2010/2011) (discussing the use of historical data to identify future offenders); 
Nadya Labi, Misfortune Teller, ATLANTIC, Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 18-19 (discussing Professor Richard 
Berk’s work to predict the recidivism risk of parolees in Pennsylvania). 
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A. Big Data: An Introduction  
Big data refers to the accumulation and analysis of unusually large  
datasets.129 It provides a shorthand term for data collection in a variety of 
industries and settings.130 As described in the next few sections, this collec-
tion involves a network of sources, relying heavily on a host of consumer, 
social media, and law enforcement datasets, as well as more established 
surveillance and tracking technologies.131  
In their book on big data, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth 
Cukier define big data in two ways. First, big data is “the ability of society 
to harness information in novel ways to produce useful insights or goods 
and services of significant value.”132 Second, they write that, “big data refers 
to things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a smaller one, to 
extract new insights or create new forms of value, in ways that change 
markets, organizations, the relationships between citizens and governments, 
and more.”133 Jules Berman describes big data using “the three V’s.”134 First, 
you must have “[v]olume—large amounts of data.”135 Second, you must 
have “[v]ariety—the data comes in different forms, including traditional 
databases, images, documents, and complex records.”136 Third, you must 
have “[v]elocity—the content of the data is constantly changing, through 
 
129 See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT 
FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 1 (2011), available at http:// 
www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation (“‘Big 
data’ refers to datasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical database software tools to 
capture, store, manage, and analyze. This definition is intentionally subjective and incorporates a 
moving definition of how big a dataset needs to be in order to be considered big data—i.e., we 
don’t define big data in terms of being larger than a certain number of terabytes (thousands of 
gigabytes). We assume that, as technology advances over time, the size of datasets that qualify as 
big data will also increase.”). 
130 See Lohr, Amid the Flood, supra note 7, at BU3 (describing the development and meaning of the 
term “Big Data”); Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/15557443/, archived at http://perma.cc/EJ3F-FDHF (noting the expansion of data collection 
in a variety of fields, including science, retail, and social media). 
131 See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 129, at 5 (describing the general benefits of big data as 
improving transparency, facilitating experimentation, improving performance, segmenting 
audiences, automating decisionmaking, and enabling innovation); Lohr, Sizing Up Big Data, supra 
note 122, at F1 (“The bundle of technologies is partly all the old and new sources of data—Web 
pages, browsing habits, sensor signals, social media, GPS location data from smartphones, 
genomic information and surveillance videos.”). 
132 See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION 
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 2 (2013). 
133 Id. at 6. 
134 See BERMAN, supra note 6, at xv, xx. 
135 Id.  
136 Id. 
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the absorption of complementary data collections, through the introduction 
of previously archived data or legacy collections, and from streamed data 
arriving from multiple sources.”137 
To understand the scope of the growth of big data, the next few sections 
will outline the sources, volume, and promise of big data technologies with 
a focus on those areas most useful for law enforcement.  
B. The Growth of Data Collection 
In many ways, the building blocks of big data are not new at all;138 data 
collection has been increasing for the last few decades.139 The growth in the 
volume of data collected, the ability to connect previously discrete data 
networks, and the analytical capabilities made possible by faster computer 
processors and more data storage capacity, however, are new develop-
ments.140 These issues will be addressed in turn. 
 
137 Id.  
138 Similarly, concerns about growing data collection techniques are not new either. See  
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological 
Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1336 (2002) (discussing case law on the scope of constitutional 
privacy protections); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (2008) [hereinafter Slobogin, Government Data Mining] (discussing 
types of government data mining); Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Govern-
ment, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 167-82 (2005) [hereinafter Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance] (outlining a 
potential regulatory structure for government surveillance of transactions); Daniel J. Solove, Access 
and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139-40 (2002) 
(describing the history of data collection by all levels of government and the accompanying 
privacy concerns); Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 
638-39 (2011) (worrying that Fourth Amendment law addressing letters and telephone calls is not 
well-suited to protect Internet communications). 
139 See Daniel J. Steinbock, Designating the Dangerous: From Blacklists to Watch Lists, 30 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 65, 69-77 (2006) (explaining the growth of government data collection to attempt to 
identify communists in the 1950s). 
140 See Joshua Gruenspecht, “Reasonable” Grand Jury Subpoenas: Asking for Information in the 
Age of Big Data, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 543, 548-49 (2011) (“The increasing speed of network 
connections has also made possible the consolidation of computing resources and associated digital 
stores—a transition popularly known as the move to ‘cloud computing.’ When combined with the 
rapidly declining price of storage and the economies of scale gained from consolidating both 
storage and processing, the increase in network speed made it economically advantageous to store 
information in remote, massive data centers.” (footnote omitted)); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, 
Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
239, 240 (2013) (“Big data is upon us. Over the past few years, the volume of data collected and 
stored by business and government organizations has exploded. The trend is driven by reduced 
costs of storing information and moving it around in conjunction with increased capacity to 
instantly analyze heaps of unstructured data using modern experimental methods, observational 
and longitudinal studies, and large scale simulations.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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1. Volume of Data 
The volume of collected data is growing exponentially. “The data surge 
just keeps rising, doubling in volume every two years. Just two days of the 
current global data production, from all sources—five quintillion bytes (a 
letter of text equals one byte)—is about equal to the amount of information 
created by all the world’s conversations, ever . . . .”141 This amount of 
information is hard to comprehend: 
[I]n 2013 the amount of stored information in the world [was] estimated to 
be around 1,200 exabytes, of which less than 2 percent is non-digital.  
There is no good way to think about what this size of data means. If it 
were all printed in books, they would cover the entire surface of the United 
States some 52 layers thick. If it were placed on CD-ROMs and stacked up, 
they would stretch to the moon in five separate piles. . . .  
Things really are speeding up. The amount of stored information grows 
four times faster than the world economy, while the processing power of 
computers grows nine times faster.142 
Although law enforcement may not use all of this electronic data, much of it 
nonetheless reveals information about individuals that simply was not 
knowable in previous generations. As Daniel Solove has observed, “We are 
becoming a society of records, and these records are not held by us, but by 
third parties.”143  
Digital records reveal who we talk to, where we go, and what we purchase. 
They give insight into our hobbies, our financial status, our employment, 
and our criminal histories.144 When linked together, these disparate data 
 
141 Lohr, Sizing Up Big Data, supra note 122, at F1. 
142 MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 132, at 9. 
143 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1089 (2002); see also James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, 
and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 181-82 (2008) (describing 
an FBI database upgrade that will give law enforcement access to “offenders’ identities (name, 
photo, fingerprint) and the states where their rap sheets can be obtained” (footnote omitted)).  
144 See Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 
385, 389 (2012) (“Big data is closely linked both literally and by its scale to the massive datasets 
compiled by well know [sic] data aggregators such as ChoicePoint or Acxiom. Those datasets often 
start by aggregating large (but not “big”) structured sets created by state, federal, and local 
governments, law enforcement, and financial institutions amongst others. Acxiom is reported to 
hold data on five-hundred million consumers with an average of 1500 data points per data subject.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Janet Dean Gertz, Comment, The Purloined Personality: Consumer Profiling in 
Financial Services, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 943, 944-945 (2002) (highlighting the amount of 
information that financial transaction data exposes, including where a person lives and works). 
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points can create a revealing composite of our identity, and when accessible 
by the government, they can serve as a valuable source of investigatory 
power.145  
As the 2013 National Security Agency scandal reveals,146 phone compa-
nies, Internet companies, and law enforcement all have the capability to 
store, access, analyze, and share the metadata of phone calls.147 Metadata 
reveals the phone numbers contacted from a targeted phone.148 Metadata 
 
145 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1720 (2008) (“In many instances, the government has the best access to 
information that decisionmakers will want to use. Criminal records, bankruptcy records, military 
service records, immigration and naturalization records, academic records from public schools or 
state-run universities, or records regarding membership in licensed professions are obvious 
examples.”); Terry, supra note 144, at 389-90 (“Increasingly and of considerable importance going 
forward, big data comes from less structured sources including ‘[w]eb-browsing data trails, social 
network communications, sensor data and surveillance data.’ Much of it is ‘exhaust data,’ or data 
created unintentionally as a byproduct of social networks, web searches, smartphones, and other 
online behaviors.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lohr, Amid the Flood, supra 
note 7)). 
146 See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S. Mines Internet Firms’ Data, Documents Show, 
WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, at A1; see also Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Taps Yahoo, 
Google Links, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2013, at A1; Siobhan Gorman & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, 
NSA Reaches Deep into U.S. to Spy on Net, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2013, at A1; Carol D. Leonnig, 
Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, Judge Defends Role in Spying, WASH. POST, June 30, 2013, at 
A1; Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, NSA Chief ’s Methods Fuel Debate on Privacy, WASH. POST, 
July 15, 2013, at A1; James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Examines Social Networks of U.S. Citizens, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at A1; James Risen, Report Indicates More Extensive Cooperation by 
Microsoft on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2013, at A14; Shira Ovide, U.S. Official Releases Details of 
Prism Program, WALL ST. J. ( June 8, 2013, 6:28 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424127887324299104578533802289432458, archived at http://perma.cc/98BU-Q9NU. 
147 See Ovide, supra note 146; see also Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ 
Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at 1A; Dionne Searcey & Anne Marie Squeo, More Phone 
Firms Fight Claims They Supplied Call Data to NSA, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2006, at A3. 
148 See Dahlia Lithwick & Steve Vladeck, Taking the “Meh” out of Metadata, SLATE (Nov. 22, 
2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/nsa_and_metadata_ 
how_the_government_can_spy_on_your_health_political_beliefs.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
6PSC-5FF6 (noting also that “by analyzing the metadata of every American across a span of years, 
the NSA could learn almost as much about our health, our habits, our politics, and our relationships 
as it could by eavesdropping on our calls”); cf. Brian X. Chen, Using E-Mail Data to Connect the 
Dots of Your Life, N.Y. TIMES ( July 5, 2013), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/using-e-mail-
data-to-connect-the-dots-of-your-life, archived at http://perma.cc/JHC4-Q5AN (describing how 
metadata programs can identify a network of contacts through linking past email contacts). 
Ordinary mail is also tracked in a similar way. See Ron Nixon, Postal Service Is Watching Too: 
Outside of All Mail Is Recorded, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2013, at A1 (detailing the “Mail Isolation 
Control and Tracking program, in which Postal Service computers photograph the exterior of 
every piece of paper mail that is processed in the United States—about 160 billion pieces last year”). 
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from cell phones can reveal the location and time of a call, text, or email.149 
As one commentator explained: 
Information about where your phone has been might seem innocuous, but it 
can be surprisingly revealing. Location data can identify where someone 
sleeps, where they work, who they get a beer with, what medical profes-
sionals they visit and what political or religious gatherings they attend. And 
it’s almost impossible to anonymize this data because . . . people are “living 
in habitrails,” following a standardized schedule in which work and home 
markers are easy to discern.150 
Location tracking through smartphone technology has become a normal 
part of police investigation.151 This information is not limited to the national 
security context, as local law enforcement regularly requests access to phone 
records for ordinary criminal cases.152 Finally, of course, the public willingly 
 
149 See Matt Richtel, Live Tracking of Mobile Phones Prompts Court Fights on Privacy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at A1. 
150 Andrea Peterson, Your Location History Is Like a Fingerprint. And Cops Can Get it Without a 
Warrant, WASH. POST ( July 31, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/ 
2013/07/31/your-location-history-is-like-a-fingerprint-and-cops-can-get-it-without-a-warrant, 
archived at http://perma.cc/33GH-NMFQ (quoting Jeff Jonas, IBM Fellow and Chief Scientist, 
IBM Entity Analytics Grp.).  
151 Cf. MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 129, at 85 (“As the number of people using mobile phones 
has increased, the use of cell-tower signals to triangulate the location of such devices has become 
increasingly common. This technology has the potential to identify the location of the owners of 
almost 5 billion globally.”); Hayley Tsukayama, Alarm on Hill over iPhone Location Tracking, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 22, 2011, at A13; Troy Wolverton, iSpy: Apple’s iPhones Can Track Users’ Movements, SAN 
JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 21, 2011, 11:22 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_17893676, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9X26-TKRP.  
152 See Robert Block, Requests for Corporate Data Multiply: Businesses Juggle Law-Enforcement 
Demands for Information About Customers, Suppliers, WALL ST. J., (May 20, 2006, 11:59 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB114808152438358490, archived at http://perma.cc/KPH-3FKR; 
John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA TODAY ( June 13, 2014, 2:40 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-data-spying-nsa-police/3902809/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/76RX-FYE3; Matt Sledge, Cops Asked for Cell Phone Data More than 1 
Million Times Last Year, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2013, 3:55 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/12/09/cell-phone-data-requests_n_4414059.html, archived at http://perma.cc/48V6-C63D 
(“The data requests, which can be made by everyone from local cops to the FBI, are facilitated by 
a 1986 law called the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which in many cases allows data 
content to be accessed on the simple say-so of law enforcement, without a warrant.”); Bob 
Sullivan, Who’s Buying Cell Phone Records Online? Cops, NBC NEWS ( June 20, 2006, 11:59 AM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12534959/, archived at http://perma.cc/K7T4-RWA4. As will be 
discussed later, this information is available to police if necessary for an investigation. See 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2012). 
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gives up this locational data to private companies interested in our habits 
and patterns.153  
Just as people are tracked by where they go and with whom they speak, 
our cars and public transportation services are also tracked. Automatic 
license plate readers record the location of tens of thousands of cars in a 
growing number of cities.154 Electronic toll collection systems record travel 
patterns on highways.155 Speed cameras record travel on local roads.156 Data 
recorders in our cars collect information about our driving habits, including 
the speed at which we drive.157 GPS devices—using the same technology that 
powers our navigation systems—can track our cars.158 Surveillance devices are 
being installed on public buses and subways.159  
We reveal information about ourselves not only in the physical world, 
but also when we go online or use mobile applications. Some Internet and 
social media sites track every single click of the mouse, revealing everything 
 
153 See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 129, at 86 (“A combination of navigation devices, cell-tower 
tracking, and smartphones accounts for the majority of personal location data  
today. . . . [S]martphones are a huge and fast-growing source of these data because the majority 
of users use applications that require their locations to be tracked.”); see also id. at 90-91 (explain-
ing geo-targeted advertising); cf. Brian X. Chen, iPhone Tracks Your Every Move, and There’s a Map 
for That, WIRED (Apr. 20, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/2011/04/iphone-tracks/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/Z93G-57GZ.  
154 Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. 
& POL’Y 281, 286 (“ALPR [automatic license plate recognition] systems not only flag passing cars 
that match a criminal database, but they also record the exact time and location of all passing cars 
into a searchable database, whether or not there is any evidence of wrongdoing. This data can be 
kept on file indefinitely. In communities with extensive, integrated networks of ALPR cameras, 
this could potentially amount to mass surveillance of an entire community.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Martin Kaste, Police May Know Exactly Where You Were Last Tuesday, NPR ( July 17, 2013, 10:00 
AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/07/16/202801282/police-may-know-exactly-
where-you-were-last-tuesday, archived at http://perma.cc/T4NX-M7NC.  
155 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (“[A]utomatic toll collection systems create a precise record of the movements of  
motorists . . . .”). 
156 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the 
Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 221 (2002) (highlighting the increase in government 
surveillance of public places). 
157 See, e.g., Associated Press, Evidence From Black Boxes in Cars Turns Up in Courts, FOX 
NEWS ( June 28, 2003), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/06/28/evidence-from-black-boxes-in-
cars-turns-up-in-courts/, archived at http://perma.cc/52K7-BPZP (explaining that many cars have 
“black boxes” that record driving behavior); Bob Gritzinger, Under the Hood, with Big Brother, 
AUTOWEEK (Nov. 7, 2004), http://autoweek.com/article/car-news/under-hood-big-brother-forget-
orwells-198420-years-later-its-our-cars-are-giving-us, archived at http://perma.cc/9M7M-TU3W 
(same). 
158 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948 (describing use of a GPS-tracking device by police). 
159 Kim Zetter, Public Buses Across Country Quietly Adding Microphones to Record Passenger Con-
versations, WIRED (Dec. 10, 2012, 4:46 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/12/public-bus-audio-
surveillance/, archived at http://perma.cc/8YM2-246Z. 
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a user does online.160 When combined with the use of mobile communica-
tions and mobile technology, this data provides investigatory clues as to 
what a user does in the real world.161  
Corporations regularly mine this online data for commercial advertising 
purposes.162 In fact, both online and offline, companies create targeted 
consumer profiles that understand what we buy, what we do not buy,163 and 
even how long we spend in particular areas of stores.164 This information is 
not used just to sell things. As Slate reported, “for a brief period of time in 
 
160 In addition, the police have created software to spy on particular individuals’ Internet 
histories. See Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, FBI Uses Malware to Gather Data on Suspects, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2012, at A1 (“[H]igh-tech search tools, which the FBI calls ‘network 
investigative techniques,’ have been used when authorities struggle to track suspects who are adept 
at covering their tracks online. The most powerful FBI surveillance software can covertly 
download files, photographs and stored e-mails, or even gather real-time images by activating 
cameras connected to computers, say court documents and people familiar with this technology.”). 
161 As one commentator put it:  
[T]he accumulation of a citizen’s email, documents, voicemails, phone logs, records, 
photos, and even location by Google rivals and perhaps exceeds the data gathering 
capabilities of traditional law enforcement methods. . . . 
The synthesis of data from a user’s web search history coupled with email, photos, 
documents, voicemails, phone logs, and location, creates a profile of an individual that 
serves as behavior modeling for advertisers. This same data could just as easily be 
disclosed to law enforcement officials for criminal profiling. 
Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Google, National Security, 
and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 163-64 (2011).  
162 Candice L. Kline, Comment, Security Theater and Database-Driven Information Markets: A 
Case for an Omnibus U.S. Data Privacy Statute, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 443, 447 (2008) (“A byproduct 
of enhanced technological capabilities is the ease with which data can be populated, aggregated, 
and exchanged across an increasingly diverse set of corporate interests. These corporate interests 
span the economy and include retailers (Sears, Hallmark), pharmaceutical companies (Pfizer), 
technology firms (Microsoft, IBM), banks and financial services firms (Bank One, Bank of 
America), and automakers (GM, Toyota). Data brokerage companies, such as Acxiom and 
LexisNexis repackage, augment, and sell personal data on individuals to corporate and public 
sector clients.” (footnotes omitted)); Natasha Singer, You for Sale: A Data Giant is Mapping, and 
Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1 (describing private-sector data 
mining). 
163 See FTC, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-acco 
untability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf (“[D]ata brokers 
hold a vast array of information on individual consumers. For example, one of the nine data 
brokers has 3000 data segments for nearly every U.S. consumer.”). See generally S. COMM. ON 
COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., MAJORITY STAFF, A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: 
COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES 13-14 (2013) 
(describing the types of data collected by data brokers).  
164 See Laura Hildner, Note, Defusing the Threat of RFID: Protecting Consumer Privacy Through 
Technology-Specific Legislation at the State Level, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 142 (2006) 
(describing radio frequency identification technology used to track customers’ movements in retail 
stores). 
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2005 and 2006, the FBI, hoping to find some underground Iranian terrorist 
cells, . . . went through customer data collected by grocery stores in the 
San Francisco area searching for sales records of Middle Eastern food.”165 
Because purchases can be traced to a particular point of sale, law enforce-
ment can identify a person’s location at any given point in time.166  
Our purchases also reveal our financial resources, information that is 
also stored directly in numerous digital databases.167 As anyone with credit 
knows, credit reports include a life’s worth of financial data and life experi-
ences.168 The new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has extensive data 
collection power over financial accounts, including personal information,169 
but this pales in comparison to the data held by private information aggrega-
tors who have developed lucrative business models around the collection and 
aggregation of personal information.170  
There are information aggregation businesses in the private sector that  
already combine personal data from thousands of private-sector sources and 
public records. ChoicePoint, Acxiom, LexisNexis, the three national credit 
bureaus, and dozens of other companies maintain rich repositories of infor-
mation about virtually every adult in the country. These records are updated 
daily by a steady stream of incoming data. They provide a one-stop-shop 
for the government when it wants access to personal data, and most of the 
government’s data mining initiatives depend on access to those data.171 
 
165 Evgeny Morozov, Connecting the Dots, Missing the Story, SLATE ( June 24, 2013, 7:45 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/06/with_big_data_surveillance_the_go
vernment_doesn_t_need_to_know_why_anymore.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FuF4-DDRW. 
166 MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 129, at 85 (“Globally in 2008, there were 90 billion to 100 
billion such transactions off line linkable to [point of sale] devices. Law enforcement investigations 
regularly use such data to establish physical location.”). 
167 Cf. Sam Kamin, The Private Is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the Fourth 
Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 125-27 (2004) (discussing databases of information on consumers 
that retailers compile). 
168 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commer-
cial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 595, 600-07 (2004) (describing the types of data compiled by different information firms, 
including the credit bureau Experian). 
169 See Carter Dougherty, Consumer Bureau Chief Defends Big-Data Program, BOS. GLOBE, 
Apr. 24, 2013, at B10.  
170 Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on 
Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 902 (2008) (“[P]rivate organizations can at times obtain and share 
information more easily and under fewer legal restrictions than the government can when it 
collects similar information on its own.”). 
171 Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 435, 457 (2008). 
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While federal, state, and local laws limit direct government access to  
financial records without some legal process,172 the government may indi-
rectly access this same information through data aggregating services almost 
without restriction.173  
Finally, police, of course, access law enforcement records of past convic-
tions, arrests, and information related to those contacts. Most officers have 
access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a computerized 
database of criminal justice information.174 According to internal FBI 
reports, users searched the NCIC database 2.7 billion times in 2011 and the 
database had 11.7 million active records.175 Once police have accessed the 
NCIC system, they can pull up physical characteristics or addresses and 
query the database to determine whether observed suspects live in an area 
or whether they match a description of a wanted suspect.176  
2. Networked Data 
The investigatory utility of standalone databases improves when law 
enforcement agencies and private companies connect those databases and 
aggregate their data. Indeed, linking traditional criminal justice data with 
private data provides a wealth of insights about a person.177 In recent years, 
 
172 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1; Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I.’s Reach Into Records Is Set To Grow, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at A12 (characterizing the government’s ability to gather financial data on 
individuals as at least moderately constrained); Josh Meyer & Greg Miller, U.S. Secretly Tracks 
Global Bank Data, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1. 
173 See Joshua L. Simmons, Note, Buying You: The Government’s Use of Fourth-Parties to Launder 
Data About ‘The People,’ 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950, 951-52, 990-99 (reporting that the 
government turns to private companies to provide information that it would be restricted from 
collecting on its own); Pratap Chatterjee, The Data Hackers, NATION (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/176542/data-hackers, archived at http://perma.cc/DRG8-62XQ 
(reporting that private companies sell data to the government for law enforcement purposes). 
174 Cf. National Crime Information Center, FBI, supra note 11. 
175 The CJIS Division Turns 20, CJIS LINK (Fed. Bureau of Investigation/Criminal Justice 
Info. Servs. Div.), Mar. 2012, at 3. 
176 Cf. Kline, supra note 162, at 451 (“An example of a state-level database initiative is the 
Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (‘MATRIX’), a law enforcement database that 
combines data from private and public sources to create a searchable database to assist in police 
investigations.”). 
177 Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance, supra note 138, at 145 (“[A]dvances in data warehousing 
and data exchange technology in the financial sector allow very easy access to a virtual cornucopia 
of transaction-related information that can reveal, among other things, ‘what products or services 
you buy; what charities, political causes, or religious organizations you contribute to; . . . where, 
with whom, and when you travel; how you spend your leisure time; . . . whether you have 
unusual or dangerous hobbies; and even whether you participate in certain felonious activities.’” 
(quoting Gertz, supra note 144, at 944-45)); Solove, supra note 138; Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining 
and the Security–Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 344 (2008) [hereinafter Solove, Security–
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the federal government created two such networked database programs, but 
eventually discontinued their use due to public concerns about privacy.  
The first database, the Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information  
Exchange Program (MATRIX), included a networked database that allowed 
police officers to check a broad range of information with one search, 
including criminal history, credit information, driver’s license information, 
vehicle registration, arrests, utility connections, UCC filings, concealed 
weapons permits, FAA aircraft and pilots licenses, hunting and fishing 
licenses, professional licenses, and voter registration records.178 As the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center argued in its amicus brief in Hiibel 
v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, a police officer using the MATRIX 
system could develop an entire profile of a suspect simply by running a 
name in the database during a routine encounter.179 According to the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Privacy Office in its review of the 
program,  
only 2.6% of the cases investigated over the course of the MATRIX pilot 
project were related to terrorism. In fact, the MATRIX project was  
predominantly used to investigate fraud, robbery, and other crimes, including 
assault, homicide and narcotics cases, underscoring the value of the program 
as a tool for traditional law enforcement.180  
The second database, the even more Orwellian-sounding Total Infor-
mation Awareness System, was designed by the Department of Defense to 
fight terrorism by linking data sources into one searchable national infor-
mation collection center.181 Renamed the Terrorism Information Awareness 
 
Liberty Debate] (introducing government data mining programs); Omer Tene, What Google Knows: 
Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1458 (explaining that search query 
logs aggregate vast amounts of personal information). 
178 Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. at 12-13, 
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (No. 03-5554); see also U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT TO THE PUBLIC CONCERNING THE MULTISTATE ANTI-
TERRORISM INFORMATION EXCHANGE (MATRIX) PILOT PROJECT 2-4 (2006), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-matrix-122006.pdf (describing privacy concerns 
that doomed the project); Katie Stenman, Comment, State Government Information Collection: The 
Shutdown of the MATRIX Program, REAL ID, and DNA Collection, 2 INFO. SOC’Y J.L. & POL’Y 
547, 549-50 (2006) (describing the MATRIX database). 
179 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 178, at 30. 
180 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 178, at 2. 
181 See Douglas A. Fretty, Comment, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth for 
Fourth Amendment Rights in Public Places, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 430, 435-36 (2011) (“Called TIA 
(originally ‘Total Information Awareness’ but redubbed ‘Terrorism Information Awareness’ to 
avoid an overtly Orwellian moniker), the program included a HumanID component, intended to 
‘identify humans using a combination of biometric modes at distances up to 500 feet.’” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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system,182 this program had several components all designed to aggregate 
available information for predictive surveillance purposes.183 The Depart-
ment of Defense reportedly designed the program to “connect the dots” in 
an attempt to avoid repeating the missed opportunities to intervene before 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.184 Among other things, the 
program sought to create predictive “risk profiles” for particular citizens 
based on the available data.185  
While these two programs (and others) were canceled over privacy  
concerns,186 law enforcement and private companies have embraced the idea 
of networking and sharing personal information. First, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division coordinates 
access to databases that include public and private sources.187 FBI agents 
 
182 Id. 
183 See Slobogin, Government Data Mining, supra note 138, at 318 (“Beginning soon after the 
passing of TIA, it spent at least $40 million developing a program called ADVISE (for Analysis, 
Dissemination, Visualization, Insight, and Semantic Enhancement), which was designed ‘to troll a 
vast sea of information, including audio and visual, and extract suspicious people, places and other 
elements based on their links and behavioral patterns.’” (quoting Ellen Nakashima & Alec Klein, 
New Profiling Program Raises Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at B1)). 
184 See K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of 
Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 3 n.3 (2003) (remarking that the Joint Inquiry Into the 
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 
H.R. REP. NO. 107-792, S. REP. NO. 107-351 (2002), “refers at least ten times to the intelligence 
communit[y’s] failure to ‘connect the dots’”); see also Fretty, supra note 181. 
185 See Solove, Security–Liberty Debate, supra note 177, at 343 (“Under the TIA program, the 
government would assemble a massive database consisting of financial, educational, health, and 
other information on US citizens, which would later be analyzed to single out people matching a 
terrorist profile. According to [Admiral John] Poindexter, ‘[t]he only way to detect . . . terrorists 
is to look for patterns of activity that are based on observations from past terrorist attacks as well 
as estimates about how terrorists will adapt to our measures to avoid detection.’” (quoting John M. 
Poindexter, Op-Ed, Finding the Face of Terror in Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at A25)); Jeffrey 
Rosen, Total Information Awareness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002 (Magazine), at 128, 129 (“In 
addition to analyzing financial, educational, travel and medical records, as well as criminal and 
other governmental records, the T.I.A. program could include the development of technologies to 
create risk profiles for millions of visitors and American citizens in its quest for suspicious patterns 
of behavior.”).  
186 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 178, at 4 (analyzing the cancellation of  
MATRIX); Solove, Security–Liberty Debate, supra note 177, at 1 (reporting the cancellation of TIA, 
but suggesting that it was merely replaced with similar programs).  
187 See Cate, supra note 171, at 442-43 (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’) main-
tains extensive databases in its Criminal Justice Information Services Division (‘CJISD’) that 
collect data from, and supply data to, a wide array of public- and private-sector entities.”); 
Hoofnagle, supra note 168, at 599-600 (describing the murky but robust relationship between 
government agencies and private data brokers); Rushin, supra note 154, at 292 (“In 2003, the 
Department of Justice began the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP), which is 
designed at improving the sharing of criminal intelligence data.”). 
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and analysts regularly access these databases which contain hundreds of 
millions of records.188  
Law enforcement has benefited and continues to benefit from the 
growth of private surveillance collection services.189 For example, the 
technology that ran the Total Information Awareness Program is now 
owned by LexisNexis, a private company.190 As one expert has written, 
“[T]he private sector is developing domain specific technologies (that is, 
applications developed specifically for law enforcement purposes) to 
aggregate and mine data using both link analysis and pattern-matching in 
criminal investigations and these technologies are already being adopted 
and employed in a variety of law enforcement environments.”191 Police, 
thus, can and do request information from third-party data sources, including 
commercial data aggregators, Google, phone companies, and social and 
financial networks.192 This creates the potential to replicate in the private 
 
188 See Cate, supra note 171, at 444 (“The FBI aggregates data from multiple databases into its 
Investigative Data Warehouse (‘IDW’). According to press briefings given by the FBI in 2006, the 
IDW contains more than 659 million records, which come from 50 FBI and outside government 
agency sources. The system’s data mining tools are so sophisticated that they can handle many 
variations in names and other data, including up to twenty-nine variants of birth dates. The 13,000 
agents and analysts who use the system average one million queries a month.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Slobogin, Government Data Mining, supra note 138, at 319-20 (“The DOJ, through the 
FBI, has been collecting telephone logs, banking records, and other personal information 
regarding thousands of Americans not only in connection with counterterrorism efforts, but also in 
furtherance of ordinary law enforcement.” (footnote omitted)). 
189 See Simmons, supra note 173, at 951-52 (“Your information is for sale, and the government 
is buying it at alarming rates. The CIA, FBI, Justice Department, Defense Department, and other 
government agencies are, at this very moment, turning to a group of companies to provide them 
with information that these companies can gather without the restrictions that bind government 
intelligence agencies.”). 
190 Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under Justice Stevens’s Fourth Amendment?, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1739-40 (2006) (“MATRIX allowed law enforcement to search through 
‘billions of records from disparate datasets’ from participating states as well as ‘commercially 
available data sources.’ The database itself actually was developed and maintained by Seisint, Inc., 
based on its Accurint service that LexisNexis later acquired.” (footnote omitted)). 
191 Taipale, supra note 184, at 15 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 14-15 (“The notion that 
powerful analytical tools developed for commercial and scientific application will not eventually be 
used for terrorism prevention (or, for that matter, general law enforcement purposes) seems 
unrealistic, particularly since these technologies are already being used in a wide variety of law 
enforcement contexts.” (footnote omitted)). 
192 See, e.g., Editorial, The End of Privacy?, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, at SR10 (describing 
increased opportunities for surveillance in a digital era); see also Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee 
& Paul M. Schwartz, Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological 
Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 271-73 (2008) (same); Taipale, supra note 184, at 21 (“In the 
context of law enforcement, data mining is no more than the computational automation of 
traditional investigative skills—that is, the intelligent analysis of myriad ‘clues’ in order to develop 
a theory of the case.”); Terry, supra note 144, at 391 (“Big data is creating a private surveillance 
model that will exceed law enforcement tracking of individuals using Internet and cell phone 
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sector much of what was envisioned in the original government surveillance 
projects that were considered threatening to Americans’ privacy.193  
Finally, because commercial entities—rather than the government—own 
these “fourth-party” records, they avoid many of the constitutional and 
statutory protections that might ensure privacy of these records.194 “Today, 
data aggregators are able to cross-index various sources of information to 
produce incredibly extensive—and invasive—lists for practically any 
purpose. For example, many can ‘provide lists of people who take Prozac 
for depression, believe in the Bible, gamble online, or buy sex toys.’”195 
 
data.”); Lee Tien, Privacy, Technology and Data Mining, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 389, 390 (2004) 
(highlighting the vast amount of data held by private firms and suggesting that the government 
would like to use it for law enforcement); Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes 
To Get the Goods on You, It May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A1 (reporting on the 
ease with which the government can access information on individuals through commercial data 
purchases); Andy Greenberg, U.S. Government Requests for Google Users’ Private Data Jump 37% in 
One Year, FORBES ( June 17, 2012, at 11:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/ 
2012/06/17/u-s-government-requests-for-google-users-private-data-spike-37-in-one-year, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HQP2-PNPM (reporting on government requests for data held by Google); 
Declan McCullagh, Feds Push for Tracking Cell Phones, CNET (Feb. 11, 2010, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/feds-push-for-tracking-cell-phones, archived at http://perma.cc/4TXW-
ZX64 (discussing government efforts to use cell phone data for law enforcement). 
193 ChoicePoint itself is said to have “14 billion records on individuals and businesses that can 
be used for tasks like pre-employment screening of job candidates.” Kline, supra note 162, at 448 
(“Electronically available personal data culled from public and private records forms the backbone 
of the multi-billion dollar database-marketing industry. Data brokers and their customers collect 
and trade massive amounts of digitized personal data on most Americans through database-driven 
information markets.”); see also Strahilevitz, supra note 145, at 1670 (“One of the most significant 
developments in the industrialized world during the last decade has been the increased availability 
of information about individuals. Personal information that was once obscure can be revealed 
almost instantaneously via a Google search.”). 
194 See Simmons, supra note 173, at 976 (“There is no provision . . . preventing [a] financial 
institution from disclosing . . . information to a fourth-party, who could then pass it on to the 
government.”); see also Michaels, supra note 170, at 902.  
195 Simmons, supra note 173, at 990-91 (quoting Paul Magnusson, They’re Watching You, BUS. 
WK., Jan. 24, 2005, at 22); see also JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, 
SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 3 (2014) (questioning 
whether companies ought to “scoop up information about people’s mental health”); Elspeth A. 
Brotherton, Comment, Big Brother Gets a Makeover: Behavioral Targeting and the Third-Party 
Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 563 (2012) (“For example, ‘supermassive databases’—like those made 
available by companies such as LexisNexis—offer billions of records about individuals aggregated 
from public and private records. Thus, a user’s profile could reflect vast quantities of highly 
sensitive personal information, including the user’s ‘demographics, family information, and credit 
history.’” (footnote omitted)); Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., 
July 31, 2010, at W1 (“Microsoft . . . had a prediction of . . . age, ZIP code[,] . . . gender[,] . . . 
income, marital status, presence of children and home ownership.”); John Markoff, You’re Leaving a 
Digital Trail. Should You Care?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at BU1 (highlighting the abundance of 
smartphone-generated data); Robert O’Harrow Jr., In Age of Security, Firm Mines Wealth of Personal 
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Similarly, the aggregators can tailor searches to identify those allegedly 
engaged in illicit activities, who otherwise would avoid suspicion. Such 
tools are increasingly useful to generate personalized, individualized 
information about a suspect, and remain largely unregulated.  
3. Identifiable Data 
To solve crimes, law enforcement must not only collect information, but 
also identify and link individuals to their accumulated data. In short, data 
must be connected with identifiable human beings.  
Facial recognition software, biometric identification technologies, and 
mobile communication make it easier to identify unknown suspects and 
access data associated with these suspects.196 Today, facial recognition 
software can identify a suspect by comparing the observed suspect’s face to 
a database of stored faces.197 As sources of photographs proliferate, and law 
enforcement databases link these sources together, the utility and ease of 
the technology will expand rapidly.198 In more technologically advanced 
 
Data, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2005, at A1 (reporting on ChoicePoint’s growth in private- and 
public-sector clients).  
196 See Aliya Sternstein, FBI Seeks Video Recognition Technology to Automatically ID Suspects, 
NEXTGOV (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2013/11/fbi-seeks-video-recog 
nition-technology-automatically-id-suspects/73168/, archived at http://perma.cc/X5H2-CWR3 
(“The FBI is weighing the use of video recognition technology to quickly identify suspects, even if 
all the camera has captured is a perpetrator’s limp or fraying blue baseball cap. Think of it as 
automated police lineups for the YouTube generation.”); see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video 
Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks 
Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1354 (2004) (highlighting identification technologies); 
John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Technology, 25 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 81 (2002) (same). 
197 See Rushin, supra note 154, at 288 (“During the Super Bowl in 2001, FaceTrac technology 
was used to digitally scan 128 points on the face of each fan entering Raymond James Stadium in 
Tampa, Florida. This information was then compared to Federal Bureau of Investigations [sic] 
databases. In total, the technology was able to identify nineteen suspected criminals. Similar 
technology has been employed in major cities across the country including Boston, Tampa, 
Providence, Kansas City, and Washington, D.C.” (footnotes omitted)).  
198 Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote 
Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 447-48 (2012) (“[T]he Interstate Photo 
System (IPS) . . . draws heavily on FRT and data mining technologies—and the database on 
which it is built is rapidly growing. As of 2009, [the database] included more than 6.75 million 
photos. By February 2012, this number had increased to more than 114.5 million photos.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1521 (2013) 
(“With a universal biometric database and ‘cardless’ national ID system, such as a biometric E-
Verify system, or biometric national ID card—e.g., digitalized and multimodal biometric driver’s 
license, Social Security Card, or passport—federal, state, and local law enforcement could scan 
biometric data or request to see a digitalized biometric ID for a wide range of reasons, including 
routine traffic stops.”). 
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jurisdictions, mobile handheld devices can match faces to a central database.199 
Soon the technology will complete searches in real time by allowing police to 
scan multiple faces along a street.200 As more police use portable computers 
linked to these photograph databases, the ability of law enforcement to scan 
and analyze faces to identify suspects will become more common.201  
The scale of available photo databases demonstrates the power of  
networked data. As reported by The Washington Post, “The FBI’s own facial-
recognition database has about 15 million criminal mug shots. Bureau 
officials are pushing to expand that by tens of millions more by encouraging 
states to upload their criminal justice photos into the national system.”202 
Many states have complied or are complying with this request, and some 
have created their own systems. The Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office in 
Florida, for example, has built one of the country’s most advanced  
 
199 See, e.g., Sabrina A. Lochner, Note, Saving Face: Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Mobile 
Facial Recognition Technology & Iris Scans, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 206 (2013) (“[T]he American 
military began using a multi-modal device called Handheld Interagency Identity Detection 
Equipment (‘HIIDE’) in 2007. This allowed soldiers to take facial pictures, iris scans, and 
fingerprints in the field and compare the gathered information to a database; the comparison let 
soldiers see if the person being scanned was on a watch list and allowed the soldiers to determine 
the person’s identity.”). 
200 See Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, Photo-ID Databases Become Troves for Police, 
WASH. POST, June 17, 2013, at A1 (“But research efforts are focused on pushing the software to the 
point where it can reliably produce the names of people in the time it takes them to walk by a 
video camera. This already works in controlled, well-lit settings when the database of potential 
matches is relatively small. Most experts expect those limitations to be surmounted over the next 
few years.”); David Goldman, Real-Time Face Recognition Comes to Your iPhone Camera, CNN 
MONEY (Mar. 12, 2012, 11:13 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/12/technology/iPhone-face-
recognition/, archived at http://perma.cc/J3WH-2Z3V; Zach Howard, Police to Begin iPhone Iris 
Scans Amid Privacy Concerns, REUTERS, July 20, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/07/20/us-crime-identification-iris-idUSTRE76J4A120110720. 
201 See Lochner, supra note 199, at 202 (“Beginning in April 2012, more than 50 law enforce-
ment agencies across the United States began using a mobile device to identify people through 
facial recognition technology (‘FRT’), iris scans, and fingerprints.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 205 
(“Using FRT, police can determine someone’s identity by running a photo of that person’s face 
through a database. The computer program matches the unidentified face with a picture, name, 
and criminal record of someone already in the database.” (footnote omitted)); see also Fretty, supra 
note 181, at 435 (“[C]ities are embracing FRT to monitor their citizens on a daily, more mundane 
basis. Many municipalities, including Los Angeles and New York City, have equipped police 
officers with facial scanners that determine whether a suspect has a criminal record, while others 
install the technology on stationary street cameras.” (footnote omitted)). 
202 Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 200, at A1; see also Ryan Gallagher, FBI to Give Facial 
Recognition Software to Law-Enforcement Agencies, SLATE (Aug. 23, 2012, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/08/23/universal_face_workstation_fbi_to_give_facial_r
ecognition_software_to_law_enforcement_.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G9VR-NMBF; Sara 
Reardon, FBI Launches $1 Billion Face Recognition Project, NEWSCIENTIST (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21528804.200-fbi-launches-1-billion-facerecognition-proj 
ect.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S3Q4-4WUM. 
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facial-recognition programs.203 “The faces of more than 120 million people 
are in searchable photo databases that state officials assembled to prevent 
driver’s license fraud but that increasingly are used by police to identify 
suspects, accomplices and even innocent bystanders in a wide range of 
criminal investigations.”204 “Pennsylvania’s Justice Network, which has 
allowed police anywhere in the state to compare a facial image with mug-
shot databases, has become a key investigative tool . . . and last month it 
added access to 34 million driver’s-license photos.”205 These examples 
represent only the beginning as twenty-six states now allow local law 
enforcement to access driver’s license photographs for facial recognition 
purposes.206 In addition, facial recognition programs can easily search a 
wealth of personal photographs uploaded online.207 
Facial recognition is but one technology used to identify suspects on the 
streets. Law enforcement can also use biometric identification technolo-
gies208 that look to irises, tattoos, scars, face-shape, and even the habitual 
 
203 Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 200, at A1.  
204 Id.  
205 Id. 
206 Id. (“Thirty-seven states now use facial-recognition technology in their driver’s-license 
registries . . . . At least 26 of those allow state, local or federal law enforcement agencies to 
search—or request searches—of photo databases in an attempt to learn the identities of people 
considered relevant to investigations.”); see also id. (“The increasingly widespread deployment of 
the technology in the United States has helped police find murderers, bank robbers and drug 
dealers, many of whom leave behind images on surveillance videos or social-media sites that can be 
compared against official photo databases. . . . [L]aw enforcement use of such facial searches is 
blurring the traditional boundaries between criminal and non-criminal databases, putting images 
of people never arrested in what amount to perpetual digital lineups. The most advanced systems 
allow police to run searches from laptop computers in their patrol cars and offer access to the FBI 
and other federal authorities.”). 
207 See Emily Steel, A Face Launches 1,000 Apps, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2011, at B5 (reviewing the 
proliferation of social media applications that use facial recognition); Richard Lardner, Your New 
Facebook ‘Friend’ May Be the FBI, NBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2010, 10:54 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
id/35890739/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/your-newfacebook-friend-may-be-fbi/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/KQJ2-9MT3 (reporting on use of social media by law enforcement); see also Dino 
Grandoni, Facebook’s New “DeepFace” Program Is Just As Creepy As It Sounds, HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/18/facebook-deepface-facial-recognition_n_4985925.html 
(last updated Mar. 25, 2014, 2:59 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/79TP-MEJR (“Facebook owns 
the world’s largest photo library, and it now has the technology to match almost all the faces 
within it. Yes, even the ones you don’t tag. Facebook announced . . . that it has developed a 
program called ‘DeepFace,’ which researchers say can determine whether two photographed faces 
are of the same person with 97.25 percent accuracy.”).  
208 Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 56 FLA. L. 
REV. 697, 704-05 (2004) (“Biometrics are identification techniques based on some unique, 
physiological, and difficult-to-alienate characteristic. Current forms of identification often rely on 
relatively primitive biometrics such as skin, hair and eye color, physical markings, gender, and 
facial hair. These characteristics are often portrayed in a photograph or list of physical characteris-
tics, such as those used on a driver’s license.” (footnote omitted)). 
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manner in which people walk.209 The goal: a comprehensive remote scanning 
technology that would allow instant identification of suspects through a 
quick search of a massive database.210 One existing program, dubbed 
MORIS, already allows an ordinary iPhone user to scan an iris and compare 
it to a database of biometric identifiers.211 With MORIS,  
[p]olice can take a picture of the subject’s face from up to [five] feet away 
and conduct an iris scan from up to [six] inches from the person’s eye. The 
device matches photographs against a national criminal records database 
that is managed by Biometric Intelligence and Identification Technologies 
(‘BI2 Technologies’), the private company that designed MORIS.212  
Other techniques will also be developed that may allow similar scanning 
through other surveillance techniques.213 
These growing mobile technologies not only allow law enforcement to 
identify previously unknown suspects but also provide other networked 
personal information about those suspects.214 As one state law enforcement 
 
209 Ellen Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2007, at 
A1; Image-Based Matching Technology Offers Identification and Intelligence Prospects, CJIS LINK 
(FBI/Criminal Justice Info. Servs. Div), Dec. 2012, at 4 (“In 2014, investigators will be able to 
query the NGI [(Next Generation Identification)] with descriptive data about tattoos to find 
images of potential matches of [scars, marks, and tattoos] associated with individuals’ records.”). 
210 Wendy Koch, Iris Scans Let Law Enforcement Keep an Eye on Criminals, USA TODAY, Dec. 
5, 2007, at A1; Howard, supra note 200. 
211 Lochner, supra note 199, at 207 (“MORIS attaches to an iPhone and allows law enforce-
ment officers to search facial, iris, and fingerprint databases while they are in the field.”) 
212 Id. at 208 (footnotes omitted); see also Donohue, supra note 198, at 461-62 ( “[T]he Mobile 
Offender Recognition and Information System, known as MORIS, incorporates FRT, iris scans, 
and fingerprinting. Police officers equipped with the device can take a picture of a person’s face 
from a distance of two to five feet away, which is then analyzed according to 130 distinguishing 
points. This information can then be compared to existing databases.” (footnotes omitted)); Emily 
Steel, How a New Police Tool for Face Recognition Works, WALL ST. J. ( July 13, 2011, 7:56 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/07/13/how-a-new-police-tool-for-face-recognition-works/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/TXS-8DHQ (noting the MORIS device’s usefulness in identifying individuals 
who are not carrying forms of identification). 
213 See, e.g., Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, Device Raises Fear of Facial Profiling, WALL ST. J., July 13, 
2011, at A1; Tovia Smith, New Police Scanner Raises “Facial Profiling” Concerns, NPR ( July 27, 2011, 9:58 
PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/11/138769662/new-police-scanner-raises-facial-profiling-concerns, 
archived at http://perma.cc/R5HT-Y342; see also Noah Shachtman, Army Tracking Plan: Drones that 
Never Forget a Face, WIRED (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2011/09/drones-
never-forget-a-face/, archived at http://perma.cc/FP49-4KTZ. 
214 See Donohue, supra note 198, at 412-13 (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for 
example, is currently developing what it calls Next Generation Identification (NGI). One of its 
components, the Interstate Photo System, allows law enforcement to submit still images or video 
surveillance feeds obtained from any public or private source. The system is designed to store this 
data and, using FRT, to identify individuals, pairing images with biographic information. NGI 
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officer remarked, “I can call up everything about you, your pictures and 
pictures of your neighbors.”215 In addition, these technologies will allow law 
enforcement to identify targeted populations easily, such as gang members 
or suspects identified on “most wanted lists.”216 For example, police in 
Lincoln, Nebraska, carry a mobile application called “P3I” (Proactive Police 
Patrol Information) that displays the location of suspected gang members, 
registered sex offenders, people with outstanding warrants, parolees, and 
criminal incident reports.217 The result is that big data technology can 
provide vastly more identifying information to help determine reasonable 
suspicion on the streets.  
C. Predictive Data 
Big data also promises another change in law enforcement techniques. 
The expansive collection of data allows for more sophisticated analysis that 
might reveal previously unknown patterns of criminal activity.218  
 
also uses biographic information to search its Repository for Individuals of Special Concern 
(RISC).” (footnotes omitted)). 
215 Simmons, supra note 173, at 952 n.1. 
216 See Molly Bruder, Comment, Say Cheese! Examining the Constitutionality of Photostops, 57 
AM. U. L. REV. 1693, 1697 (2008) (“Increasingly, police departments and law enforcement agencies 
are using gang databases to combat gang violence. These databases contain personal information 
about suspected gang members, including gang allegiance, street name, address, physical descrip-
tion, identifying marks, tattoos, and photographs.” (footnote omitted)); Jim Adams, Officers Share 
Names to Battle Gangs, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 24, 1998, at B1; Editorial, “GangNet” Bears 
Watching, DENVER POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at B23; Ryan Lizza, The Year in Ideas: Ghetto Profiling, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002 (Magazine), at 94, 94-95 (describing a profiling technique in which 
police target crime-plagued neighborhoods to build a database of potential suspects); see also Hong 
H. Tieu, Picturing the Asian Gang Member Among Us, 11 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 41, 44-45 (2006) 
(reporting that California’s “CalGang” database is the largest gang database in the nation and 
contains photographs of suspected gang members who have been detained—although not 
necessarily arrested—by local police departments); De Tran & Iris Yokoi, O.C. Asians Say Police 
Photos Are Harassment: Dispute: Fountain Valley’s “Mug” Shots Unfairly Stereotype Youths as Gang 
Members, Complainants Say, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-11-15/ 
news/mn-1093_1_fountain-valley-police-department, archived at http://perma.cc/CQK3-3NC6 
(reporting that Asian youths allege that they are unfairly branded as gang members as police take 
their photos for the gang database). 
217 Tom Casady, P3i Lincoln Police Department, YOUTUBE ( July 28, 2011), https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=7HpQwkAcU24&f; Zach Pluhacek, Lincoln Cops’ App Up for Download, 
LINCOLN J. STAR (Aug. 24, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://journalstar.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/lincoln-cops-app-up-for-download/article_6a2ae7c2-4597-51e0-a5b3-eae4069a587a.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/5XJ5-AJW3; see also Zach Pluhacek, Finding Crooks? “There’s an App for 
That,” LINCOLN J. STAR (Oct. 15, 2010, 6:45 AM), http://journalstar.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/finding-crooks-there-s-an-app-for-that/article_d3f33ae6-d7ea-11df-b5d6-001cc4c03286.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/A7R3-JCCG. 
218 See Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, at SR1 (“Police depart-
ments across the country, led by New York’s, use computerized mapping and analysis of variables 
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Predictive policing technologies are already in use in major cities such as 
Los Angeles and Seattle.219 While current technologies focus primarily on 
expected “places” of criminal activity, they also predict patterns of criminal 
actions. Computer programs can analyze these patterns, and police accordingly 
could use these patterns to stop unknown suspects whose actions fit the 
predicted activity.220 Available technologies provide different levels of 
sophistication, but the underlying theory that crime patterns can be identi-
fied, analyzed, and predicted is well established.221 Traditional hot-spot 
mapping,222 COMPSTAT systems,223 and more modern technologies like 
predictive policing all rely on data analysis to track crime patterns.224 The 
logic behind these technologies is that certain environmental vulnerabilities 
exist to encourage crime at a particular location.225 Repeated observation of 
 
like historical arrest patterns, paydays, sporting events, rainfall and holidays to try to predict likely 
crime ‘hot spots’ and deploy officers there in advance.”). 
219 See Kahn, supra note 24 (describing predictive policing in Los Angeles); Rubin, supra note 
24 (same); see also Martin Kaste, Can Software That Predicts Crime Pass Constitutional Muster?, NPR 
(July 26, 2013, 4:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/26/205835674/can-software-that-predicts-
crime-pass-constitutional-muster, archived at http://perma.cc/C2GW-86LG (discussing predictive 
policing in Seattle).  
220 See JIE XU ET AL., RUTGERS CENT. ON PUB. SEC., CRIME GENERATORS FOR SHOOT-
INGS IN URBAN AREAS: A TEST USING CONDITIONAL LOCATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE AS 
AN EXTENSION OF RISK TERRAIN MODELING 2 (2010) (reporting that shootings are concentrated 
around certain terrain features); Rubin, supra note 24 (“For patrol officers on the streets, mapping 
software on in-car computers and hand-held devices would show continuous updates on the 
probability of various crimes occurring in the vicinity, along with the addresses and background 
information about paroled ex-convicts living in the area.”).  
221 See Ferguson, Predictive Policing, supra note 29, at 265-69. 
222 See generally Ferguson, Crime Mapping, supra note 25, at 184-90 (providing an overview of 
crime mapping techniques). 
223 See generally JAMES J. WILLIS ET AL., POLICE FOUND., COMPSTAT IN PRACTICE: AN 
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THREE CITIES 2-5 (2003) (providing an overview of COMPSTAT 
technology); James J. Willis et al., Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of 
Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147, 148 (2007) 
(“COMPSTAT, a management and technological system, . . . [c]ombine[s] cutting-edge crime 
analysis and geographical information systems with state-of-the-art managements princi-
ples . . . .”). 
224 Ferguson, Predictive Policing, supra note 29, at 265-69. 
225 See Anthony A. Braga et al., The Relevance of Micro Places to Citywide Robbery Trends: A 
Longitudinal Analysis of Robbery Incidents at Street Corners and Block Faces in Boston, 48 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 11 (2011) (“Studies of the spatial distribution of robbery in urban environ-
ments have also revealed that a small number of micro places generate a disproportionate number 
of robberies. Certain high-risk facilities, such as bars, convenience stores, and banks, at particular 
places also tend to experience a disproportionate amount of robbery.”); Lisa Tompson & Michael 
Townsley, (Looking) Back to the Future: Using Space–Time Patterns to Better Predict the Location of Street 
Crime, 12 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 23, 24 (2010) (“Research has repeatedly demonstrated that 
offenders prefer to return to a location associated with a high chance of success instead of choosing 
random targets.”). 
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these place-based vulnerabilities allows analysts or algorithms to predict the 
next area of likely criminal activity.226  
The collected crime data also holds other keys to understanding the actions 
of criminals.227 Criminals adopt certain modi operandi and generally are 
creatures of habit.228 In fact, one reason why certain crimes encourage 
almost “contagious” criminal activity in the surrounding areas is because the 
same criminals (or groups of criminals) are doing the acts.229 Identifying 
these patterns may well provide clues as to who was involved in the 
crimes.230 Sometimes these patterns, in conjunction with other factors, such 
as bus routes, escape routes, weather patterns, paydays, license plates, and 
special events, may also reveal a likely offender.231  
At a deeper level of sophistication, with enough data, police will be able 
to predict criminal networks from patterns or connections.232 Just as 
companies can identify you and your interests and associates from past 
activities, law enforcement might be able to target criminal networks using 
 
226 See Erica Goode, Sending the Police Before There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2011, at 
A11 (reporting on predictive policing in Santa Cruz, California). 
227 This predictive focus on individuals has already been adopted in other areas of the criminal 
justice system, most notably in predicting recidivism and for pretrial release. Risk assessment 
mechanisms used in dozens of jurisdictions rely on predictive formulas to judge which offenders 
should be released and their likelihood of reoffending. Berk, supra note 128, at 1074. 
228 Cf. Cynthia Rudin, Predictive Policing: Using Machine Learning to Detect Patterns of Crime, 
WIRED (Aug. 22, 2013, 3:07 PM), http://www.wired.com/insights/2013/08/predictive-policing-using-
machine-learning-to-detect-patterns-of-crime, archived at http://perma.cc/84SQ-RCBG (“The 
algorithm tries to construct a modus operandi (M.O.) of the offender. The M.O. is a set of habits 
that the offender follows and is a type of behavior used to characterize a pattern. The M.O. for the 
burglaries included factors like means of entry (front door, back door, window), day of the week, 
characteristics of the property (apartment, single family house), and geographic proximity to other 
break-ins.”).  
229 Kate J. Bowers & Shane D. Johnson, Who Commits Near Repeats? A Test of the Boost Explana-
tion, W. CRIMINOLOGY REV., Nov. 2004, at 12, 22. 
230 See Vikas Grover et al., Review of Current Crime Prediction Techniques, in APPLICATIONS 
AND INNOVATIONS IN INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS XIV 233, 233 (Richard Ellis et al. eds, 2007) 
(“Data is not just a record of crimes, it also contains valuable information that could be used to 
link crime scenes based on the modus operandi (MO) of the offender(s), suggest which offenders 
may be responsible for the crime and also identify those offenders who work in teams (offender 
networks) etc.”); cf. Usama Fayyad et al., From Data Mining to Knowledge Discovery in Databases, AI 
MAG., Fall 1996, at 37, 39 (“Historically, the notion of finding useful patterns in data has been 
given a variety of names, including data mining, knowledge extraction, information discovery, 
information harvesting, data archaeology, and data pattern processing. The term data mining has 
mostly been used by statisticians, data analysts, and the management information systems (MIS) 
communities.”). 
231 See Rudin, supra note 228. 
232 See Steve Lohr, How Privacy Vanishes Online, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at A1 (discussing 
the “power of computers to identify people from social patterns”). 
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similar pattern recognition technologies.233 For example, police concerned 
with the manufacture of methamphetamine could glean valuable infor-
mation from commercial sales data in a jurisdiction. Big data analysts might 
track all of the purchases of individuals who bought several of the compo-
nent parts required to make the drug: lye, iodine, ephedrine (Sudafed), 
Drano, brake fluid, and lighter fluid.234 Each of these products has a lawful 
use, but identifying the individuals who bought all of these products would be 
a valuable clue in determining who might also be making methamphetamine. 
Patterns of anonymous sales data alone might demonstrate the levels of 
meth manufacture taking place; identifying the actual identities of repeat 
purchasers would benefit investigators even more. Though merely a more 
sophisticated form of criminal profiling,235 this possibility has drawn the 
interest of major players, including the FBI,236 who see the potential of big 
data pattern matching.237  
 
233 See, e.g., Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 
4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1 (describing “a ticking privacy time bomb” where search 
engine data can reveal user identity); Ryan Singel, Netflix Spilled Your Brokeback Mountain Secret, 
Lawsuit Claims, WIRED (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/12/netflix-
privacy-lawsuit, archived at http://perma.cc/GU22-4LWD (suggesting that Netflix users can be 
identified based on their viewing history and movie ratings). 
234 See Jon Bardin, Kentucky Study Links Pseudophedrine [sic] Sales, Meth Busts, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 16, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/16/news/la-heb-kentucky-counties-pseudophed 
rine-meth-busts-20121016, archived at http://perma.cc/EG2P-EZHN (“Using that data, researchers 
were able to determine how much of the drug was sold in each Kentucky county and compare it 
with the number of meth busts in local police logs. . . . The researchers found a significant 
association between pseudophedrine [sic] sales and meth busts: In any given county, an increase in 
pseudophedrine [sic] sales of thirteen grams per 100 people translated to an additional meth lab 
busted. The results suggest that the computer databases could actually be used to predict where 
drug busts are most likely to take place.”). 
235 See Steinbock, supra note 18, at 13 (“Data mining differs from data matching in that it is 
concerned with patterns of characteristics and behavior and is often used for making predictive 
judgments. . . . Data mining is also called ‘knowledge discovery,’ ‘pattern-matching,’ and 
‘dataveillance.’” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 30 (“[A]lthough predictive profiling is not inconsistent 
with the Fourth Amendment, the factors used must indicate to the investigating officers (and, 
later, the reviewing court) the requisite degree of suspicion. Nothing suggests that these actors 
should defer to a computer algorithm for projecting that level of suspicion, but nothing rules out 
that possibility either.” (footnote omitted)). 
236 Building Safer Communities: The Importance of Effective Federal–Local Collaboration in Law 
Enforcement, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 35 (2011) (statement of 
Richard A. McFeely, Special Agent in Charge, Balt. Field Office, FBI) (“Since September 11, 2001, 
the FBI has shifted from a traditional crime-fighting agency into an intelligence-led, threat-driven 
organization, guided by clear operational strategies. Today’s FBI is focused on predicting and 
preventing the threats we face while at the same time engaging with the communities we serve. 
This shift has led to a greater reliance on technology, collaboration, and information sharing.”). 
237 Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 803, 830 (2010) (“But the use of databases to generate suspects represents a new kind of 
investigation altogether—whether based on particular information (e.g., ‘who called this number’) 
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Several jurisdictions have even compiled “bad guy lists” of individuals 
they predict will commit crimes in the future or are involved in ongoing 
criminal activity but have not yet been caught. As Rodney Moore, the 
Chief of Police of Charlotte–Mecklenburg, North Carolina, stated, “We 
could name our top 300 offenders. So we will focus on those individuals, the 
persons responsible for the criminal activity, regardless of who they are or 
where they live. . . . We’re not just looking for crime. We’re looking for 
people.”238 These unofficial lists are not based on ongoing observed actions, 
but instead derive from a suspect’s links to known criminal actors or past 
alleged actions.  
D. Unprotected Data 
Big data remains largely under-regulated. This Section reviews the  
constitutional, statutory, and commercial restrictions imposed on the 
collection and use of information underlying big data. 
As a constitutional matter, few limits exist on accessing and collecting 
personal data. The controlling Fourth Amendment standard, derived from 
Katz v. United States, asks whether an individual has an expectation of 
privacy that society would consider objectively reasonable.239 This expecta-
tion of privacy test has little application to the information police collect 
about individuals who enter the criminal justice system (including convic-
tions, arrests, or biographical information provided pursuant to the criminal 
process). It also has little application to information individuals knowingly 
expose to the public, as the Supreme Court has reasoned that this infor-
mation does not deserve Fourth Amendment protection.240 In addition, 
information given to private individuals who later turn it over to law  
enforcement is not protected under the theory that the risk of disclosure was 
assumed by revealing the information to another person.241 Similarly, data 
 
or upon predefined algorithms (e.g., ‘who has traveled to these three countries and bought these 
two items within a one month period’).”). 
238 Mitchell, supra note 28. 
239 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1967) (stating that searches without judi-
cial approval are per se unreasonable—“subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions”—and that people are “entitled to know that [they] will remain free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures”). 
240 See id. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207, 213 (1986) (“The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require 
law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.”).  
241 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1984) (“[T]he fact that agents of the 
private carrier independently opened the package and made an examination that might have been 
impermissible for a government agent cannot render otherwise reasonable official conduct 
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given to commercial third parties, including banking records,242 telephone call 
lists,243 cell phone locations,244 or Internet search or subscriber information245 
 
unreasonable. The reasonableness of an official invasion of the citizen’s privacy must be appraised 
on the basis of the facts as they existed at the time that invasion occurred.”); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489 (1971) (reasoning that when the suspect’s wife produced evidence 
for the police, “it was not incumbent on the police to stop her or avert their eyes”); Hoffa v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (“Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever 
expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a 
person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”); Burdeau v. McDowell, 
256 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1921) (“[The Fourth Amendment’s] origin and history clearly show that it 
was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a 
limitation upon other than governmental agencies . . . .”); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the 
Third Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1199, 1222 (2009) (“[T]he law is entitled to the evidence of every person, and it is hard to think of 
a criminal system that could survive a new-found ability of every person to bind the state by 
contracting out of the third-party rules.”). 
242 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“The depositor takes the risk, in reveal-
ing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Govern-
ment.”). Compare Commonwealth v. Duncan, 817 A.2d 455, 463 (Pa. 2003) (reasoning that with 
respect to bank record disclosures, “[a] person’s name and address do not, by themselves, reveal 
anything concerning his personal affairs, opinions, habits or associations.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)), with State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 874 (N.J. 2005) (“[B]ank records are 
simply a collection of numbers, symbols, dates, and tables. . . . However, when compiled and 
indexed, individually trivial transactions take on a far greater significance. . . . Indeed, the 
totality of bank records provides a virtual current biography.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
243 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (“When he used his phone, petitioner volun-
tarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to 
its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the 
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”); see also United States v. Christie, 624 
F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[N]o reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP address, 
because that information is also conveyed to . . . third parties, including ISPs.”); United States v. 
Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that there is no objectively reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in subscriber information given to an Internet service provider); United States v. 
Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Every federal court to address [the] issue has 
held that subscriber information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment’s privacy expectation.”); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[E]-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their 
messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because they should know that this 
information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of 
directing the routing of information.”).  
244 See In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that individ-
uals’ historical cell location information stored by third-party cell providers is not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment). See generally Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth 
Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 702-08 (2011) (providing background 
information on government requests for location data). 
245 See, e.g., United States v. D’Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (D. Mass. 2007) (“The Smith 
line of cases has led federal courts to uniformly conclude that internet users have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their subscriber information, the length of their stored files, and other 
noncontent data to which service providers must have access.”). 
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have not been protected by the third-party doctrine.246 Some scholars have 
critiqued this policy, and Justice Sotomayor has expressed some inclination 
to reconsider the third-party doctrine.247 By and large, however, Fourth 
Amendment protection is currently unavailable for this type of information.  
Unlike these constitutionally unprotected categories of information, 
there exists a patchwork of statutes that limit the disclosure of health 
information, financial information, and some online communication.248 To 
be clear, these statutes cover direct access to third-party information. For 
example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996249 
(HIPAA) protects access to medical records, although it allows law  
enforcement to access the records through an administrative, trial, or grand 
jury subpoena.250 Likewise, laws such as the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act,251 
the Bank Secrecy Act,252 the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,253 and 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act,254 provide some measure of protection from 
unauthorized access to financial records, although these protections can be 
surmounted by a subpoena or court order.  
Similarly, the content of electronic communications is statutorily pro-
tected by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986255 (ECPA) 
 
246 See, e.g., Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment, supra note 37, at 1015 
(“Where the third party itself initiates the transfer, the ‘private search’ doctrine is controlling, in 
that the Fourth Amendment and its state analogues only restrict government conduct.”); 
Henderson, Fifty States, supra note 37, at 395-96 (offering a fifty-state survey of states’ positions on 
the federal third-party doctrine); Kerr, supra note 37, at 563 (“By disclosing to a third party, the 
subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment rights in the information revealed.”); Orin S. Kerr, 
The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801, 858 (2004) (“Because the Fourth Amendment reflects a clear commitment of 
the Framers to protect privacy, judges should identify the values of privacy in new technologies 
and translate them in to new Fourth Amendment rules.” (footnote omitted)). 
247 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More fundamen-
tally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”). 
248  Murphy, supra note 38, at 503 (discussing the federal statutory limits on data disclosure—
and corresponding exemptions for law enforcement).  
249 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, 
and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).  
250 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (1)–(2) (2013). 
251  15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2012). 
252 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951–59 (2012). 
253 Id. at §§ 3401–22. 
254 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
255 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (cod-
ified as amended in sections of 18 U.S.C. (2012)); but see Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (requiring telecommunications 
carriers to maintain systems compatible with certain types of surveillance techniques). 
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and the Stored Communications Act,256 but the protection lapses quickly.257 
Finally, telephone records are subject to protection through the Telephone 
Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006,258 but they too can be accessed 
by police if the evidence is relevant based on “specific and articulable” 
facts.259  
In addition to constitutional and statutory protections, certain consumer 
guidelines established by companies promise to keep information private.260 
Yet most major commercial entities—including Internet search companies, 
online retailers, and social media platforms—collect data to monetize it.261 
In fact, many businesses, including big-name companies like Google, 
Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Facebook, are financially successful, in part, because 
of their ability to sell targeted advertising using user data.262 These economic 
incentives, combined with a willingness to assist law enforcement as good 
corporate citizens, means that most third-party information is not  
well-protected from government access.  
III. BIG DATA AND REASONABLE SUSPICION ON THE STREETS 
What happens when a doctrine built on small data becomes overwhelmed 
by big data? What happens when previously unknown suspects can become 
known with a few quick search queries? Police and courts will soon confront 
this new reality as officers come to use existing facial recognition or biometric 
technology and networked databases to obtain individualized and particular-
ized information about a suspect. Courts will confront additional questions 
as these technologies become more sophisticated, mobile, and reliant on 
predictive analytics.  
 
256 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
257 Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2516, 2518 (2012) (describing the heightened requirements for 
obtaining real time communications), with id. § 2703(a) (setting out the lower standards for 
obtaining a court order for stored communications). 
258 18 U.S.C. § 1039 (2012). 
259 Id. § 2703(c)–(d). 
260 See, e.g., Microsoft.com Privacy Statement, MICROSOFT, http://privacy.microsoft.com/en-
us/default.mspx (last updated Aug. 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/F96M-8FUH; Privacy Policy, 
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/privacy (last modified Mar. 31, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
5FL4-NEHK;  
261 See supra Section II.B.2. 
262 See, e.g., Rupert Neate & Rowena Mason, Networking Site Cashes in on Friends, TELEGRAPH 
( Jan. 31, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/ 
4413483/Networking-site-cashes-in-on-friends.html, archived at http://perma.cc/CBF6-R5N9 
(reporting Facebook’s move to monetize its collection of personal user information by allowing 
advertisers to target Facebook users selectively). 
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This Part studies this intersection of technology and doctrine through 
three different lenses—observation, investigation, and prediction—
mirroring the most common types of police work. Police officers regularly 
observe ongoing criminal activity, investigate past criminal activity, and 
predict future criminal activity. The impact of “big data suspicion” will be 
different depending on the type of police activity at issue. 
A. Observation of Ongoing or Imminent Crimes 
Consider a modern day Terry v. Ohio situation. Detective McFadden is 
patrolling the street. He observes John Terry and, using facial recognition 
technology, identifies him and begins to investigate using big data. Detec-
tive McFadden learns through a database search that Terry has a prior 
criminal record, including a couple of convictions and a number of  
arrests.263 McFadden learns, through pattern–matching links, that Terry is 
an associate (a “hanger on”) of a notorious, violent local gangster—Billy 
Cox—who had been charged with several murders.264 McFadden also learns 
that Terry has a substance abuse problem and is addicted to drugs.265 These 
factors—all true, but unknown to the real Detective McFadden—are 
individualized and particularized to Terry. Alone, they may not constitute 
reasonable suspicion that Terry is committing or about to commit a particu-
lar crime. But in conjunction with Terry’s observed actions of pacing 
outside a store with two associates, the information makes the reasonable 
suspicion finding easier and, likely, more reliable.  
In observation cases, by using mobile facial recognition to identify the 
suspect, the officer now can turn any unknown suspect into a known suspect 
and can search for information that might justify reasonable suspicion. This 
change allows the officer to review traditional data sources known to law 
enforcement, including prior criminal history, arrests, addresses, gang 
associations, known associates, and even concealed weapons permits. Perhaps 
this individual is on a local “most wanted” list or a watch list as someone who 
has already been identified as being trouble in the neighborhood.266 Perhaps 
 
263 Louis Stokes, Representing John W. Terry, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 727, 728-29 (1998) (discuss-
ing the facts of the Terry case); see also Terry v. Ohio 30 Years Later, supra note 48, app.B at 1523 
(reporting the sentencing judge as describing Terry as “a man who has from December 30, 1948, to 
the present time, be[en] consistently involved in difficulties with the law”).  
264 Stokes, supra note 263, at 728-29. 
265 Id. at 727. 
266 See Slobogin, Government Data Mining, supra note 138, at 322 (“Match-driven data mining 
programs are designed to determine whether a particular individual has already been identified as 
a ‘person of interest.’ In other words, the goal here is not to find out more about a suspect, but 
rather to determine whether a particular person is a known suspect.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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his height, weight, race, hairstyle, facial hair, or other distinguishing marks 
match a robbery suspect. This traditional law enforcement information 
might also now include data from automatic license plate readers, digitally 
archived surveillance video, and intelligence reports created and maintained 
by police. Even this limited information may be—as a constitutional 
matter—enough for an officer to stop the suspect. If, for example, the 
suspect had an extensive history of commercial robberies, or if license plate 
data connected him to prior robberies in the area, this information might 
well constitute reasonable suspicion that the suspect was going to commit a 
robbery.  
Additional big data innovations may also assist the police. For example, 
the New York Police Department (NYPD) has unveiled the Domain 
Awareness System (DAS) in partnership with Microsoft.267 This technology 
allows an officer to observe, through video surveillance or automated license 
plate readers, the location of a suspect prior to the initial observation: 
DAS is capable of rapidly blending and analyzing realtime data gathered from 
roughly 3,000 civic closed-circuit cameras, 911 call recordings, and license 
plate readers . . . as well as historical crime reports. Now the NYPD can do 
things like track a vehicle and instantly determine nearly everywhere it’s been 
for the past few days or weeks; instantly access a suspect’s arrest record, and 
all the 911 calls related to a particular crime; [and] map criminal history to 
geospatially and chronologically reveal crime patterns . . . .268 
Thus, the officer could determine whether the suspect had just arrived with 
a getaway driver, had been casing the store, or had merely been doing non-
criminal errands all morning.269 These patterns may well affect whether an 
officer has reasonable suspicion that a suspect is about to commit a crime.  
 
267 See Press Release, Microsoft, New York City Police Department and Microsoft Partner to 
Bring Real-Time Crime Prevention and Counterterrorism Technology Solution to Global Law 
Enforcement Agencies (Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://news.microsoft.com/2012/08/08/new-york-
city-police-department-and-microsoft-partner-to-bring-real-time-crime-prevention-and-counter 
terrorism-technology-solution-to-global-law-enforcement-agencies. 
268 Douglas Page, Crime Fighting’s Next Big Deal, OFFICER.COM (Sept. 4, 2012), 
http://www.officer.com/article/10773317/crime-fightings-next-big-deal, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
YTF5-A2UC; see also Michael Endler, NYPD, Microsoft Push Big Data Policing Into Spotlight, INFO. 
WK. (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/security/privacy/nypd-microsoft-push-big-
data-policing-in/240005838, archived at http://perma.cc/DK97-7HMD (describing how DAS could 
lead to earlier apprehension of criminals). 
269 Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears as Surveillance Grows in Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2013, 
at A1 (pointing out that big data-driven policing in Oakland, California, could help separate 
innocent actions from criminal activity).  
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For a second level of inquiry, imagine the police officer uses networked 
databases owned by third parties to discover personal information about a 
suspect. This data might include credit information, financial records, credit 
card activity, employment, past addresses and telephone numbers, names 
and addresses of family members, neighbors’ addresses and telephone 
numbers, business associates, make, model, and color of registered vehicles, 
social security numbers, dates of birth, bankruptcies, liens and judgments, 
and GPS locational data. While access to some of these data would usually 
require particular legal authorization, law enforcement can circumvent 
statutes restricting direct access by instead using “fourth-party” commercial 
aggregators.270 Such personalized information will allow an officer to 
develop a more individualized picture of a suspect. While generally unem-
ployment, credit card debt, and bankruptcy are not indicia of criminal 
activity, when viewed in conjunction with suspicious action in front of an 
expensive jewelry store, however, a personal financial crisis might be 
relevant to the totality of circumstances. Further, accurate GPS data tying 
the suspect to a prior robbery or to a pawnshop might lead to reasonable 
suspicion. Even the otherwise innocent purchase of a wool cap or ski mask 
at Walmart might tip a seasonal purchase into reasonable suspicion. 
Finally, imagine if law enforcement could access the suspect’s social  
media data.271 Search queries, Facebook and Twitter posts, YouTube videos, 
emails, texts, and similar communications are all available to third-party 
providers—if not publically available. While personal content is usually 
statutorily (or commercially) protected, it is generally not constitutionally 
protected. This mosaic of personal information might well provide individ-
ualized facts necessary to make the police officer’s suspicion reasonable.272 
For example, a suspect’s admission of financial difficulties or photograph 
displaying the fruits of the crime through social media could appropriately 
be added to the totality of circumstances.  
With each level of search, officers can access additional individualized and 
particularized facts that, when viewed within the totality of circumstances, 
help justify the officer’s stop of a suspect. The effect is that additional 
personalized information encourages a finding of reasonable suspicion. A 
 
270 See Simmons, supra note 173, at 990-92 (describing commercial data acquisitions by the 
government). 
271 See Joseph Goldstein & J. David Goodman, Seeking Clues to Gangs and Crimes, Detectives 
Follow Internet Rap Videos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2014, at A20 (“Directed by prosecutors to build 
evidence that individual shootings are part of larger criminal conspiracies, officers are listening to 
local rappers for a better sense of the hierarchy of the streets. ‘You really have to listen to the 
songs because they’re talking about ongoing violence.’”). 
272 Cf. id. (highlighting police use of social media to gain insight into criminal conspiracies).  
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trip to a pawnshop could indicate a person is selling stolen goods—or is 
merely poor enough to have to sell belongings at a steep discount. A 
photograph of jewelry could be an admission of theft or could simply be a 
photograph of jewelry. Yet in a criminal investigation, the inferences of 
suspicion are easy to develop and, against a low legal threshold, easy to meet. 
Of course, suspicious facts must be connected with a suspected crime. It 
would not be relevant if the searches revealed a pattern of domestic violence 
crimes, unrelated to robbery. It would also not be relevant if the infor-
mation was not directly connected to the suspect. Being a friend of a friend 
of a known robber is a fact, but not one that should influence the constitu-
tional calculus. But, as long as the data are connected to both the suspected 
criminal activity and the suspected criminal, it would likely be persuasive in 
evaluating reasonable suspicion in observation cases.  
B. Investigation of Completed Crimes  
Many crimes occur without direct police observation, and police must 
investigate the crime to identify the perpetrator. Reasonable suspicion is 
still relevant in investigating past crimes (assuming the information available 
does not rise to the higher level of probable cause).273 In Hensley, the 
Supreme Court set out the standard for investigating past crimes based on 
reasonable suspicion: 
The precise limits on investigatory stops to investigate past criminal activity 
are more difficult to define. The proper way to identify the limits is to apply 
the same test already used to identify the proper bounds of intrusions that 
further investigations of imminent or ongoing crimes. That test, which is 
grounded in the standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment, balances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal 
security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to 
justify the intrusion. When this balancing test is applied to stops to investigate 
past crimes, we think that probable cause to arrest need not always be  
required.274 
 
273 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983) (“[P]robable cause deals with probabilities.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The impact of big data on probable cause is a separate subject 
beyond the scope of this Article.  
274 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985) (citations omitted); see also id. at 227 
(“This is the first case we have addressed in which police stopped a person because they suspected 
he was involved in a completed crime. In our previous decisions involving investigatory stops on 
less than probable cause, police stopped or seized a person because they suspected he was about to 
commit a crime, or was committing a crime at the moment of the stop.” (citation omitted)); id. 
(“We do not agree . . . that our prior opinions contemplate an inflexible rule that precludes police 
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While acknowledging that courts might balance these interests differently 
when investigating a past, completed crime—as opposed to an ongoing 
crime275—the Supreme Court still held that “the ability to briefly stop that 
person, ask questions, or check identification in the absence of probable 
cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and 
bringing offenders to justice.”276 By adopting a reasonable suspicion test for 
investigation of past crimes, the Court gave police the flexibility to stop 
suspects based on this lower threshold of suspicion.277 
As in observation cases, the primary use of big data would be to identify 
unknown perpetrators for arrest and prosecution. As one security expert 
explained, “[i]magine the ability to instantly take a security camera photograph 
from a bank robbery and match it using a facial recognition algorithm to a 
photograph in an out-of-state motor vehicle database, and then to link that 
person’s name to a mobile phone from a private-sector marketing data-
base.”278 Already, police have relied on similar linkages of networked 
information in more run-of-the-mill cases.279 With new search technology, 
disparate pieces of data are compiled to link, match, and identify a suspect 
through pattern matching techniques. This can be done not only with a 
name, address, or license plate, but also with a particular modus operandi.280 
 
from stopping persons they suspect of past criminal activity unless they have probable cause for 
arrest. To the extent previous opinions have addressed the issue at all, they have suggested that 
some investigative stops based on a reasonable suspicion of past criminal activity could withstand 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”). 
275 See id. at 228-29 (“The factors in the balance may be somewhat different when a stop to 
investigate past criminal activity is involved rather than a stop to investigate ongoing criminal 
conduct.”). 
276 Id. at 229. 
277 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983) (allowing stops “when the officer has 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity.” (emphasis added)); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (allowing certain seizures 
“if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime” 
(emphasis added)); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 n.2 (1981) (“Of course, an officer 
may stop and question a person if there are reasonable grounds to believe that person is wanted for 
past criminal conduct.”). 
278 Page, supra note 268. 
279 See Mark Ward, Crime Fighting with Big Data Weapons, BBC (Mar. 18, 2014, 2:35 AM), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26520013, archived at http://perma.cc/4ETS-GKDF; see also 
Neal Ungerleider, This Small City’s Police Department Builds an App, Nabs Big Data to Find and Fight 
Bad Guys, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 26, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3027641/this-
small-citys-police-department-builds-an-app-nabs-big-data-to-find-and-fight-bad-guys, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7Z7H-5TNP. 
280 Taipale, supra note 184, at 21 (“The popular view of investigation in law enforcement is 
that there must first be a specific crime and that law enforcement then follows particularized clues 
or suspicions after the fact. In reality, investigators often look for criminal patterns or hypothetical 
suspects in order to anticipate future crime. For example, investigators may use pattern recogni-
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This information, specific to a person and particularized to a crime, meets 
both requirements needed to establish reasonable suspicion.  
The value of big data to reasonable suspicion investigations is probably 
greater than its value to observation cases, because police have time to 
surmount the “legal process” requirements necessary to obtain third-party 
information.281 With an official request, a court order, or a subpoena (let 
alone a warrant or grand jury subpoena), law enforcement officers can 
obtain most third-party data if doing so in furtherance of a criminal investi-
gation.282  
Software can isolate patterns and identify suspects through existing public 
and private data in novel ways. One fascinating example of big data sleuth-
ing arose out of the investigation of a major Swedish armed robbery of 
millions of dollars.283 Police assumed that, to disguise their plot, the thieves 
must have used prepaid disposable phones. Data analysts then searched 
through the list of all prepaid disposable phones in the area looking for “a 
set of phones that stayed within their own miniature network.”284 Police 
analysts found a single set of phones that only communicated with each 
other, did so only for a few weeks leading up to the heist, and then went 
silent after the robbery. Identifying this network allowed police to solve the 
case. Police traced the phones to specific cell tower locations corresponding 
with the robbers’ locations before, during, and after the robbery.285 In fact, 
once police knew the numbers, they could track location-by-location exactly 
where the robbers had been. When police identified one person who had 
purchased the phones, they were able to determine how the crime occurred 
and the location of the thieves at all times.286 
Major police departments, as well as the FBI, have adopted this type of 
pattern matching investigation technique.287 In child abduction cases, 
 
tion strategies to develop modus operandi (‘MO’) or behavioral profiles, which in turn may lead 
either to specific suspects (profiling as identifying pattern) or to crime prevention strategies 
(profiling as predictor of future crime, resulting, for example, in stakeouts of particular places, 
likely victims, or potential perpetrators).”). 
281 See supra Section II.D (discussing the statutory requirements of court orders for some 
private information). 
282 See supra Section II.D (noting the ease with which law enforcement may access records 
that are protected by statute). 
283 EVAN RATLIFF, LIFTED ch. 5–9 (Kindle Singles ed. 2011), available at https://www.atavist.com/ 
stories/lifted/ (describing the investigation of the heist).  
284 Id. at ch. 12.  
285 Id.  
286 Id. at ch. 13. 
287 See Josh Richman & Angela Woodall, Around the Bay Area, You’re Being Watched, CONTRA 
COSTA TIMES ( June 30, 2013, 1:29 AM), http://www.contracostatimes.com/News/ci_23569173/ 
Around-the-Bay-Area-youre-being, archived at http://perma.cc/V8UE-2TJR (“[I]t’s not just the 
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“Amber alerts” have led to quick reviews of license plate reader databases. 
By searching the location of a car, police can determine the likely route of 
the suspect.288 In gang cases, recordings of gunshots have helped map out 
areas of contested gang turf.289  
Returning to the robbery example, imagine that a particular jewelry 
store was robbed by an unknown suspect. Police officers have a video still 
from the robbery that does not allow for a facial recognition match. The 
photo, however, clearly shows a neck tattoo, and officers obtain a partial 
description of the getaway car. Running a search for the tattoo against a 
database might narrow the list of suspects. Comparing the narrowed list 
with owners of a particular type of car might further limit the list of 
suspects. Looking at the remaining suspects’ associates, movements, or even 
bank deposits, credit card expenditures, or social media comments might 
again tighten the search. The result is that big data can help identify the 
suspect with a few search queries. While these data might not be enough to 
get an arrest warrant, they would likely provide the reasonable suspicion 
needed to stop and investigate the suspect.290  
C. Predicting Crimes 
Unlike observation or investigation cases, reasonable suspicion based on 
prediction remains the stuff of science fiction. Police have begun to predict 
areas of heightened criminal activity,291 and may predict likely troublemakers 
 
National Security Agency secretly vacuuming up your personal data. Local police agencies are 
increasingly adopting Big Data technologies . . . .”); cf. Charles Piller & Eric Lichtblau, FBI 
Plans to Fight Terror with High-Tech Arsenal, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at A1 (“By Sept. 11, 2011, 
the FBI hopes to use artificial-intelligence software to predict acts of terrorism the way the 
telepathic ‘precogs’ in the movie ‘Minority Report’ foresee murders before they take place.”). 
288 Lochner, supra note 199, at 225 (“[T]he Automated License Plate Recognition system, 
store[s] license plate numbers of the innocent and guilty so the database can be mined during 
Amber Alerts or for leads in cases.”). 
289 See Christopher Benjamin, Note, Shot Spotter and FaceIt: The Tools of Mass Monitoring, 
UCLA J.L. & TECH., Spring 2002, art. 2, at 6 (describing a system by which automated phone 
calls help find the location of gunfire). 
290 See Cook, supra note 18 (“The Boston Police Department is rolling out a powerful new 
computer program built to find hidden connections among people and events almost instantly, 
allowing detectives to investigate murders, rapes, and other crimes far faster than they can 
today.”); see also Yang Xiang et al., Visualizing Criminal Relationships: Comparison of a Hyperbolic Tree 
and a Hierarchical List, 41 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 69, 75-77 (2005) (describing how a tool known 
as COPLINK Criminal Relationship Visualizer links co-occurring events and characteristics). 
291 Ferguson, Predictive Policing, supra note 29, at 312-13; Paul Bowers, Predictive Policing Arrives 
in Charleston, CHARLESTON CITY PAPER ( June 27, 2012), http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/ 
charleston/predictive-policing-arrives-in-charleston/Content?oid=4101684, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
JWL7-35TD (discussing the use of predictive analytics to reduce armed robberies in Charleston, 
South Carolina).  
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involved in criminal enterprise through an unofficial “bad guy list,” but 
predictive analytics cannot yet tell police whom to stop for a crime not yet 
committed. To be clear, these are prediction-based stops where no crime 
has occurred and no crime is observed. 
Yet big data invites provocative questions about whether such predictive 
tips should factor into the reasonable suspicion calculus. For example, if a 
drug distribution gang is run by a tight-knit family or neighborhood 
organization, such that the pattern for several years has been that when one 
family member is arrested, another cousin or brother takes their place, then 
why can we not predict who will be the next member of the gang?292 If 
burglaries are contagious in part because the same gang of burglars commits 
similar crimes, and police identify one burglar, why should we not target a 
burglar’s associates as likely suspects for future burglaries?293 In these cases, 
police could show specific and articulable facts indicating that a particular 
person is likely to participate in ongoing criminal activity (e.g., drug dealing 
or burglaries).294 Because the criminal enterprise is ongoing, the Terry 
standard might well apply, and police could try to stop and investigate 
would-be members of these criminal organizations if they were observed 
doing anything that might suggest drug dealing or burglary. 
The questions get harder when no ongoing criminal enterprise exists, 
yet the same predictive logic holds. In Chicago, analysts have identified 
young people at greater risk of being involved in gun violence.295 Researchers 
 
292 See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST 
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 89-114 (2005) (discussing the economics and 
social relationships of the drug trade in the famous chapter “Why Do Drug Dealers Still Live with 
Their Moms?”). 
293 See Wim Bernasco, Them Again?: Same-Offender Involvement in Repeat and Near Repeat 
Burglaries, 5 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 411, 423-25 (2008) (“[B]oth repeat burglaries and near repeat 
burglaries are much more likely to involve the same offender than are spatially or temporally 
unrelated burglaries.”); Bowers & Johnson, supra note 229, at 13 (discussing how features of an 
offender’s modus operandi, like spatial and temporal preferences, can be used to identify crimes 
carried out by a particular network of offenders). 
294 Domestic violence also presents a possible predictive environment for crime. See Joseph 
Goldstein, Police Take on Family Violence to Avert Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2013, at A1 (“[T]he 
officers assigned to the domestic violence unit make a total of 70,000 precautionary visits a year to 
the households with past episodes. Each precinct station house also maintains a ‘high propensity’ 
list of a dozen or so households that get special attention because they are believed to be most at 
risk of further violence.”). 
295 See Andrew Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating 
Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 229-33 (describing Chicago’s 
program to identify and address likely perpetrators and victims of gun violence); see also TRACEY 
MEARES, ANDREW V. PAPACHRISTOS & JEFFREY FAGAN, HOMICIDE AND GUN VIOLENCE IN 
CHICAGO: EVALUATION AND SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS PROGRAM 1 
(2009), available at http://www.psnchicago.org/PDFs/2009-PSN-Research-Brief_v2.pdf (“Data analysis 
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can predict their likelihood of being a victim or perpetrator of gun violence 
using big data metrics, including place of residence, social associations (e.g., 
past experience with victims of gun violence and gang connections), and 
age.296 Assuming the accuracy of these data, could police target these 
individuals as part of a predictive stop strategy?297 In fact, the Chicago 
Police Department appears to have adopted this predictive logic in its 
intervention program. As described by the New York Times,  
[i]n recent months, as many as 400 officers a day, working overtime, have 
been dispatched to just 20 small zones deemed the city’s most dangerous. 
The police say they are tamping down retaliatory shootings between gang 
factions by using a comprehensive analysis of the city’s tens of thousands of 
suspected gang members, the turf they claim and their rivalries. The police 
are also focusing on more than 400 people they have identified as having 
associations that make them the most likely to be involved in a murder, as a 
victim or an offender.298  
 
immediately revealed that a very small number of neighborhoods in Chicago are responsible for 
most of the city’s violence trends. The ‘city’s’ crime problem is in fact geographically and socially 
concentrated in a few highly impoverished and socially isolated neighborhoods. Data also revealed 
that most victims (and offenders) of gun violence in Chicago tend to be young African American 
men who live in neighborhoods on the West or South sides of the city.”).  
296 John Buntin, Social Media Transforms the Way Chicago Fights Gang Violence, GOVERNING, 
Oct. 2013, at 26, 28 (“Today, the Chicago Police Department is doing something similar with 
gangs. Using a tool academics call ‘network analysis,’ the CPD is mapping the relationships among 
Chicago’s 14,000 most active gang members. It’s also ranking how likely those people are to be 
involved in a homicide, either as victims or offenders. In the process, the CPD has discovered 
something striking: Cities don’t so much have ‘hot spots’ as ‘hot people.’ That finding is transform-
ing the way the police do business in Chicago and has significant implications for how other cities 
should be policed.”). 
297 Michael Sierra-Arevalo, How Targeted Deterrence Helps Police Reduce Gun Deaths, SCHOLARS 
STRATEGY NETWORK ( June 3, 2013, 1:11 PM), http://thesocietypages.org/ssn/2013/06/03/targeted-
deterrence, archived at http://perma.cc/GZ65-U25X (“The perpetrators of gun violence are also 
concentrated in particular sectors of the population. In places like Boston, more than 50% of all 
murders and 70% of all shootings are committed by about one percent of youth aged 15 to 24.”); see 
also id. (“Initiatives like The Boston Gun Project and Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods allow 
police to concentrate their efforts on gang-affiliated individuals with previous criminal records.”). 
See generally OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PROMISING STRATEGIES TO REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE 26-33 (1999), available at 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/html/cd_rom/solution_gang_crime/pubs/PromisingStrategiestoReduceGu
nViolence.pdf (discussing Boston’s strategy to reduce gun violence by targeting specific groups and 
geographic areas). 
298 Monica Davey, Chicago Tactics Put a Major Dent in Killing Trend, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at 
A1; see also Mark Guarnio, Can Math Stop Murder?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR ( July 20, 2014), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2014/0720/Can-math-stop-murder-video, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
G3TA-9SPT (discussing predictive policing techniques in Chicago including sending officers to 
the houses of suspected gang leaders).  
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Those four hundred individuals—part of a list of predicted offenders—
were identified through big data techniques. Chicago police call it a “heat 
list.”299 Young men on the heat list are targets of predictive intervention-
based strategies.  
While a Fourth Amendment stop based solely on an individual’s inclu-
sion on this list, without more, might not be sufficiently particularized, big 
data tools exist to generate the necessary reasonable suspicion.300 For 
example, imagine one of those four hundred individuals is a young man 
whom police wish to stop because they suspect that he is up to no good (and 
likely in possession of a gun). Plainly, an officer’s suspicion that someone is 
“up to no good” does not constitute constitutionally sufficient justification 
for a stop. An officer sees the young man on the streets (but not engaged in 
any overt criminal activity). The officer identifies the young man as being 
on a list of individuals that predictive analytics suggested are at a height-
ened risk of involvement in gun violence. A quick NCIC database search 
reveals gang contacts, criminal associates, and prior arrests—including gun 
charges. Gang tattoos link the young man to local gangs. A license plate 
reader places the family car in the general vicinity of a gang shooting in the 
last month. His Facebook profile contains statements that police could 
interpret as directing violence at rival gang members.301 Finally, predictive 
policing software has forecast the young man’s location as the site of likely 
gun violence. If the police officer stops the young man (doing nothing 
overtly criminal) and finds a gun during a frisk, would a court really say 
there was not individualized and particularized suspicion that this individual 
was involved in gun and gang-related activity? Though the young man took 
no action to signify criminal activity, the data suggest that he was far more 
likely to be in possession of a gun than most people in Chicago.  
How courts resolve these issues will determine the impact of big data on 
law enforcement. On one hand, judges might require some affirmative, 
imminent suspicious activity correlating with gun possession before upholding 
the stop, such as “furtive movements,” a suspicious bulge, or unexplained 
 
299 Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Use “Heat List” As Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 
21, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-21/news/ct-met-heat-list-20130821_1_chicago-
police-commander-andrew-papachristos-heat-list, archived at http://perma.cc/8TJA-Y6KM. 
300 Presence on the list might also allow police to identify individuals for whom therapeutic 
intervention might be necessary. 
301 See, e.g., JAAP BLOEM ET AL., SOGETI TREND LAB VINT, BIG SOCIAL: PREDICTING 
BEHAVIOR WITH BIG DATA 35 (2012), available at http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/10/Big-Social-Predicting-Behavior-with-Big-Data.pdf (“In the Netherlands, police 
officers go on duty with a smartphone in order to be able to pick up signals in the neighborhood 
from social media. In this way, they can show their faces before something serious happens in the 
schoolyard, for example.”). 
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nervousness.302 Without the requirement of some observable activity, the 
odds increase that predictive stops will target innocent people, criminalize 
by association, and negatively impact individuals based on little more than a 
hunch supported by non-criminal facts. On the other hand, many judges 
might find this totality of suspicions—even if focused on a particular 
suspect and not a crime—sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. 
Reasonable suspicion is a low threshold. Thus, in practice, aggregated 
reasonable suspicion would likely justify a stop in many courtrooms. As 
Part IV explains, this shift has significant implications for the Fourth 
Amendment.  
D. Big Data Suspicion  
Big data’s ability to generate information about an identified suspect 
reveals the inherent vulnerability in the reasonable suspicion standard. 
Indeed, along the continuum of suspicion, more data makes it easier to 
satisfy the standard for two primary reasons. First, under a totality-of-
circumstances test, the more factors a court considers in the totality, the 
easier it is to articulate suspicion. Quantity can make up for quality.303 
Second, the information provided by big data is individualized and particu-
larized, consistent with the Terry language.304 To be clear, the data are 
individualized to the criminal, not the crime. As courts apply Terry, however, 
which arose in the unknown suspect context, the difference becomes blurred.  
This latter point is important to emphasize. The language in the earlier 
reasonable suspicion cases speaks to a general suspicion of unspecified 
criminal actions, using terms like “criminal activity may be afoot,”305 
“involved in criminal activity,”306 “legal wrongdoing,”307 or “illegality.”308 
The general language does not require discussion of a particular observed 
crime (e.g., drug distribution or gun possession), because the officer actually 
observed the illegal activity in question. The observed crime and the 
 
302 See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 56 A.3d 1206, 1209-12 (D.C. 2013) (discussing the diffi-
culty of interpreting furtive gestures and nervousness).  
303 Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2404088 (recognizing “courts’ consistent 
preference for police narratives chock full of detail, even when each additional detail does not 
contribute much to the suspicion”); see also id. (manuscript at 42) (“When assessing an officer’s 
decision to stop or search somebody, courts prefer a long lists [sic] of reasons. The more reasons 
the agent can recount, the better.”).  
304 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
305 Id. at 30. 
306 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). 
307 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). 
308 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000). 
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observed criminal were not separate things to analyze; no distinction was 
needed in the analysis. Thus, in a small data world, the traditional language 
describing suspicious behavior has no meaning outside of the observed 
activity.  
In a big data world, this same generalized language becomes distorted. 
An officer may know information about a suspect, but the question  
becomes: how does that information relate to the observed actions? Knowing 
someone is a “drug dealer” does not mean that the individual is actively 
dealing drugs at the moment of observation. Courts analyzing big data 
suspicion should thus be careful to require a direct link between the past 
data about a suspect and the observed suspicion. With big data suspicion, it 
is important for the individualized and particularized information to relate 
to the particular action observed. If a police officer identifies a suspect and 
learns information about the suspect’s arrests, convictions, or associations 
that has nothing to do with the observed actions (if the officer observed any 
actions at all), then the new information should be irrelevant to the reasonable 
suspicion calculus. Only when those particularized factors can be connected 
to observed actions that signify criminal activity should they affect the 
analysis.  
Courts will soon be asked to address the impact of big data on reasonable 
suspicion. But before that time, policymakers will need to think through 
and evaluate whether this innovation is good or bad for police, individuals, 
and society.  
IV. EVALUATING BIG DATA AND PREDICTIVE REASONABLE 
SUSPICION 
While big data may expose the fragility of the reasonable suspicion doc-
trine, the technology has arrived, and its impact on Fourth Amendment 
cases is imminent. As such, it is necessary to evaluate the questions of law 
and policy that arise from the move to big data policing. This Part discusses 
positives and negatives of big data policing and provides suggestions on 
how to address the pending evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
A. The Positives of Big Data Suspicion  
As may be evident from early adoption and experimentation with  
predictive technologies, law enforcement officials see the potential of these 
tools to reduce crime. Big data suspicion, if used correctly, can improve 
accuracy and efficiency, and it will yield unexpected insights into the 
patterns of criminal activity.  
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1. Improved Accuracy 
Reasonable suspicion based on big data primarily benefits law enforce-
ment because of the increased accuracy it purports to offer.309 More infor-
mation, and more precise information, should make it more likely that 
police target actual criminals rather than innocent people. In a small data 
environment, police rely on proxies for information to the detriment of 
everyone. Class, race, age, choice of clothing, and gender all factor into police 
officers’ discretionary decisions on the street.310 Police perceive ambiguous 
actions as suspicious because of subtle cues or instincts. These judgments also 
unfortunately include explicit and implicit biases, policing traditions, and the 
frailties of human perception.311 Replacing those generalized intuitions with 
 
309 Cf. Rachael King, IBM Analytics Help Memphis Cops Get “Smart,” BLOOMBERG BUSI-
NESSWEEK (Dec. 05, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/ibm-analytics-help-memphis-
cops-get-smart-12052011.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q77C-WCXW (describing the 
technology used by law enforcement in Memphis, Tennessee, which has contributed to the lowest 
crime rates there in a quarter-century).  
310 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 
200 (2013) (examining “whether police demonstrate racial bias” in deciding whether to make 
arrests); Katherine Y. Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absent 
Racial Profiling, 54 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1113, 1132-35 (2005) (explaining study results in which a driver’s 
race was found to be “the most salient factor” in deciding whether to search a vehicle); Angela J. 
Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 425 (1997) (describing the reluctance 
of two black men to draw additional attention to themselves while driving because their race and 
gender already “makes them more likely to be stopped and detained by the police”); David A. 
Harris, Essay, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual 
Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 546, 570 (1997) (“[P]retextual police stops of 
blacks are so common—frequent enough to earn the name “driving while black”—[that] many 
African-Americans regularly modify the most casual aspects of their driving behavior . . . and 
even their personal appearance . . . .”); Noel Leader, Panel Discussion at CUNY School of Law 
(Sept. 29, 2010), in Suspect Fits Description: Responses to Racial Profiling in New York City, 14 CUNY 
L. REV. 57, 65-67 (2010) (asserting that illegal stops based on racial profiling are breaches of 
officers’ duty, though police often attempt to justify them by citing alternative explanations like 
the suspect’s dress); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police 
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1279-87 (1998) (arguing that although methods in place in 
the 1960s to deter crime were facially race-neutral, the implementation of these strategies was 
largely determined by the race of the subject). 
311 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for, 
Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 15-16 (2010) (“It 
is true that some people are, at times, reasonably good at making certain judgments based on first 
impressions. But they are also often quite bad at doing so. Moreover, first impressions can involve 
at least five major attributes, namely, the subject’s emotions, personality, intelligence, mental 
states, and use of deception.”); id. at 16 (“In addition, individuals’ self-knowledge about the 
relative degree of accuracy of their ability to make judgments concerning each of the five major 
attributes upon first impression is also poor.”); see also L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the 
Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1147 (2012) (“Implicit social cognition research demonstrates 
that people have nonconscious reactions to others that can negatively influence their behaviors. 
These implicit biases begin when people categorize others both consciously and nonconsciously by 
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precise detail about actual people should result in a more accurate policing 
strategy. Humans are notoriously bad at making snap judgments, and while 
police officers make more snap judgments than most, they are not immune 
from the imperfections of human nature.312  
For example, stories of racial profiling involving famous celebrities, 
wealthy professionals, and other citizens show how racial stereotypes can 
influence suspicion.313 Yet in a big data world, a quick license plate scan or 
facial recognition check and a query of other databases (perhaps including 
professional licenses or even addresses), could help avoid the indignity of 
detention based solely on a police hunch.314 Of course in many cases, 
information will not reveal that the individual is a celebrity, but even basic 
 
race, gender, or a host of other socially relevant categories. Categorization triggers implicit 
stereotypes and attitudes.” (footnotes omitted)). 
312 Eli B. Silverman, With a Hunch and a Punch, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 133, 140 (2007) (“Like 
other individuals within the same occupation, police vary in their ability to make intelligent, 
intuitive choices. Just as it varies among the general population, some police are better than others 
in detecting patterns from experience. Research and empirical observation amply demonstrates 
that there is a wide range in the ability of police officers to successfully deploy reasonable hunches 
in their work.”); see also Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 947 (2006) (discussing the effects of mental processes outside 
of “conscious attentional focus” on decisionmaking); L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police 
Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267, 271 (2012) (“It is highly probable that 
fundamental attribution error affects police judgments of criminality. Officers on the beat often 
make quick decisions based upon limited evidence. The stressful nature of their jobs likely 
depletes their cognitive capacities, making correction for fundamental attribution error more 
difficult.”); id. at 269 (“It is well established in the psychological literature that people tend to 
explain the behaviors of others by reference to their character (disposition) rather than to 
situational influences.”). 
313 See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., THE PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: THE ARREST OF 
HENRY LOUIS GATES JR. AND RACE, CLASS, AND CRIME IN AMERICA, 129-241 (2010) (telling 
the stories of one hundred influential African Americans who faced racial profiling or discrimina-
tion); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 265, 273-74 (1999) (describing measures taken by African Americans to avoid 
police harassment while driving); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 
YALE L.J. 214, 214 (1983) (“Thirty years ago police stopped Malcolm X because he was a black man 
in a white neighborhood. A revolution in civil rights later, police still view race as an important 
factor in the decision to detain a suspect.” (footnote omitted)).  
314 Compare Albert W. Alschuler, The Upside and Downside of Police Hunches and Expertise, 4 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 115, 118-19 (2007) (acknowledging that while hunches may be developed from 
real world experience, they are unreliable, shaped by racial stereotypes, burdensome to law 
enforcement, and unreviewable), and Harold Baer, Jr., Got a Bad Feeling? Is That Enough? The 
Irrationality of Police Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 103 (2007) (“Until law enforcement 
agencies spend more time and money addressing the problems that arise from their culture, 
training and, in some locales, education, the hunch will remain problematical and occasionally 
unjust.”), with Craig S. Lerner, Judges Policing Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 25 (2007) 
(“[E]motions and intuitions are not obstacles to reason, but indispensable heuristic devices that 
allow people to process diffuse, complex information about their environment and make sense of 
the world.”). 
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personal or employment data (or lack of criminal information) might 
provide police with a clue that a suspect is just an ordinary citizen not 
involved in criminal activity. 
While vulnerable to abuse, predictive suspicion ultimately may make 
police stops more reliable. At its core, reasonable suspicion is a doctrine of 
predictive suspicion. The collected totality of circumstances must justify an 
officer’s prediction that criminal activity is afoot.315 Thus, having more 
information about an individual should result in more reliable predic-
tions.316 If police focus their efforts on people placed on “bad guy lists,” it 
may protect individuals who are not on the lists. If police are forced to use 
big data to identify and link a suspect to a crime, they may also see patterns 
that suggest that the suspect was not involved in the crime. In this way, big 
data policing may be a measure more protective of individuals on the street.  
The accuracy that big data provides not only increases the likelihood 
that police target the right suspects, but also, in turn, prevents the resulting 
physical, face-to-face interactions that generate tension.317 Many police 
stops involve confirming or disproving suspicion.318 Even if no arrest 
results, the unpleasant (and perhaps unnecessary) police–citizen contact 
breeds resentment and distrust.319 Allowing police to confirm a person’s lack 
 
315 Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune-Telling and the Fourth Amendment: Of Terrorism, Slippery 
Slopes, and Predicting the Future, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 195, 201 (2005) (“What is less often 
emphasized is that Katz faced the Justices with the question whether it is possible to authorize a 
search for non-existent evidence—evidence that may or may not come into being in the future.”). 
316 But cf. Steinbock, supra note 18, at 38 (“The Fourth Amendment permits interferences 
with liberty and privacy based on predictions, often made by field officers, without notice to or 
consultation with the suspect.”). 
317 See Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police 
Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 729-32 (2009) (criticizing police training programs for 
cultivating the culture of machismo and militarism that leads to police violence); James Forman, 
Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 14 (2004) (discussing 
police–citizen tension caused by “[b]elittling remarks, illegitimate orders, and cursing” by police 
during stops).  
318 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (“[W]here a police officer observes 
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal 
activity may be afoot . . . the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable 
inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
319 Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 465 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]hose who have found—by reason of prejudice or misfortune—that encounters with the police 
may become adversarial or unpleasant without good cause will have grounds for worrying at any 
stop designed to elicit signs of suspicious behavior. Being stopped by the police is distressing even 
when it should not be terrifying, and what begins mildly may by happenstance turn severe.”); 
David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and 
Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 334 (2001) (“[I]t is precisely at this intersection 
of crime, race and, police stop and frisk practices that the underlying social and legal conflicts 
most often are manifested, and not infrequently in sharp and violent confrontations.”). 
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of involvement in criminal activity through a database search, rather than a 
physical stop, avoids unnecessary conflict.  
2. Exculpatory Facts 
Suspicion is not a one-way street. Suspicion can be disproved. Suspicion 
can be alleviated. The advent of big data suspicion may require consideration 
of exculpatory factors that lessen suspicion. Just as big data enables a wealth 
of suspicious inferences, it also generates an equal number of potentially 
exculpatory facts. For example, if Detective McFadden learned that John 
Terry’s wife worked near the downtown location of the observation, pacing 
outside a store might turn from “casing a robbery” to “waiting for a loved 
one.”  
The potentially exculpatory nature of big data is a strong positive argu-
ment for its use in policing. Presumably, if big data information exists about 
a suspect, police should be obligated to check before initiating a stop.320 The 
totality of circumstances should not be understood as the totality of suspi-
cious activities; it should include exculpatory information that reduces 
suspicion as well. This is an established part of the probable cause analysis,321 
and big data technology allows it to be included in the reasonable suspicion 
analysis. Thus, existing exculpatory information should be factored into the 
totality of circumstances and weighted just as heavily as suspicious factors.  
Courts might even require police to factor in exculpatory information as 
a self-contained check on the regular discretionary powers granted to police. 
When big data is available, an officer who did not use it in an exculpatory 
manner might be deemed to have acted recklessly.322 In the same way that 
courts may take a negative inference from an unrecorded confession in a 
jurisdiction where videotaping confessions is the norm, a failure to use the 
available search technology might be held against the officer.323 In this way, 
 
320 See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 
1031 (2014) (arguing that defendants have a right to government-created exculpatory big data). 
321 See, e.g., United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 n.2 (2006) (“[P]robable cause may cease 
to exist after a warrant is issued. The police may learn, for instance, that contraband is no longer 
located at the place to be searched.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 432 n.5 (1976) 
(Powell, J., concurring) (“But in some cases the original grounds supporting the warrant could be 
disproved by subsequent investigation that at the same time turns up wholly new evidence 
supporting probable cause on a different theory.”). 
322 See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning the New Exclu-
sionary Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623, 648-52 (2014) (discussing recklessness in the context of Fourth 
Amendment violations).  
323 Cf., e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping 
of Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois’ Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 337, 385-88 
 
  
2015] Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion 393 
 
using big data to determine reasonable suspicion might actually prevent 
certain stops that would have been allowed under a traditional, small data 
reasonable suspicion standard.  
3. Accountability 
Focusing on big data sources also provides the potential for increased 
documentation of stops. In general, police do not document their suspicions 
before a stop, nor does anyone do so on their behalf.324 Data-driven suspicion, 
though, can be documented beforehand. Police officers could demonstrate 
the steps they took to investigate a suspect by producing records of which 
databases they accessed and which search queries they used. In this way, 
police would replace the ex post justification for a stop with an ex ante 
description of the steps taken to validate a hunch before conducting a stop. 
In simple terms, a police officer could show that she checked the NCIC 
database and ran a license plate check before explaining why this infor-
mation corroborated her initial suspicion. This record has the potential not 
only to limit whom police stop, but also to make a judge’s determination of 
an officer’s reasonable suspicion significantly easier. 
This documentation will also encourage the development of a culture 
that allows for auditing of data, standards for record collection, and perhaps 
even notice requirements for targeted suspects. For example, police admin-
istrators, as an internal monitoring strategy, might examine an officer’s 
history of stops to see what factors influenced his decision to stop a suspect. 
Looking through the documented history of big data searches and comparing 
them with the justifications for a stop might help police develop better 
training tools and build stronger accountability measures. Independent of 
any court case, internal monitoring measures can improve hit rates for 
arrests. In other data-driven contexts, these types of retention and accounta-
bility efforts are built into the regulating structure.325  
 
(2001) (discussing a proposed law in Illinois that would have required videotaping confessions for 
certain crimes and made inadmissible confessions not videotaped). 
324 Many police officers are required to document certain police–citizen encounters after the 
fact. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in 
New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 487-88 (2000) (describing the NYPD’s use of UF-250 
cards to record police–citizen encounters). 
325 Cf., e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO 
THIRD PARTY RECORDS § 25-7.1 (3d ed. 2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/third_party_access.authcheckdam.pdf (recommend-
ing accountability mechanisms for databases used by law enforcement). 
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4. Efficiency 
A move toward data-driven policing will also improve the efficient use 
of police resources. In many cases, better information will lead police to 
focus scarce resources on more serious risks and prevent unnecessary 
contacts with law-abiding citizens.  
The rise of predictive policing signals the beginning of this shift to data-
driven tips.326 Underlying the theory of predictive policing is the idea that 
areas statistically more likely to have crime should have an additional police 
presence.327 The data guide the officer patrol patterns, down to the particular 
time, date, and location.328 While not replacing police patrols in other areas, 
police seek to target the areas identified through data.329 Police administrators 
 
326 See generally Ferguson, Predictive Policing, supra note 29, at 265-69 (discussing the use of 
algorithms to predict crime and allocate law enforcement resources). 
327 See Braga et al., supra note 225, at 9 (“Criminological evidence on the spatial concentra-
tion of crime suggests that a small number of highly active micro places in cities—frequently 
called ‘hot spots’—may be primarily responsible for overall citywide crime trends.”); see also Joel 
M. Caplan et al., Risk Terrain Modeling: Brokering Criminological Theory and GIS Methods for Crime 
Forecasting, 28 JUST. Q. 360, 364 (2011) (“While a crime event occurs at a finite place, risk is a 
continuous dynamic value that increases or decreases intensity and clusters or dissipates in 
different places over time, even places remote from a crime event.”); Shane D. Johnson et al., 
Offender as Forager? A Direct Test of the Boost Account of Victimization, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 181, 184 (2009) (positing that the clustering of crimes could be explained by 
optimal foraging strategies); Shane D. Johnson et al., Space–Time Patterns of Risk: A Cross National 
Assessment of Residential Burglary Victimization, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 201, 203-04 
(2007) (“Most criminals commit crimes in areas with which they are already familiar.”); Ashley B. 
Pitcher & Shane D. Johnson, Exploring Theories of Victimization Using a Mathematical Model of 
Burglary, 48 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 83, 85-86 (2011) (discussing two theories that seek to 
explain the near-repeat phenomenon). 
328 See generally Goode, supra note 226, at A11 (reporting on anticipatory police deployments 
in Santa Cruz, California); Predictive Policing: Don’t Even Think About It, ECONOMIST, July 20, 
2013, at 24, 24-26 (describing data-driven police resource allocation); Leslie A. Gordon, Predictive 
Policing May Help Bag Burglars—But It May Also Be a Constitutional Problem, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 1, 
2013, 3:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/predictive_policing_may_help_bag_ 
burglars--but_it_may_also_be_a_constitutio/, archived at http://perma.cc/J3L3-U9NN (discussing 
constitutional concerns relating to predictive policing); Kaste, supra note 219 (reporting on 
forward-looking policing strategies used in Seattle and other cities).  
329 See Charlie Beck & Colleen McCue, Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn from Wal-
Mart and Amazon About Fighting Crime in a Recession?, POLICE CHIEF (Nov. 2009), 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1942
&issue_id=112009, archived at http://perma.cc/D6DP-UYAS (“Predictive policing allows command 
staff and police managers to leverage advanced analytics in support of meaningful, information-
based tactics, strategy, and policy decisions in the applied public safety environment. As the law 
enforcement community increasingly is asked to do more with less, predictive policing represents 
an opportunity to prevent crime and respond more effectively, while optimizing increasingly 
scarce or limited resources, including personnel.”). 
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have embraced predictive policing because it allows them to allocate 
resources more efficiently while at the same time reducing crime. 
Similarly, collecting data on individuals or groups perceived to be at 
high risk of entering the criminal justice system allows for a more focused 
use of police resources. Joint federal and state fusion centers have evolved 
to tackle gang and gun violence.330 In these collaborative centers, police, 
with the help of technology, identify and map individuals by known gang 
associations, ethnicity, age, race, address, and social connections.331 In 
Washington, D.C., one early partnership between federal and local law 
enforcement resulted in a “gang audit” that “helped identify 136 of the most 
violent gang/crew members in three of the highest crime areas in D.C.”332 
People identified by police as involved in gangs faced targeted interven-
tions, including face-to-face meetings, evictions from public housing, and 
criminal prosecution.333 By mapping and targeting only those statistically 
most likely to be involved in criminal activity, the police attempted to 
address violence in the community proactively. This was the thinking 
behind the Chicago “heat list,” and the approach has the benefit of focusing 
resources on those more likely to be involved in crime—whether as perpe-
trators or victims. While predictive policing practices raise a host of fairness 
concerns, from an efficiency perspective, recent innovations appear to have 
been a success.  
5. Unexpected Insights 
Big data also allows for unexpected insights from the collection of vast 
amounts of seemingly innocuous information. To package crack cocaine, a 
drug dealer needs tiny plastic bags and a scale.334 To fire a gun, a shooter 
 
330 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FUSION CENTER GUIDELINES: DEVELOPING AND SHARING 
INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE IN A NEW ERA F-3 (2006), available at 
http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines.pdf (defining a fusion center as “[a] 
collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and/or infor-
mation . . . with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, apprehend, and respond to 
criminal and terrorism activity”); see also Mimi Hall, Feds Move to Share Intelligence Faster, USA 
TODAY, July 27, 2006, at 3A (reporting that state fusion centers are run by “state police, FBI 
agents, National Guard, health officials and others”). 
331 Cf., e.g., Kelly, supra note 152 (describing the rise in use of cell phone information-
gathering devices by police departments). 
332 SCOTT DECKER ET AL., PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS: STRATEGIC INTERVEN-
TIONS 18 (2007), available at https://www.bja.gov/publications/strategic_prob_solving.pdf. 
333 Id. at 17-19.  
334 See United States v. Dingle, 114 F.3d 307, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recounting expert testi-
mony on practices used by drug dealers for packaging and distributing crack cocaine). 
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needs a bullet.335 To break into a car, a thief needs tools (modern or old 
fashioned).336 By tracking the sale of these items, police can recognize 
patterns and thus identify the criminals making the purchases. Similarly, 
most major criminal enterprises must launder money and otherwise hide 
illicit proceeds.337 Unusual deposits, purchases, or money transfers can allow 
police to identify money laundering and the people involved.338  
Incorporating geographic data can reveal patterns of location in an  
otherwise fluid criminal environment. Knowing where particular crimes 
occur can allow for more targeted suppression strategies. Big data allows for 
better tracking of national (or transnational) crimes, including human 
trafficking, drug smuggling, and credit card fraud.339 For example, Google 
and others have partnered with three international antitrafficking nonprofits 
to track where calls for assistance originate to better map and disrupt 
human trafficking.340 Similarly, hospital overdose admissions could reveal 
 
335 For an interesting story on how data about guns used in violent crime can be tracked and 
studied, see David S. Fallis, Tracing Secrets, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2010, at A1, which reports the 
findings of a Washington Post investigation into the sources of guns used in crimes—most notably 
that one dealer sold more than 2500 guns later recovered by police. 
336 See, e.g., Today: Rossen Reports (NBC television broadcast June 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.today.com/news/police-admit-theyre-stumped-mystery-car-thefts-6C10169993 (reporting 
on a series of car thefts committed using a device that quickly bypasses electronic locks).  
337 Jimmy Gurulé, The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating a New Federal Offense or 
Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative Means of Punishing Specified Unlawful Activity?, 32 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823, 823 (1995) (describing money laundering as the “lifeblood” of organized 
crime); see also Money Laundering Legislation: Hearing on S. 572, S. 1335, and S. 1385 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 30 (1985) (statement of Sen. DeConcini, Member, S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary) (“Without the means to launder money, thereby making cash generated by a 
criminal enterprise appear to come from a legitimate source, organized crime could not flourish as 
it now does.”). 
338 See, e.g., Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards 
on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 503, 527-28 
(2011) (describing the “red flags” used by the Treasury Department’s financial intelligence unit, 
FinCEN, to identify money laundering). 
339 See, e.g., Philip K. Chan et al., Distributed Data Mining in Credit Card Fraud Detection, 
IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 67, 68 (providing technical details of specific 
credit card fraud identification algorithms); Scott R. Peppet, Prostitution 3.0?, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
1989, 2039-40 (2013) (suggesting data with which to estimate the likelihood that a prostitute is a 
victim of human trafficking); Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on 
Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. REV. 951, 964 (2006) (discussing the “out of pattern” system for identifying 
credit card fraud). 
340 Bernhard Warner, Google Turns to Big Data to Unmask Human Traffickers, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-04-10/google-turns-to-
big-data-to-unmask-human-traffickers, archived at http://perma.cc/3CSC-RDUJ (“The [Google-led] 
alliance . . . means the three anti-trafficking networks . . . will share data on where the 
emergency phone calls are originating, the ages of the victims, their home countries, and the types 
of criminal activities they have been forced into. . . . [T]he agencies will be able to crunch data 
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drug use patterns. Social media trends may reveal clues about gang activi-
ties,341 prostitution services,342 or cybercrime.343  
Patterns of crime can also reveal the locations of criminal actors. Police 
can link certain getaway routes to robbery hotspots.344 Locations of gunshots 
can reveal shifting gang-related turf borders.345 Social services visits to 
monitor “stay-away orders” can reveal potential locations of future domestic 
violence.346 Even the type of alcohol sold at stores and restaurants can 
correlate with the rate of violent crime in a neighborhood.347 These insights 
can help police investigate and prevent crime and would not have been 
easily observed before the advent of big data. 
 
like this in real time to detect crime trends that they can then share with police and policymakers 
to help protect victims.”). 
341 See, e.g., Ben Austen, Public Enemies: Social Media Is Fueling Gang Wars in Chicago, WIRED 
(Sept. 17, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/09/gangs-of-social-media/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3L5H-L2M2 (describing escalating gang tensions via Twitter and YouTube). 
342 See, e.g., Erica Fink & Laurie Segall, Pimps Hit Social Networks to Recruit Underage Sex 
Workers, CNNMONEY, (Feb. 27, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/27/technology/ 
social/pimps-social-networks, archived at http://perma.cc/S4BU-LEUK (reporting on the use of 
Facebook and other social media sites to lure victims into becoming sex workers). 
343 See generally Online Privacy, Social Networking, and Crime Victimization: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5-12 
(2010) (statement of Gordon M. Snow, Asst. Dir., FBI) (discussing ways in which cybercriminals 
use social media to deceive victims). 
344 JENNIFER BACHNER, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T, PREDICTIVE POLICING: PRE-
VENTING CRIME WITH DATA AND ANALYTICS 15-16 (2013), available at http://www.businessof 
government.org/sites/default/files/Predictive%20Policing.pdf. (suggesting that criminals prefer 
“areas with desirable escape routes,” including “[a]reas in close proximity to features such as 
interstate highways, bridges, and tunnels”). 
345 See Andras Petho, David S. Fallis & Dan Keating, Acoustic Sensors Reveal Hidden Depth of 
Gun Use in D.C., WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2013, at A1 (describing data from the District of Columbia’s 
acoustic “ShotSpotter” system, which had identified 39,000 separate instances of gunfire, many of 
which were clustered geographically). 
346 Goldstein, supra note 294, at A1 (discussing efforts by the NYPD to reduce domestic 
violence). 
347 Robert Lipton et al., The Geography of Violence, Alcohol Outlets, and Drug Arrests in Boston, 
108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 657, 661 (2013) (suggesting “a positive relationship between violent 
crime and the presence of package stores,” but “a negative relationship between violent crime and 
the presence of restaurants selling beer and wine.”); see also Press Release, Univ. of Mich. Health 
Sys., Could a Computer on the Police Beat Prevent Violence? (Feb. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.uofmhealth.org/news/archive/201302/could-computer-police-beat-prevent-violence 
(“Results from the study indicate that types and densities of alcohol outlets were directly related to 
violent crimes despite the fact that alcohol outlets are typically viewed as locations in which other 
population or environmental factors, such as poverty or prostitution, relate to the violence.”). 
  
398 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 327 
 
B. The Negatives of Big Data Suspicion 
While big data offers much promise, big data–driven policing also has 
potential negative consequences. This Section outlines a few representative 
concerns.  
1. Bad Data 
A system based on data requires accurate, up-to-date information.348 
One concern with a vast, ever-growing, networked data system is that the 
quality controls on shared data are almost nonexistent.349 Police may rely on 
existing data without any knowledge of how the data was collected or 
whether mechanisms exist to ensure its accuracy. Data problems have 
emerged even within locally controlled systems350 and certainly arise when 
jurisdictions share information.351 Reputed “gang lists” used by police have 
been shown to be inaccurate.352 Arrest reports can be inaccurate or erroneous 
 
348 Cope, supra note 24, at 193 (“Data quality affected the development of analysis. Analysts 
frequently found crucial details missing from intelligence reports for their products.”). 
349 See, e.g., Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-
Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 126 (2009) (noting that while most databases are supposed to 
be subject to quality control, “[i]n reality . . . , the evidence is overwhelming that the control 
measures currently in place regularly fail, either due to lack of resources, skill, or because they are 
simply neglected”); Wright, supra note 121, at 122 (finding quality control lacking in one database 
where no reports were questioned by superiors; the officers making some of the reports had no 
gang experience, and there were no reviews for accuracy). 
350 See Jeff Morganteen, What the CompStat Audit Reveals About the NYPD, N.Y. WORLD 
( July 3, 2013), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2013/07/03/compstat/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
K4ZP-KR4L (“The outside audit . . . not only confirmed that such data manipulation takes place 
but found several weak points in the ways the department tracks and uncovers it.”); see also DAVID 
N. KELLEY & SHARON L. MCCARTHY, THE REPORT OF THE CRIME REPORTING REVIEW 
COMMITTEE TO COMMISSIONER RAYMOND W. KELLY CONCERNING COMPSTAT AUDITING 
47 (2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/crime_ 
reporting_review_committee_final_report_2013.pdf (“[T]he patterns of the misclassified reports 
support in some measure the anecdotal accounts . . . that certain types of incidents may be 
downgraded as a matter of practice in some precincts.”).  
351 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The risk of 
error stemming from these databases is not slim. Herring’s amici warn that law enforcement 
databases are insufficiently monitored and often out of date. Government reports describe, for 
example, flaws in NCIC databases, terrorist watchlist databases, and databases associated with the 
Federal Government’s employment eligibility verification system.” (footnotes and citation 
omitted)). 
352 See, e.g., Mitnick, supra note 349, at 126; Wright, supra note 121, at 129 (“In sum, gang 
databases appear to be riddled with factual inaccuracies, administrative errors, lack of compliance 
with departmental guidelines, and lack of oversight.”). 
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but remain in public and private databases.353 The FBI’s own files—used for 
millions of background checks—reportedly contain hundreds of thousands 
of errors.354 Worse, there is no simple mechanism to clear the bad data from 
a web of networked systems all sharing the same errors.355  
Adding private, third-party sources of information only compounds the 
problem. CBS News’s 60 Minutes reported that “as many as forty million 
Americans have a mistake on their credit report. Twenty million have 
significant mistakes.”356 These are the same credit report datasets that 
underlie many commercial big data systems. Both discovering and correcting 
mistakes is difficult; it requires knowledge of the error and the wherewithal 
to change it. Police agents accessing records, however, would have no 
knowledge that an error existed—or even necessarily a way to check the 
accuracy of the data. Mistakes can occur at any point in the process from 
collection to entry to analysis. In addition, data can grow stale. Typographical 
errors can lead to erroneous linkages.357 These mistakes can have real 
consequences on individual liberty. As Justice Ginsburg warned: 
Inaccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic infor-
mation raise grave concerns for individual liberty. The offense to the dignity 
of the citizen who is arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a public street 
simply because some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate computer 
data base is evocative of the use of general warrants that so outraged the 
authors of our Bill of Rights.358  
 
353 Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial Disparate Impact of Pre-Employment 
Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 231, 246-48 (2012) (highlighting 
the high cost of false positives in pre-employment queries of criminal records databases). 
354 See Ylan Q. Mui, Use of FBI Database in Hiring Raises Concerns, WASH. POST, July 30, 
2013, at A1 (discussing a report by the National Employment Law Project on errors in FBI 
background checks).  
355 See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Lost in Translation? Data Mining, National Security and the “Ad-
verse Inference” Problem, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 757, 775-76 (2006) 
(discussing reports of errors and inaccuracies in credit reports); Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data 
Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 298 (2011) (discussing the problem of errors 
in data mining processes). 
356 60 Minutes: 40 Million Mistakes: Is Your Credit Report Accurate? (CBS television broadcast 
Feb. 10, 2013), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57567957/credit/.  
357 Cf. Wayne J. Pitts, From the Benches and Trenches: Dealing with Outstanding Warrants for 
Deceased Individuals: A Research Brief, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 220 (2009) (describing a study that 
discovered numerous errors in a warrant database, including incorrect social security numbers, 
inaccurate names, and “illogical birth dates,” and noting that “none of the[] issues are surprising or 
unusual given the nature of the population being tracked”). 
358 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155-56 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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The lack of transparency in these data systems only increases the chance 
of error. Police systems are usually restricted to authorized police users. 
Private companies, seeking commercial gain, have little incentive to reveal 
the workings of proprietary systems or the data thereby collected. No 
agency has the responsibility to audit the growing governmental and 
commercial big data network. While the Federal Trade Commission has 
promised to monitor private big data companies,359 it has little ability to 
examine the data itself and has no role in oversight of law enforcement use 
of the data. Though oversight institutions do exist (including courts, 
congressional committees, and independent agencies),360 the volume of 
information at issue prevents these groups from examining the quality of 
the data or the magnitude of the errors.361 Without transparency, there can 
be little hope for accountability to ensure that data systems will be suffi-
ciently reliable to justify altering constitutional rights.362 In short, big data 
suspicion may be based on bad data.  
 
359 See Brendan Sasso, FTC Chief Targets Firms with Vast Databases, HILL (Aug. 19, 2013, 9:12 
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/317729-ftc-chief-targets-firms-with-vast-databases, archived 
at http://perma.cc/8HTB-SE4W (reporting that the head of the FTC stated that the agency “will 
use its power to punish deceptive business practices [and] to crack down on firms that fail to live 
up to their own promises about how they will use their customers’ data”). See generally FTC, DATA 
BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 46-56 (2014), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-
report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf (presenting findings of an 
FTC study of large data brokers and recommending reforms). 
360 For example, the House Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence have legislative oversight of the intelligence agencies. The House Committee on the 
Judiciary, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the House Committee on Homeland Security, 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and others have 
oversight of domestic surveillance. Independent agencies such as the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board have general oversight. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court provides 
some judicial oversight. General counsels and inspectors general add additional layers of 
protection.  
361 For example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court released a redacted opinion 
offering insight into problems with overcollection of phone records by the National Security 
Agency. See [Redacted], [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011). In its October 
2011 opinion, the court revealed that it could review only samples of the NSA-collected data due to 
the incredible number of search queries and volume of data involved with the NSA’s operations. 
See id. at *10; see also In re Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], 2013 
WL 5741573, at *10-14 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (No. BR 13-109) (setting guidelines for review of 
NSA metadata-related surveillance programs); MAJORITY STAFF, SENATE COMM. ON COM-
MERCE, SCI. & TRANSP., 113TH CONGRESS., A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: 
COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES (2013), 
available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0d2b3642-6221-4888-
a631-08f2f255b577 (providing an example of a congressional investigation into data brokers and the 
collection of personal information). 
362 See Solove, Data Mining, supra note 177, at 359 (“Another key issue regarding the liberty 
side of the balance is transparency—the degree of openness by which a particular security measure 
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2. False Positives 
Even assuming “good data,” big data reasonable suspicion will result in 
false positives whereby police stop innocent people.363 This burden will fall 
most heavily on individuals who have some criminal history, but who are 
not currently engaging in criminal activity.364 Predictive analytics will 
suggest suspicion based on an identified correlation, but such suspicion will 
often be unfounded. Perhaps a license plate reader will place the car of a 
convicted burglar within a predicted burglary hotspot, which also happens 
to be next to the convicted burglar’s grandmother’s house. Police might stop 
the suspected burglar solely because of this correlation. One can imagine 
that those individuals who find themselves on a “bad guy list” will be 
marked for more than their fair share of borderline suspicious stops.365  
Big data suspicion creates the real concern that certain individuals by 
virtue of their past criminal activities will always be at risk to be stopped. 
Those with lengthy criminal records or gang associations may be stopped 
because of who they are and not what they are doing. Prior police contacts 
will become the digital “scarlet letter” marking certain people in a commu-
nity as suspicious.366  
Over the past several decades, poor people and people of color have had 
disproportionate contact with the criminal justice system.367 If these 
contacts become data points that can be used in a reasonable suspicion 
analysis, then these data may become proxies for race or class (with similar 
 
is carried out. Transparency is essential to promote accountability and to provide the public with a 
way to ensure that government officials are not engaging in abuse.”). 
363 Cf. Taslitz, supra note 311, at 10 (“Any concept of reasonable suspicion . . . that tolerates 
massive false negative rates—frequent invasions of privacy, property, and locomotive rights that 
ensnare the apparently innocent—is a flawed conception. The costs imposed on communities and 
individuals become great, while little in the way of crime-control efforts is achieved.”). 
364 See supra Part III. 
365 Of course, these individuals might also be targeted without a big data–inspired list.  
366 See David Wolitz, The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil Disabilities, and the Right to 
Clear One’s Name, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1277, 1316 (arguing that a criminal conviction is a “uniquely 
stigmatizing piece of information” and that it disproportionately affects a person’s reputational 
profile). 
367 See Robin Walker Sterling, Raising Race, CHAMPION, Apr. 2011, at 24, 24-25 (“The criminal 
justice system has exploded outside of the prison walls, as well. As of 2009, the number of people 
under criminal justice supervision—including those who are in jail, in prison, on probation, and on 
parole—totaled 7.2 million people. In a dismaying parallel to incarceration rates, people of color 
are also overrepresented among arrestees, probationers, and parolees. There are more African 
Americans under correctional control today than were enslaved in 1850. . . . With numbers like 
these, it is clear that this overrepresentation of minorities in the criminal justice system, or 
disproportionate minority contact (DMC), is one of the major human rights violations of our 
time.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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effect). For example, the ACLU’s recent national study on marijuana arrests 
demonstrates that African Americans are more likely to be arrested for 
marijuana than whites, despite equivalent usage rates.368 Thus, more data 
has been collected about minority marijuana possession, even though whites 
commit the crime at the same rate. If data are collected only about certain 
classes of people, then those people are more likely to become future targets 
of suspicion simply because of the initial selection bias. Thus, important 
questions remain about who collects, interprets, and chooses the big data to 
study.369  
Worse, like other quantitative systems used for decisionmaking, big data–
based predictive policing will appear to be objective and fair when it may in 
fact reflect subjective factors and structural inequalities. Just as we have 
credit ratings that allow lenders to predict future creditworthiness, police 
could develop “criminal ratings” to predict future criminal proclivity.370  
Similarly, data can lead us to believe our own worst instincts.371 If  
published data demonstrate a higher arrest rate for people of color, then this 
information may well influence discretionary decisions about who to stop.372 
Implicit bias and confirmation bias will result in police seeing what they have 
been told to see, even if it is not actually occurring.373 Implicit bias involves 
unconscious prejudices that influence individuals making discretionary 
 
368 ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 17-22 (2013), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu-thewaronmarijuana-rel2.pdf (reporting that blacks are roughly 
four times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than whites despite similar usage 
rates); see also Steven Nelson, ACLU Marijuana Study: Blacks More Likely to be Busted, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. ( June 4, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/ 
2013/06/04/aclu-marijuana-study-blacks-more-likely-to-be-busted, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
W5DS-ZBUG (reporting on the ACLU study). 
369 See Cohen, supra note 7, at 1922 (“It is beyond serious question that the techniques that 
comprise Big Data offer vitally important strategies for promoting human flourishing in an 
increasingly complex, crowded, and interdependent world. But those techniques cannot themselves 
decide which questions to investigate, cannot instruct us how to place data flows and patterns in 
larger conceptual or normative perspective, and cannot tell us whether and when it might be fair 
and just to limit data processing in the service of other values.”). 
370 Thank you to the discussants at Northeastern University School of Law’s Legal Scholarship 
4.0 conference for developing the concept of “criminal ratings.” 
371 Thank you to the discussants at the criminal law professor workshop at the Washington 
College of Law, American University, for developing this argument.  
372 Cf. Taslitz, supra note 311, at 44-45 (discussing the potential for extrapolation from past 
experience despite insufficient information). 
373 See Tracey G. Gove, Implicit Bias and Law Enforcement, POLICE CHIEF, Oct. 2011, at 44, 
50 (“The study of implicit bias has important implications for police leaders. Police officers are 
human and, as the theory contends, may be affected by implicit biases just as any other individual. In 
other words, well-intentioned officers who err may do so not as a result of intentional discrimination, 
but because they have what has been proffered as widespread human biases.”). 
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decisions.374 This can result in unequal outcomes for similarly situated 
individuals.375 Implicit bias inevitably exists in the ordinary course of police 
activities, but is even more damaging when combined with confirmation 
bias: “the tendency to bolster a hypothesis by seeking consistent evidence 
while minimizing inconsistent evidence.”376 Thus, an officer conditioned to 
believe that a particular type of person may be more likely to commit a 
criminal act will likely see that person through the lens of suspicion. By 
providing the information to confirm this suspicion, big data will make it 
easier for police to justify a stop. Even more dangerously, an officer with 
discriminatory animus may be able to justify a knowingly unconstitutional 
stop using an aggregation of otherwise innocent data.377 
This risk demonstrates how suspicions about past criminal actions can 
all too easily morph into suspicions about current criminal activity. It 
highlights the importance of requiring a nexus between the suspected 
criminal and the suspected criminal activity. It also highlights the dangers 
of how big data can target certain populations based on correlations with 
possible criminal activity, rather than causation from real criminal activity. 
Justification to stop these individuals—marked by big data—will be too 
easily met, undermining the individualized and particularized protections in 
the Fourth Amendment.  
3. Shifting Power Balance 
The Constitution establishes a power-sharing relationship between citi-
zens and the government. The Fourth Amendment, like other parts of the 
Bill of Rights, represents a check on government power.378 The probable 
cause standard, and to a lesser extent, the reasonable suspicion standard, 
limits the actions of government agents. Big data, by weakening the reasonable 
 
374 Richardson, supra note 312, at 271-72. 
375 See Mary Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 192 (2013) 
(“A rich body of literature has documented how implicit biases—negative perceptions of minori-
ties that may unconsciously lurk despite best intentions—impact the judgment of an array of 
actors, such as police, prosecutors, and jurors.”). 
376 Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors That Aggravate and Counteract 
Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 315, 315 (2009); see also 
id. at 318 (noting that “[p]olice investigators are also prone to confirmation bias”). 
377 See Richard Winton et al., LAPD to Build Data on Muslim Areas, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2007, at A1 (describing a police initiative to identify areas “at-risk” for terrorist activities based on 
ethnicity); Richard Winton et al., Outcry Over Muslim Mapping, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at A1 
(same). 
378 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (noting that the purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment is to protect against “arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforce-
ment officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals”). 
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suspicion standard, restructures this relationship, with police gaining more 
power and citizens losing a measure of liberty. Though citizens are complicit 
in giving up much of that information to third parties, the government now 
has more information and can use that information to investigate.379 
Possessing the information, and letting citizens know the government 
possesses the information, might alone shape individual choices. Citizens 
may be more reluctant to associate with certain groups, participate in 
certain activities, or even take political stances because of the information 
the government knows about their private lives.380 The collection of the 
information may be as threatening as its potential use.381 Privacy scholars 
have ably addressed this issue as a consequence of the new big data world.382 
And, for police–citizen encounters on the street, this informational power 
could alter behavior. 
V. TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
This Article is an attempt to sketch the potential impact of big data  
information on a small data reasonable suspicion doctrine. It has exposed 
real distortions and potential vulnerabilities, as well as clear advantages, that 
arise from this technological innovation. The debate over big data is noisy 
and contested, perhaps revealing its immature state of development. This 
last Part addresses tentative solutions in this changed landscape.  
 
379 See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 118 (2008) (“[T]he govern-
ment’s law enforcement power is unique. . . . The ability of government to intrude, monitor, 
punish, and regulate is greater than that of private actors by many orders of magnitude. But more 
than this, the state has a right and duty to intrude into people’s lives that private parties do 
not. . . . But precisely because the state’s law enforcement power gives it a license to intrude into 
our homes and lives in ways that private parties cannot, the state poses dangers to a free citizenry 
that private parties do not.”). 
380 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1946-48 (2013) 
(discussing the dangers to intellectual privacy from surveillance). 
381 Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 49, 60 (1995) (“Particularly in light of new technology, privacy is threatened as much 
by what law enforcement authorities do with information as by the original acquisition itself.”). 
382 See generally Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 
257-73 (2012) (suggesting that expanded tort law could help address violations of data privacy, 
including harm from subsequent disclosures); Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of 
the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1076 (1995) 
(discussing the demise of the tort of public disclosure of private facts and the resulting gap in 
privacy law); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 
1334-35 (2012) (arguing that in a world of vanishing privacy, a view of the Fourth Amendment as 
addressing a balance of power between government and the people is more appropriate than 
limiting it strictly to a right to privacy). 
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A. Doctrinal Changes 
Initially, we could simply require a more stringent standard of reasonable 
suspicion. To be clear, the Supreme Court has been steadfast in articulating 
that it has no intention of quantifying—or even clarifying—the standard, 
instead recognizing that police officers operate within “the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
men, not legal technicians, act.”383 But if the underlying logic of a standard 
based on unknown suspects has been upended by all-knowing technology, 
then perhaps the standard needs to be altered. The “factual and practical 
considerations” are no longer limited to small data observations, so why 
shouldn’t the factual and practical considerations include requiring more 
data now easily available? One could imagine that in the context of big data 
predictive suspicion, where police can more easily access information, courts 
might require more information to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard.384  
In practical terms, this could result in a different standard of reasonable 
suspicion when big data information is used. If big data makes more 
information available with relatively little effort, then big data should be 
required to be part of the reasonable suspicion calculus. This would include 
both potentially suspicious and potentially exculpatory information. After 
all, if the original justification for reasonable suspicion arose out of a 
situation necessarily limited by practicality (unknown suspect, potentially 
imminent crime, limited information), then better information about a 
known suspect suggests a different standard should be used.385  
B. Big Data Changes 
If changing the standard of reasonable suspicion is not a realistic option, 
then perhaps the solution lies in the nature of big data itself. At its core, big 
data encourages a heightened focus on (1) statistical analysis, (2) geospatial 
 
383 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
231 (1983)). 
384 While beyond the scope of this Article, there may be an unarticulated taxonomy of  
reasonable suspicion that applies differently in different circumstances based on the type of crime 
at issue. It may be that an analysis of big data’s impact simply reveals this unacknowledged truth.  
385 One reason the Terry court seemed willing to create a standard less than probable cause 
was because practicality demanded it. Detective McFadden simply could not obtain any other 
information about John Terry without stopping him. If McFadden let the suspects go, he might 
never have been able to identify them. Big data suspicion changes one part of that calculus—
information is now available to police without leaving the scene. Information about the suspect 
may alter the level of suspicion, even in potentially violent and imminent crimes. In addition, 
identifying suspects for certain possession offenses may allow police to monitor the suspects 
without necessarily stopping them at that moment.  
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and temporal analysis, and (3) link analysis. Adapting these three methods 
of analysis to big data suspicion on the streets might provide some precision 
and, thus, some limitation for an otherwise malleable standard. 
1. Statistical Analysis 
First, big data not only involves making predictions, but also quantify-
ing the likelihood that these predictions will come true. The statistical 
analysis behind the predictive analytics provides actual, observable num-
bers. For example, a predictive policing algorithm might report a 2.06% 
chance of a burglary on a particular block.386 A pattern match might provide 
police with a percentage likelihood that a particular suspect associates with 
another individual. In these cases, if part of the predictive suspicion of an 
individual comes from big data, courts could require (when available) a 
numerical prediction of accuracy.387 This quantification process would 
necessarily result in courts having to confront the ultimate question of how 
“certain” a police officer must be to constitute reasonable suspicion.388 This 
has been a forbidden discussion in the courts, and the possibility of such a 
discussion would likely forestall any adoption of this proposal. Yet big data 
creates the promise of using quantitative and empirical evidence to refine 
what has ordinarily been a quasi-subjective judgment. Courts and police 
could adapt this hallmark of the big data revolution to sharpen the reasonable 
suspicion analysis. Thus, a court might find a likelihood of 2.06% to be 
insufficient in the reasonable suspicion analysis but a likelihood of 20.06% 
to be enough. Even if courts were unwilling to establish a particular  
percentage threshold as reasonable suspicion, the quantified likelihood could 
still be included in the totality of circumstances calculation.  
Related to this threshold determination would be the more difficult 
question of whether the threshold should change depending on the type of 
crime at issue. Should a 10% predictive judgment be enough for a murder 
investigation but not a drug crime? Should the scale be a sliding one based 
 
386 Kalee Thompson, The Santa Cruz Experiment, POPULAR SCI., Nov. 2011, at 38, 40  
(describing a prediction in Santa Cruz, California, that on “Linden Street, where, the statistics 
reveal, there is a 2.06 percent chance of a crime happening today, and 3:1 odds that a crime, should 
it occur, will be a home break-in versus an auto theft”). 
387 See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 68, at 1607-22 (discussing cases in which courts have 
handled evidence of and sought to define “high-crime” areas). 
388 See, e.g., Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 
958 (2009) (arguing that judges should be allowed to consider success rates when dealing with 
probable cause claims and warrants); Taslitz, supra note 315, at 202-04 (discussing the qualitative 
and quantitative requirements the Supreme Court uses for anticipatory warrants).  
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on risk of harm to society?389 Again, going back to first principles, Terry 
involved a potential armed robbery. This may be different than a potential 
shoplifting offense. Risk assessment mechanisms already exist that use an 
adjusted actuarial model that starts with a fixed percentage and then adjusts 
based on other factors.390 While not perfectly aligned, this type of model 
may prove useful in designing a quantifiable percentage that courts would 
be comfortable adopting.  
At this early stage of the development of big data, any normative argu-
ment about how statistical precision should be incorporated into a police 
officer’s calculations will ultimately be unsatisfying. The algorithms do not 
yet exist that would project numerical likelihoods. While one could demand 
a specific numerical target, we simply do not know how big data technology 
will be integrated in everyday policing, nor do we know how data will 
influence police officers’ discretionary decisions. The focus of this Article is 
to highlight the existence of big data policing and, instead of ignoring it or 
pretending it will not affect police officers on the street, make courts and 
scholars aware of the constitutional concerns.  
2. Precision of Place and Time 
Second, in evaluating big data’s influence, courts could focus on the  
precision of the data, in terms of place and time, to observe how the data 
correlate with the predicted suspicion. Big data’s value as a predictive tool 
involves its ability to drill down to specific factors that identify a specific 
person, at a specific time, at a specific place. Because all predictions might 
come true at a certain level of abstraction, big data also poses risks. An 
officer who sees a suspect on the street outside the jewelry store and looks 
up the suspect’s criminal history, which includes several theft convictions, 
would at one level have persuasive information to consider in the totality of 
circumstances. If after further examination, however, the officer found that 
the thefts were exclusively downloading digital music, the data would not 
support suspicion of a jewelry store robbery. Or, if the timing of the prior 
thefts were several years old or in another state, the correlation might not 
be strong. Reliance on big data—because it can provide granular information 
on particular events or linkages—should also necessitate a requirement of 
 
389 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 50-
58 (2003) (discussing proportionality and consistency principles). 
390 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 277, 
288-93 (2006) (highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of using actuarial prediction 
techniques and clinical techniques). 
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precision. A requirement of geospatial and temporal precision would 
provide some measure of protection. 
As a related point, if the reasonable suspicion standard incorporated an 
“imminence requirement” such that the predicted crime must be imminent 
or occurring, the general suspicion created by big data would be limited. 
Such a requirement would conflict with Hensley (which allows for reasonable 
suspicion of already completed crimes),391 but would provide a counterweight 
to the power of general suspicion of some unstated “criminal activity.” 
Police officers would need to be able to articulate the particular crime that 
was imminent based on the data or be foreclosed from using the information. 
Grafting on an imminence requirement could offer more protection within 
the existing reasonable suspicion analysis.  
Requiring a heightened level of technological precision is consistent 
with general Fourth Amendment principles requiring particularity and 
individualization392 and preventing arbitrary invasions of individual  
security.393 In addition, the availability of big data sources now allows for 
this level of specificity. The question for reviewing courts will be whether 
to require it. If it were possible to obtain more particularized information 
from available sources, and officers choose not to obtain that information 
instead relying on generalized data, then judges, like they routinely do with 
warrants, could deny the use of generalized data in their reasonable suspi-
cion findings. Judges will be in the best position to make these decisions, 
and the more precision that judges demand, the more incentive there will be 
for police to generate precise information to support their suspicion. 
3. Limited Link Analysis 
Finally, predictive suspicion must embrace the cautions arising from 
link analysis, which examines the connections between data points.394 In the 
context of criminal activity, link analysis refers to the connections between 
criminals and between crimes. Though link analysis can help find matches 
in patterns, identify anomalies where known patterns are absent, and 
discover new patterns, it remains fundamentally overinclusive. There will 
 
391 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227-29 (1985).  
392 For a wonderfully insightful analysis of how individualization has been analyzed in the 
Fourth Amendment context, see Bambauer, supra note 303.  
393 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security in Public, 55 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1283, 1327-31 (2014) (discussing the importance of protecting against 
arbitrary government action as part of the “security” focus of the Fourth Amendment).  
394 Richard Gordon, Terrorism Financing Indicators for Financial Institutions in the United States, 
44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 765, 779 (2012) (“Link analysis explores associations within 
collections of data.”). 
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always be links that demonstrate nothing suspicious. Correlations do not 
prove causation.  
In order to overcome uncertainty in data, analysts have to go beyond 
direct links (sometimes several links or “hops” out) and instead look for 
approximations in identifying data. This indirectness invites error in 
identification. People have the same names.395 People are related to crimi-
nals without being criminals themselves. People forsake the criminal life.396 
In a wired world, people are more closely connected than we think.  
Researchers have validated the “six degrees of separation” theory in the 
information age.397 One study of Facebook users showed that the “average 
number of acquaintances separating any two people in the world was not six 
but 4.74.”398 Thus, a link analysis that goes out three “hops” can cast a very 
wide net, accidentally capturing many people who are only suspicious by 
this loose, associative relationship.  
 In response, predictive suspicion based on link analysis must demand a 
tighter connection between suspects. Courts must not blindly accept 
associational suspicion created by an algorithm stretched to link two people. 
Instead, the link must be tightly controlled. Currently, no rules govern 
these links, but in order to prevent the use of associational correlations to 
determine suspicion, some tighter limits must be required.  
 
395 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-1031, TERRORIST WATCH 
LIST SCREENING: EFFORTS TO HELP REDUCE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE PUBLIC 2 (2006), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061031.pdf (“Because terrorist watch list screening 
involves comparisons based on personal-identifying information such as names and dates of birth, 
there is potential to generate misidentifications—given that two or more persons, for example, 
may have the same or similar names.”); McIntire, supra note 120, at A1 (describing how some 
targets of the government’s terrorist watch list are “victims of errors in judgment or simple 
mistaken identity”).  
396 See generally, e.g., R. DWAYNE BETTS, A QUESTION OF FREEDOM: A MEMOIR OF SUR-
VIVAL, LEARNING, AND COMING OF AGE IN PRISON (2009) (recounting the author’s eight years 
in Virginia prisons and the effect it had on his life); SHON HOPWOOD WITH DENNIS BURKE, 
LAW MAN: MY STORY OF ROBBING BANKS, WINNING SUPREME COURT CASES, AND FINDING 
REDEMPTION (2012) (detailing the life story of a bank robber-turned jailhouse lawyer); Lonnae 
O’Neal Parker, From Inmate to Mentor, Through the Power of Books, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2006, at 
A1 (recounting the story of Dwayne Betts, who served time before reforming and starting a book 
club for youth). 
397 See David Smith, Proof! Just Six Degrees of Separation Between Us, OBSERVER, Aug. 3, 
2008, at 7 (reporting that Microsoft studied email communications and found an average of 6.6 
degrees of separation between any two people). 
398 John Markoff & Somini Sengupta, Separating You and Me? 4.74 Degrees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
21, 2011, at B1. 
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CONCLUSION 
The question that opened this Article was “whether a Fourth Amend-
ment stop can be predicated on the aggregation of specific and individual-
ized, but otherwise noncriminal, factors.”399 In a big data world, the answer 
appears to be—perhaps troublingly—yes, if those particularized factors can 
be connected to observed actions. For those who are concerned that the 
reasonable suspicion standard has already allowed for overly aggressive 
policing, discriminatory policing, and unaccountable policing, this conclu-
sion will only raise the level of concern. At the same time, more accurate 
data may well prevent many of the “rough justice” tactics that are based on 
class, race, or age profiling and that have nothing to do with the actual 
individual involved. 
In either case, the rise of big data is only just beginning. The search for 
new data sources and connections has just commenced, and as society’s 
technological capabilities improve, the law must similarly evolve. Police 
officers on patrol in 2015 may not be able to immediately scan a crowd to 
reveal identities, but that technology is coming.400 As with many technolog-
ical innovations, the law has lagged behind. The concerns raised in this 
Article will soon be addressed by courts forced to confront how to evaluate 
reasonable suspicion in a big data world. Perhaps this change will involve 
new interpretations of the reasonable suspicion standard, or perhaps courts 
(or legislatures) will adopt wholly new legal standards. But, the law will 
have to adapt because the current small data reasonable suspicion standard 
cannot survive the big data era. 
 
 
399 See supra p. 330. 
400 Rushin, supra note 154, at 288 (“Facial recognition software has already been combined 
with video surveillance and used by law enforcement to identify potential suspects amongst large 
crowds.”). 
